Etudes et Travaux

en ligne n° 34

Co-publishing GRET and GLTN-ONU-Habitat

Aurore Mansion and Virginie Rachmuhl

with contributions from Papa Ameth Keita, Benjamin Michelon and Olivier Toutain

Building Cities for All

Lessons from Four African Experiences

LES EDITIONS DU GRET

Document reference:

Mansion, Aurore; Rachmuhl, Virginie, (eds) 2012, *Building cities for all. Lessons from Four African Experiences.* Gret e-publications, Series n°34, joint publication by GLTN/UN-Habitat and GRET, www.gret.org, p.132

Authors: Aurore Mansion (Gret), Virginie Rachmuhl (Gret).

Contributions and input from: Papa Ameth Keita (Senegal, Ingésahel), Benjamin Michelon (Rwanda, EPFL), Olivier Toutain (Morocco, independent consultant).

Translation: Lou Leask

Proofreaders: Christian Castellanet, Aurélie Quentin and Danièle Ribier (Gret), Serge Allou (Cities Alliance), Rémy Sietchiping Jean D'Aragon and Esther Njeri Kihang'ah (GLTN–UN-Habitat), Alain Durand Lasserve (CNRS), Armelle Choplin (Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée)

Technical and financial support: GLTN–UN-Habitat and Gret.

Field(s): Urban development, habitat, urban policies, right to the city.

Geographic zones: Morocco, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal.

Key words: Land tenure, habitat, housing, informal settlement, urban development, slum, social assistance/support, participation.

Available online: June 2012.

Cover layout: Hélène Gay.

About the authors

Aurore Mansion trained as a social anthropologist, and has managed Gret projects on land policies and securing land rights since 2004. Building on her involvement in the identification and implementation of informal settlement restructuring projects in Nouakchott, Mauritania (*kebbé* and *gazra*), more recent work includes producing a series of studies documenting the development implications of land-related issues in developing countries, various projects on this theme, and moderating the French Cooperation 'Land Tenure and Development' Technical Committee. She has also published a development anthropology thesis on the circulation of knowledge about land matters between research, expertise and public action.

Virginie Rachmuhl is a sociologist and urban planner who has spent the last 20 years working on the urban, social, political and economic inclusion of residents of low-income neighbourhoods in France and other countries. Since becoming Gret's urban programme manager in 2001, she has helped implement projects to improve low-cost housing and restructure informal settlements in Cuba, Brazil, Mauritania and Haiti. She has also prepared several pre-operational studies and evaluation and impact assessments of urban operations in Mauritania, Morocco, Panama, Cambodia, South Africa and French Guiana. A regular contributor at seminars and conferences, she also supervises Masters students and has contributed to several publications on urban issues.

About the contributors

Papa Ameth Keita trained as a planner, and has a post-graduate degree in Town and Country Planning, Decentralisation and Territorial Development. In 2001 he became Deputy Director of the Senegalese consultancy firm Ingésahel, where he is responsible for urban projects. In addition to producing studies on restructuring and land regularisation initiatives in Grand Médine, Ouakam, Tivaouane, Pikine Irrégulier Sud and a flood mitigation project in Djiddah Thiaroye Kao in Senegal, he has participated in various seminars and training workshops on urban development, focusing on urban restructuring and informal settlements in Senegal, Cameroun and Switzerland.

Benjamin Michelon, PhD, is an independent social town planning consultant. Urban projects funded by various donors have taken him across Africa to Benin, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritania, Rwanda, Burkina Faso and elsewhere. During the identification phase of the project in Rwanda, Mr Michelon worked with the Urbaplan team on the assessment and strategy for upgrading informal settlements, and then prepared a Resettlement Action Plan to anticipate and manage the socio-economic consequences of the projected works. His thesis on the evolution of town planning and land use in informal settlements in Douala and Kigali draws on his experiences in these two cities and other African urban centres.

Olivier Toutain trained as an architect and is now involved in town planning and urban development. Much of his professional career has been spent in Morocco, producing numerous studies and works on the problems associated with insecure housing and slum clearance for various bodies, ministries, donors and international development agencies. Further international experience includes a stint in India as Project Director for the Bangalore Urban Development Master Plan. He currently works for Gret as project director for the evaluation and social impact assessment of PARHIB, the slum and substandard housing clearance support programme funded by the AFD and implemented by Holding d'aménagement Al Omrane in Morocco.

Partner organisations

The Global Land Tool Network (GLTN)[1] is a network of experts and institutions whose aim is to promote and disseminate land management tools that are adapted to local issues, and put in place land policies that favour the poorest and most vulnerable members of society, especially women. GLTN is involved in the formulation and application of land policies designed to reduce poverty and inequality. Its work centres around defending the interests of the poor, good governance, equity, subsidiarity and affordability, using gender-sensitive and systematic, large-scale approaches. The network has identified 18 priority land tools and eight cross-cutting themes in consultation with partner organisations and countries. In May 2012 it had 47 global partners, including Gret, and over 1,800 members. It is funded by the Norwegian and Swiss governments, and operates under the auspices of UN-Habitat.

The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN–HABITAT)[2] is mandated by the United Nations General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities, with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all.

UN-Habitat recognises that cities are the hubs of national production and consumption. Its work covers slum clearance, land issues and access to housing, water, sanitation and other basic services.

This work contributes to the United Nations Millennium Declaration, particularly Target 11 of Millennium Development Goal No. 7, to improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020, and Target 10, which calls for the number of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water to be halved.

Gret[3] is a non-profit organisation composed of professional development practitioners who support sustainable development processes in urban and rural areas. Social equity, economic development and environmental protection are central to its work designing and implementing innovative field projects, mobilising expertise, running networks, defending ideas in international forums, and producing and disseminating publications that draw on the lessons learned over three decades in development. In 2010 Gret was operating in 33 countries, with 13 permanent missions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Less than 10 per cent of its 700 staff are based at its headquarters.

Gret believes that cities play a key role in development, and that the pace and nature of urbanization call for specialist support and assistance. After nearly 30 years in urban development cooperation, working to improve low-cost housing and consolidate/restructure informal settlements, Gret is currently working with local actors (community organisations, NGOs, small economic operators, local governments and urban operators) in ten capital cities and large and medium-sized cities in developing countries. Its primary aim is to tackle urban degradation and secure the right to the city for as many people as possible.

[1] *http://www.gltn.net/en*

[2] *http://www.unhabitat.org*

[3] *http://www.gret.org/*

The last 15 years have been particularly focused on land issues, promoting local mechanisms to secure land tenure, negotiated natural resource management and legal recognition for locally recognised rights and norms. Since 1996, Gret has acted as the scientific secretariat for the 'Land Tenure and Development' Technical Committee put in place by the French Development Agency to help inform and develop tools for land policy actors in developing countries.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank everyone who contributed to this publication by sharing their analyses, experiences and insights. We are particularly indebted to the pioneering sociologist Françoise Navez Bouchanine, who has led the way in this field in Morocco and in the research and development community, and worked tirelessly to promote social assistance in urban operations. Her contributions to research and more practical studies have been an invaluable source of information.

Summary

Nearly 830 million people around the world currently live in slums, two thirds of them in Africa. Although UN-Habitat findings indicate that the living conditions of 24 million slum dwellers have improved over the last decade, the slum population in sub-Saharan Africa[4] has only fallen by five per cent.[5] Urban operations are now one of the main tools used to improve living conditions in informal settlements. The authoritarian methods that were used to characterise these operations in Africa are changing with the spread of new approaches that take greater account of human factors and encourage participation by affected residents. These approaches raise many questions about the underlying objectives of such operations, the strategic choices that shape them and the practices used to implement them.

This paper aims to provide some guidelines for the designers, decision-makers and operators involved in such actions. Its particular focus is on **social assistance, an aspect of these operations that is often largely ignored.** The experiences presented below reflect a range of socio-economic situations and housing conditions, levels of development, amenities, access to services, etc. What they do have in common is the fact that few, if any residents, have land rights that are recognised or secured by the existing legal and institutional framework. Three types of operations are considered here:

- **Upgrading** operations to consolidate what is already in place. These range from modest to quite ambitious interventions;
- **Restructuring** operations, which usually include a substantial investment programme, and involve reorganising the parcel plan and displacing varying numbers of residents on a temporary or permanent basis;
- **Clearance** operations involving major interventions, if not the complete eradication of the original settlement.

The main challenge with operations of every kind is finding the right balance between over-provision and under-provision, urban density and urban sprawl, razing or retaining existing neighbourhoods, and adjusting to the realities of the actual settlement and the planned neighbourhood.

This paper is based on four experiences that illustrate some of the approaches currently employed in Africa:

- The operation to clear the slums of Karyan Thomas and Douar Skouila in Casablanca, Morocco, as part of the 'Cities without Slums' programme. Some 8,400 families have been affected by this operation, which began in 2004 and is projected to conclude in 2012. The works include restructuring and, from 2007 onwards, clearing parts of the original sites.
- The operation to restructure the *kebbé* of El Mina in Nouakchott, Mauritania. This was implemented between 2000 and 2008 within the framework of the Urban Development Programme. It affected nearly 15,000 families, over half of which were resettled in new sites.
- The operation to upgrade and consolidate peri-central informal settlements in Kigali in Rwanda. This was undertaken between 2003 and 2010 as part of the Infrastructures and Urban Management Project. About 75,000 people in three neighbourhoods were affected by this initiative to progressively improve living conditions while displacing as few people as possible.
- The ongoing operation to upgrade, restructure and regularise land tenure in Pikine Irrégulier Sud, in Senegal. Work on this programme, which was triggered by the construction of a toll highway between Dakar and Diamnadio, began in 2006. It directly affects 1,000 concessions, just under half of which will be resettled on an alternative site.

[4] The UN-Habitat definition of sub-Saharan Africa covers 48 countries in West, East, Central and South Africa.

[5] UN-Habitat, State of the World's Cities 2010/2011 - Cities for All: Bridging the Urban Divide. 2010.

One of the many lessons learned from the comparative analysis of these initiatives is that urban operations are highly political exercises. They are largely driven by security, economic or political objectives, which may not always be explicit but nevertheless shape the way that the operations are designed, implemented and monitored. Three of the four operations (Rwanda, Mauritania and Senegal) were instigated by the World Bank, whose Operational Policy 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement stipulates that residents must be taken into account (participation, compensation, assistance, etc.). Application of this policy on the ground is patchy and operational mechanisms take little account of the social and local aspects of these interventions. Some progress has been made, but local governments and residents still need to play a much bigger role in these operations, and social assistance accorded the same weight as technical and economic objectives.

Taking this crosscutting analysis as our starting point, we identified **nine strategic themes** that could make these operations real catalysts for urban development that reflect local residents' needs:

1. **Target groups and eligibility criteria.** The question of who has the right to benefit from different compensation measures or to be rehoused is clearly strategic. The eligibility criteria that are selected will partly determine the nature and economy of an operation. However, the social realities on which these criteria are based are complex and varied (families, households, tenants, 'owners', title holders, insecure occupants, etc.), are not always clearly defined, and may be difficult to ascertain on the ground. This can cause confusion and open the door to opportunistic behaviour. There are tools for managing these risks but whether or not they are used is largely a matter of political will. Tenants were not eligible to participate in three of the four operations considered here (Mauritania, Morocco and Rwanda), even though they are often among the poorest and most vulnerable residents in these settlements. There are opportunities to take account of their situation and involve them in operations which need to be explored (compensation, credit, etc.).
2. **Implementation and steering.** Restructuring operations are often regarded as a series of technical or social activities to be undertaken in a logical order. Their implementation is usually fairly standardised, with the post-operational phase limited to regularisation programmes and dealing with residual cases. Measures need to be put in place to assist residents in the longer term. Local governments play a primary role in providing this support, and need assistance to ensure that they can progressively take over the management of operations, working with State ministries and public executive agencies.
3. **Social assistance.** Social assistance includes various kinds of activities at different phases of the operation – information, outreach, consultation, administrative support, etc. The need to make progress on the technical and operational fronts often means that insufficient time and attention is given to social activities, particularly in the upstream and downstream phases of operations. These activities require a range of skills (listening, communication, negotiation, conflict management, institutional analysis) that are rarely found among technical operators, and which need to be reinforced. An explicit mandate formalising management of the social aspects of a project would help remedy certain deficiencies in this area.
4. **Involving residents.** Participation by residents is often very limited and subject to political controls. Residents in these four case studies tended to influence operations through negotiation, pressure or obstruction rather than formal participatory mechanisms. The risk with this type of situation is that it accentuates inequalities in the way that people are treated. The mechanisms that are put in place need to be adapted to each particular institutional situation. Even when the context is not conducive to participation, there are tools that can help instigate modest changes and encourage greater participation (information, individual interviews, collective meetings, surveys, etc.).
5. **Managing resettlement.** Since it is sometimes impossible to avoid total or partial resettlement, the best practical means of doing so and reducing the negative impacts on families need to be found. Challenges will vary according to the nature of the operation and type of resettlement involved (temporary or permanent resettlement of all or some residents). People's lives are severely disrupted by these operations, especially when the resettlement sites are

located far from the original neighbourhood. Therefore, they can only succeed if social support systems are put in place before, during and after resettlement.

6. **Managing land issues.** The four operations studied did not all include a tenure regularization component and when they did, they dealt with the matter in different ways. When it is an explicit objective, land tenure is nearly always regularised by issuing individual ownership titles, although this does not automatically guarantee security of tenure. Occupancy can be secured by other means apart from ownership titles (prescriptive rights, taxation, collective ownership, hire-purchase, etc.), which need to be considered in reform processes and changing concepts of ownership in the countries concerned. These reforms can take a while, so in the meantime, mechanisms are needed to help residents understand the different procedures for securing tenure.
7. **Funding operations.** Informal settlement restructuring operations are expensive. They use a combination of public, private, international, national, local and individual funding, drawing on subsidies, savings, self-funding and credit. The balance between these different components depends on the target groups concerned, but all operations need an element of subsidies to ensure that they reach the poorest households. Innovative financial arrangements are needed to ensure that these mechanisms are balanced and replicable; bearing in mind that access to land and credit are two strategic variables of these mechanisms.
8. **Compensation and financial contributions from residents:** Compensation and financial contributions are two key – but largely unexplored – elements of these four operations. The main motivation in deciding whether residents should be given compensation or asked to make a financial contribution is encouraging them to subscribe to the process and ensuring that the operations move forward. Both approaches run the risk of having the opposite of the desired effect: encouraging speculation, attracting people from outside the neighbourhood, or leading to the loss of housing. The best approach is often to combine financial contributions and compensation, but it takes a complex mix of financial and social skills to find the right balance, and this is rarely achieved. This aspect of funding also needs to be considered in relation to the overall economy of the operation, with all its immediate and deferred costs.
9. **Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.** Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are designed to aid decision-making and reporting on project execution, and help document and consolidate learning processes. In these four experiences, they are primarily used to report back to national decision-makers and international donors on the technical and financial progress of operations. Voluntary procedures are needed to incorporate social, urban, institutional and environmental impacts into monitoring and evaluation. Decision-making and steering processes also need to be improved by using more rigorous methods and tools, initiating public debate on these operations, and securing more determined support from donors.

Contents

Preface

The upgrading, restructuring or clearance of so-called 'informal settlements' is one of the major challenges in urban development and efforts to tackle poverty and inequality in African cities. It is also an extremely pressing problem, given that 60 per cent of the people in these settlements live outside the formal systems of development, land, amenities, services, housing and tax.

Urban operations are now one of the preferred tools for improving living conditions in informal settlements. The authoritarian methods that used to characterise these operations in Africa are changing with the spread of new approaches that take greater account of human factors and encourage participation by affected residents. These approaches raise many questions about the underlying objectives of such operations, the strategic choices that shape them and the practices used to implement them.

Complementary actions by GLTN and Gret

The Global Land Tool Network (GLTN) and Gret share similar aims and are engaged in complementary activities, producing reference materials and stimulating debate to support land policy actors and those who work with them. Their first joint venture was a workshop held in Cotonou on October 20-24 2008 to discuss communal-level land management practices in West Africa and Madagascar. It was attended by 80 participants involved in land reforms in Benin, Niger, Madagascar, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and the Comoros.[6]

After formalising their collaboration in a letter of partnership in 2009, the two organisations went on to produce a joint publication on possible modes of social assistance in operations to upgrade, restructure or clear informal settlements in Africa, based on Gret's experience in Nouakchott, Mauritania.

This paper is aimed at the actors who work to transform these neighbourhoods: national and local political officials, technical and social operators, consultancy firms, NGOs and residents' organisations.

Our aim was not to produce a series of tools (which could never be entirely appropriate to every context), or to propose standard responses to complex, dynamic situations that usually require tailored measures. We wanted to present a more detailed examination of the problems raised by the design, implementation and monitoring of urban operations in informal settlements, show how these issues have been tackled in certain cases, learn from these responses and make recommendations accordingly, building on the experience acquired by Gret in over 30 years in the field. In short, the objective of this paper is to contribute to policies and practices that promote more equitable urban development and management, to help build cities that are better able to meet their residents' needs and enable every citizen to fulfil their potential.

This document is the fruit of joint efforts by contributors from different disciplines and backgrounds (architecture, town planning, sociology, anthropology, engineering) who share the belief that social and economic assistance is not only essential before, during and after urban operations, but also a condition for their success.

[6] *Lavigne Delville P., Mansion A., Mongbo R., Vers une gestion foncière communale: stratégies, outils et conditions de réussite, 'Land Tenure and Development' Technical Comittee, Paris, 2009.*

We would like to thank the authors:

- Aurore Mansion (Gret) and Virginie Rachmuhl (Gret), for coordinating and editing most of this work. Over the years they have been involved in various informal settlement restructuring operations in Mauritania, Senegal, Haiti, Brazil and Cuba, and have produced studies on operations in Mauritania, Morocco, Panama, Cambodia, South Africa and French Guiana;
- Papa Ameith Keita (Ingésahel), Benjamin Michelon (EPF[7]) and Olivier Toutain (independent expert), who were respectively involved in the urban operations in Senegal, Rwanda and Morocco. The comparative analysis of these four experiences would not have been possible without their work on the case studies.

We are also most grateful to Rémy Sietchiping (GLTN), Christian Castellanet, Danièle Ribier and Aurélie Quentin (Gret), Serge Allou (Cities Alliance), Alain Durand Lasserve (CNRS) and Jean D'Aragon (UN-Habitat), for their astute observations and invaluable advice on the collaborative process and the structure of this document.

Finally, GLTN and Gret would like to thank Mohamed Ali Ould Cheibany, technical advisor to the General Directorate of Nouakchott Urban Development Agency (ADU), for his contribution to the debates and thinking behind this initiative. Mr Cheibany is also the former head of the ADU Resettlement Unit, which steered the on-site resettlement and displacement of families affected by informal settlement restructuring operations in Nouakchott.

All have our thanks for their various contributions to this highly informative work, which we hope will guide future actions by GTLN and Gret.

Bénédicte Hermelin

Director General, Gret

Clarissa Augustinus

Head of Land and Tenure Section
and GLTN in UN-Habitat

[7] *École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne.*

Introduction

- **Objectives**

For many years, most operations to restructure informal urban settlements in developing countries used authoritarian approaches that recognised neither the legitimacy of the residents concerned nor the importance of providing social assistance throughout the process. This was particularly true of African operations.

With the spread of democratisation and growing international involvement in such operations, these 'heavy-handed' methods are gradually being replaced with approaches that encourage participation by affected residents and aim to regularise their tenure, improve their housing and increase access to services and amenities.

Although progress has been made in certain respects, these operations often have mixed social outcomes. Families are moved to unserviced, out-of-the-way locations, social networks are destroyed, the poorest residents are further impoverished or forced out by the many costs associated with these initiatives, tenants (who are often the poorest and longest-standing residents) are not taken into account, and numerous families are excluded from the process at various stages of the operation.

In many cases, these shortcomings are due to the highly political nature of these operations, which is rarely made explicit. They are also due to a lack of knowledge and experience in what are becoming increasingly lengthy and complex exercises involving different actors who do not necessarily share the same vision or interests. If these operations are to be effective, mechanisms need to be defined and put in place to plan and implement not only the technical aspects, but also social and economic assistance, steering, arbitration, conflict management and institutional follow-up. However, the countries concerned often have few legal precedents for such procedures.

This document sets out certain principles and guidelines that can be used to address this situation, and ensure that greater account is taken of issues that affect the social and economic development of the families concerned. Our objective is to help the actors involved in these operations ask relevant questions and understand the issues that they raise, thereby enabling them to improve the quality of their actions. The aim was not to set out 'good' practices', present the 'best' experiences and 'right' models, or provide 'ready-made tools'; nor was it to lay down a methodology for evaluating, quantifying or comparing the social benefits of urban operations.

Our target audience is broad and varied. It is primarily the designers, decision-makers and operators involved in these interventions: the ministry officials responsible for steering them, elected officials, donors, central and local government technical services, (topographers, town planners, surveyors, engineers), technical and social operators, development NGOs, consultancy firms and residents' associations. The aim is to give all these actors the tools to help them understand the issues involved, and pointers to enable them to make well-informed strategic choices and implement more holistic operations.

Finally, it is intended to provide insights for all those who are concerned with the challenges that these settlements pose for urban development, be they students, researchers, experts or partners in these processes.

- **Methodology**

This document is based on comparative analysis of operations in four African countries. They were deliberately chosen because so little has been written about these processes in Africa, unlike Latin America and Asia, where there is much more literature on the topic. The documentation that does exist in Africa is rarely made available to anyone outside the initiative, and is mostly confined to strictly

operational information. The Cities without Slums programme in Morocco is unusual in this respect, and proved a relatively rich source of documentation.

We used the experience in Mauritania as our baseline and the foundation for an analytical table showing key points that need to be addressed when considering the social and economic aspects of urban operations. The experiences in Rwanda, Senegal and Morocco were compared with the Mauritanian case in order to determine which aspects of these operations are context-specific and which are more crosscutting. This work differs from previous procedures in that it reframes practices within the local socio-political realities of each situation.

The operations and programmes in these four countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Rwanda and Senegal) have been under way for several years now. Certain actions have been completed, and others are ongoing or planned. All constitute concrete references, as these operations are part of programmes and policies that we wanted to examine in order to identify the conditions in which they were designed and implemented.

Work on this document began in June 2010, proceeding in three main stages:

- **A literature review** culminating in a paper setting out the conceptual and methodological framework for the document and laying the foundations for the first part of the work;
- A three-day **workshop** in France in July 2010, organised by Gret and attended by various partners and contributors to the initiative. Participants worked in groups to identify the specificities and cross-cutting dimensions of each experience, structure the document around nine key questions and feed into the content of each of these questions;
- **A final stage of writing** and exchanges between the different authors. The document was completed in March 2012.

- **Structure**

This paper is divided into two main sections.

Part one presents:

- **The framework and definition of the terms employed in the document**: the three central elements of the paper are defined and characterised in all their diversity: the settlements targeted by operations, the operations themselves, and social assistance activities. This chapter describes the different types of neighbourhoods and modes of intervention covered by the paper;
- **The four experiences** in Morocco, Mauritania, Rwanda and Senegal: this chapter presents an overview of the operations' objectives, the progress made, the settlements and actors involved, the type of social assistance mobilised and the outcomes of each operation. More detailed presentation of each operation can be found on the Internet;[8]
- **Key characteristics of the operations:** crosscutting analysis of these four experiences identifies common aspects of their objectives, the role played by donors (particularly the World Bank), and their operational arrangements;
- **Lines of work to improve the quality of operations:** progress needs to be made in several areas to improve the quality of urban operations. Several lines of work are suggested, and expanded upon in the second section of the document.

Part two is organised around **nine sheets**, which are presented as key questions for decision-makers and operators. Each sheet is divided into three sections:

- The first ('overview of the question') sets out the question and the debates it raises;
- The second ('summary of the experiences') briefly describes the outcomes of the cases studied;
- The third ('lessons learnt and recommendations') draws on the lessons learned and proposes lines of action likely to improve operational practices.

Boxes are used to clarify ideas and highlight particular operational, theoretical or methodological aspects of the work.

[8] *http://www.gret.org/publication/batir-des-villes-pour-tous-en-afrique/*

Concepts, experiences, key questions and recommendations

This first section sets out the framework for the document. It is made up of four chapters that define key concepts, give a brief presentation of the four cases concerned, describe the operations and suggest possible options for improving the design and implementation of such initiatives.

In its first chapter, a definition of the settlements is provided emphasising their diversity and ambiguous relationship with the public authorities, which is clearly reflected in the words used to describe them.

The second chapter presents the different types of urban operations implemented in informal settlements and the possible conceptual and operational framework for each type of operation. The four 'illustrative' experiences are studied in relation to this frame of reference.

These first two chapters define the terms that will be used in the rest of the document.

The third chapter summarises the four experiences from Morocco, Mauritania, Rwanda and Senegal: the specificity of the target neighbourhoods, the objectives of the operations, the institutional and operational framework, the place given to social assistance mechanisms and the progress and limitations of each operation. Readers who wish to explore certain aspects of the case studies in greater depth can find more detailed presentations on the Internet.[9]

Finally, the fourth chapter uses cross-cutting analysis of these four experiences to identify the main characteristics of urban operations. It highlights key factors for their success, and the main avenues to be explored in order to improve their design and implementation. These aspects are then discussed in more detail in the second half of the document.

[9] *http://www.gret.org/publication/batir-des-villes-pour-tous-en-afrique/*

What are urban operations in informal settlements?

The differing realities of informal settlements and insecure housing

- **Loaded labels**

"'Illegal', irregular', 'unplanned', 'informal' or even 'precarious':[10] these are just some of the words used to describe neighbourhoods where residents' land tenure, development, amenities, services, housing or taxation are not 'in order'.[11] Such normative adjectives focus on the fact that these settlements do not meet land and town planning regulations, suggesting a uniform reality characterised by poverty, marginality and all kinds of exclusion.[12]

In reality, these reductive labels mask the diversity and complexity of such neighbourhoods, which differ on so many levels: geographic, socio-economic, demographic, land, town planning, housing, access to services and infrastructures. Realities vary between regions, countries and cities, and within a single city or even settlement.

Each neighbourhood is characterised by a particular combination of factors. They may be mixed or poor, inhabited by owners or tenants, located on public or private land, 'appropriated', 'squatted', partly or wholly authorised by private owners or the public authorities. Housing may be put together by residents or constructed by private developers, consist of shacks made from recovered materials, small 'solidly built' houses or apartment blocks (constructed with or without permission), inhabited by untitled occupants or holders of innumerable '*petits papiers*',[13] occupancy permits or ownership titles. Settlements may be large or small, urban niches or sprawling neighbourhoods in the centre or outskirts of the city, located in sought-after, at-risk or abandoned spaces that may be connected to urban networks, partially serviced or totally lacking in services. The permutations are almost endless.

[10] *This list is by no means exhaustive. Other terms used to describe these neighbourhoods include deprived, chaotic, problematic, marginal, unregulated, unplanned, clandestine, unsanitary, shantytowns, slums, squatters, etc.*

[11] *Alain Durand-Lasserve and Jean-François Tribillon, 'Quelles réponses à l'illégalité des quartiers dans les pays en développement?', contribution to ESF/N-AERUS seminar, Belgium, May 2001.*

[12] *Aurore Mansion, Virginie Rachmuhl, 'Devenir des quartiers précaires, devenir de la ville: un destin lié? L'exemple de Nouakchott, Mauritanie' in Voyage en Afrique urbaine, ed. Pierre Gras, 2009, éditions l'Harmattan, Paris.*

[13] Unofficial contracts or local receipts.

Neighbourhoods in Mauritania, Haiti, Guiana, Morocco and Rwanda

El Mina *kebbé* in Nouakchott, Mauritania. © Christian Vium.

Baillergeau in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. © Alexis Doucet.

Villa Rosa in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. © Jean-Marc Tipret.

Chekepatty in Saint-Laurent du Maroni, Guiana. © Bérangère Deluc.

Ain Al Aouda in Casablanca, Morocco. © Virginie Rachmuhl.

Kiyovu in Kigali, Rwanda. © Benjamin Michelon.

Attitudes to these neighbourhoods are reflected in the names that they are given in each country. For example, '*kebbé*' and '*gazra*' respectively mean 'dumping ground' and 'usurped' or 'occupied by force' in the Arab dialect spoken by the vast majority of Mauritanians.[14]

[14] *Similarly, there are favelas in Brazil; slums, kijiji or korogocho in Kenya; imijondolo/township in South Africa; karyan in Morocco; ranchos in Venezuela; villas miseria in Argentina; solares or ciudadelas in Cuba, and so on. Cf. Wikipedia.*

These labels reveal the history and stigmatisation of such spaces and their inhabitants and mark changing attitudes and public interventions in these sites. Informal neighbourhoods in Cambodia were called "squatter neighbourhoods" in the early 1990s and "poor communities" from 1994 onwards. This changed to "urban poor" in 1998, "in recognition of their residents' legitimate right to be part of the city"; and in 2000 the Prime Minister called for the expression "squatter"[15] to be replaced with "temporary resident".

The way neighbourhoods are differentiated within a particular country is also indicative of how the public authorities deal with them. "*Thus, in Egypt, the term for slums is* "achwaiy" (*'random/risky'*) *but there is also a distinction between areas that are* "ghîr amena" (*insecure or unsafe*) *and* "ghîr moukhattat" (*unplanned*).[16] [...] *The Ministry of Housing is responsible for improving unplanned areas* [...], *while the Informal Settlements Development Fund is responsible for designating "unsafe" slums for demolition, with residents rehoused in outlying neighbourhoods".*[17]

Informal settlements in central Pnomh Pen and the Boeng Kak rail slum

© Valérie Clerc.

These settlements are often referred to as 'informal' because they are closely linked to the formal sector, even though they operate outside the regulations in many respects. In Phnom Penh, Cambodia, they developed in response to the urban, land and housing policies of the 1980s and 1990s. Some residents are unauthorised occupants, while others pay private owners or public agents an individual or collective fee to settle in the neighbourhood, on either a temporary or permanent basis. These transactions are often registered by public agents, for another fee.[18]

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[15] *The term "squatter" is perjorative in Khmer as it signifies "anarchist".*

[16] *Agnès Deboulet, 'Contrer la précarité par la sécurisation foncière et la légalisation. Enjeux et opportunités dans le Monde arabe et en Égypte, in 'Dynamiques foncières dans les villes du Sud', Revue Tiers Monde n° 206, April-June 2011, eds Aurélia Michel, Éric Denis and Rafael Soares Gonçalves, pp. 75-95.*

[17] *Valérie Clerc, Virginie Rachmuhl, Les marchés fonciers et immobiliers des quartiers informels à Phnom Penh – Cambodge: dynamiques et enjeux pour l'action publique, Ambassade de France au Cambodge, Coopérer aujourd'hui n° 50, Gret, 2006.*

[18] *In his article 'Le marché de la location informelle dans les favelas de Rio de Janeiro et sa régularisation dans une perspective historique', Rafael Gonçalves Soares shows that many favelas in Rio are built on private land with the landowner's permission,*

The formal and informal markets are also very closely linked. In fact, one could say that there is a continuum between the two,[19] since families move from one to the other as their situation changes. Housing costs and conditions for accessing services and employment overlap at the upper end of informal settlements and the lower end of formal markets.[20]

This example from Asia could well have come from Africa.

- **The difficulty of quantifying and qualifying these settlements**

It is very hard to quantify these neighbourhoods, partly because they are so diverse and partly because there is so little data on urban areas in Africa. Producing reliable quantitative and qualitative data will be a major factor in obtaining recognition for these settlements.

UN-Habitat took a step in this direction with a suggested definition of slums that was officially adopted at the United Nations summit in 2002.[21]

UN-Habitat definition of slums[22]

A slum is a contiguous settlement where the inhabitants are characterised as having inadequate housing and basic services. A slum is often not recognised and addressed by the public authorities as an integral or equal part of the city.

A household living in a slum is a group of persons living under the same roof in an urban area who lack one or more of the following:

- Access to an improved water supply,

- Access to an improved sanitation system,

- Access to sufficient living space,

- Permanent and durable housing.

There was initially a fifth indicator – security of tenure – but this was removed in 2005 as there was no methodology for measuring it.[23]

This definition only applies to one category of settlement, and focuses on its physical and spatial conditions – illustrating the difficulty of defining such neighbourhoods in a positive manner, and the tendency to do so in terms of what they lack (legality, formality, regularity, security, services, planning, etc.). It does not take account of the dynamics behind their development, the individual or collective

in return for rent. Landowners sometimes build dwellings to rent out, directly or indirectly through an intermediary. In Aurélia Michel, Éric Denis and Rafael Soares Gonçalves (eds), 'Dynamiques foncières dans les villes du Sud', in Revue Tiers Monde n° 206, April-June 2011, pp. 21-37. Similar situations exist in Haiti, Kenya and many other countries.

[19] *For further information on the functioning of African land markets, see: State of African Cities 2010. Governance, inequalities and land markets, UN-Habitat, 2010, 150 p. (http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=3035), and Urban Land Markets: Economic concepts and tools for engaging in Africa, GLTN, UN-Habitat, Urban Land Market, 2010, (http://www.gltn.net/index.php?option=com_docman&gid=247&task=doc_details&Itemid=24).*

[20] *Valérie Clerc, 'Du formel à l'informel dans la fabrique de la ville. Politiques foncières et marchés immobiliers à Phnom Penh', in Espaces et sociétés n° 143, 2010, pp. 63-79. Based on research on land and property markets in informal settlements in Phnom Penh conducted between 2003 and 2005. Valérie Clerc, in collaboration with Virginie Rachmuhl, Les marchés fonciers et immobiliers des quartiers informels à Phnom Penh, Cambodge, dynamiques et enjeux pour l'action publique, Paris, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, report published in 2008, Gret collected Studies and publications, n°32, 176 p. and synthesis in 2006 in Coopérer aujourd'hui, Gret, n°50, 27 p.*

[21] *World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.*

[22] *Guide to the evaluation of Target 11: Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers. Global Urban Observatory. UN–Habitat. April 2003.*

[23] *UN-Habitat, Monitoring Security of Tenure, December 2011, http://www.gltn.net/index.php?option=com_docman&gid=269&task=doc_details&Itemid=24*

forces working to transform them, or their complex relationship with public policies. This is why certain authors prefer to call them "low-income areas" or "unregulated settlements".[24]

Although it is not perfect, the UN definition does constitute a reference point, opening the way for indicators to be defined, data gathered, countries compared with each other, and progress on Target 11 of the Millennium Development Goals measured: 'Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers'.

According to this criterion, the situation has improved, as the proportion of the urban population living in slums in Africa fell between 1990 and 2010. However, progress has been very uneven across the continent. While the overall proportion of city dwellers living in slums and informal settlements in North Africa as a whole dropped from 34 per cent to 13 per cent in this period, the number of slum dwellers south of the Sahara only fell by eight per cent. It stood at 62 per cent in 2010, with marked disparities between countries. Furthermore, demographic growth means that this declining percentage masks an increase in absolute values, as the slum population in this region has doubled since 1990. It reached just under 200 million people in 2010, making sub-Saharan Africa the developing region with the highest prevalence of urban slums (24 per cent across the region).[25] Urban development has created more varied situations and fragmented settlements within cities,[26] generating a growing number of neighbourhood projects with an increasingly complex cast of characters (NGOs, decentralised cooperation agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors).

These settlements can be divided into four main types, with various combinations of characteristics:

1. **Slums, or the most precarious neighbourhoods** in terms of location, type of buildings, infrastructures and services, socio-economic profiles and land tenure. These are usually found on public land.
2. **More mixed neighbourhoods** in terms of socio-economic conditions, access to land and basic services, and housing conditions. These are found on public and private land.
3. **Irregular or unplanned neighbourhoods**, which are solidly built, fairly well integrated into the urban and social fabric, and usually located on private land that has been illegally parcelled and does not meet town planning or building regulations.
4. **City centres** or dilapidated and impoverished historic centres.

This paper focuses solely on the first two types of neighbourhood, which are targeted by urban operations. The third and fourth types tend to be covered by operations to eliminate substandard housing and regularise land tenure, or plans to safeguard or renovate urban areas.

The difficulty of naming these neighbourhoods

Although none of the terms currently used to describe these settlements is entirely satisfactory, we believe that 'precarious or insecure settlements', 'informal settlements' and 'low-income areas' are the most appropriate.

The experiences examined in this paper reflect a range of socio-economic situations, with different levels of housing, amenities, access to services, etc. The common denominator in all these situations is the fact that few, if any residents have land rights that are recognised and secured within the existing legal and institutional framework.

Thus, we will favour the term "informal settlements", which is the term most currently used in English.

[24] *Agnès Deboulet, presentation at 'Populaire, Précaire ? Regards croisés sur un habitat majoritaire', Centre Sud and École nationale supérieure d'Architecture de Paris la Villette, 2011.*

[25] *State of the World's Cities 2010-2011. Bridging the Urban Divide, UN-Habitat, 2008.*

[26] *Michelon, B. (2012) Planification urbaine et usages des quartiers précaires en Afrique. Études de cas à Douala et à Kigali. Lausanne: EPFL.*

A wide range of interventions

- **Numerous public, private, international, national and local intervening agencies**

Urban operations involve a wide variety of public and private actors with different strategies and interests. They also have different institutional and organisational frameworks, which are shaped by the institutional conditions in each country, programme, project or operation, and determined by mandatory financial procedures. The most common actors are:

- **national public institutions** with overall responsibility for steering or managing the operation: governments, ministries and administrative departments responsible for housing, urban development, construction, finance, land tenure, home affairs;
- **public and private technical operators** mandated to manage projects or execute works on behalf of the overall project manager: executive agencies put in place by the World Bank, developers, property developers, professionals such as promoters, solicitors, topographers, land and building surveyors, building firms, consultants and NGOs;
- **public, parastatal or private finance institutions**: national and local banks, microfinance institutions;
- **technical and financial development partners**: multilateral and bilateral donors, decentralised cooperation agencies, NGOs and international consultancy firms;
- **deconcentrated institutions:** sectoral administrations, political organs of the central government;
- **local governments** in decentralised contexts: communes or infra- and supra-communal groups;
- **national experts** operating in consultancy firms, NGOs, public companies;
- **civil society and individuals**: customary chiefs, residents, residents' associations and support groups, political or religious groups, private economic operators, etc.

The African operations discussed in this paper are project managed at the national level, with the technical operator responsible for ensuring that the operation proceeds according to plan. In Latin America and Asia, local governments are often responsible for project management.

The part that civil society plays in these operations is determined by its capacity to mobilise and organise citizens, and how much space the project manager is prepared to make for civil society groups. Here too, it plays a smaller role than in Latin America or Asia. However, residents can influence the course of operations outside any formal participatory processes that may be put in place, acting as individuals or working in groups.

As these operations usually take several years to complete, the actors and roles allocated to them may change during the course of the intervention.

- **Different components of the intervention**

Three possible components of interventions in informal settlements

Jean-François Tribillon identifies three components of informal settlement restructuring operations in his book *Nouveau manuel d'aménagement foncier.*[27] These are actions to:

- re-equip the neighbourhood (in the broad sense), which include all works and interventions to make substantial quantitative and qualitative improvements to local amenities;
- 'legalise' land tenure (in the strict sense) by providing 'land papers' for people with no documentation;
- 'consolidate' the settlement by reconfiguring the layout of the neighbourhood. This may entail completely reorganising existing plots to establish a block of land in which a new set of urban parcels is laid out, or making minor adjustments to the existing parcel plan, which is largely left in place.

[27] *Tribillon J.-F., 1993, Nouveau manuel d'aménagement foncier, Villes africaines, ADEF, Paris, pp. 187-188.*

In many operations, re-equipment can involve major works and entail displacing people and their homes. "It is a short step from consolidation-modification to completely rethinking the parcel plan and succumbing to pressure from the land services to make it as neat and tidy as a brand new one".[28]

Most operations include some investment in road networks, infrastructures and basic services (water, sanitation, electricity). Opening up the area is usually a priority for both residents and project managers, but providing the right level of basic services and amenities can be problematic. Under-provision will have a negative effect on the urban and social integration of families; over-provision raises questions about their capacity to pay for the new services or help fund operations.

Some operations include a housing component, which may involve assisted self-builds or the standard construction of individual or shared housing.

These interventions alter the layout of parcels and change the way the land is occupied. Most operations also aim to regularise land occupancy, which can be done in various ways.

Different operations may approach each of these components in a different way.

- **Proposed typology of interventions**

In this section we suggest a typology of operations based on their main characteristics.[29] This was largely inspired by the classification proposed by Françoise Navez Bouchanine (for the case in Morocco), which seems particularly relevant to the situations under consideration here.[30]

This typology distinguishes between three main types of intervention:

Actions to improve/upgrade existing conditions

This category includes 'modest' developments that significantly improve residents' daily lives without requiring them to move, and which do little to change the economic, social or urban structure of the settlement. The idea is to gradually develop and consolidate the area over time. This type of intervention can take two forms:

- Isolated actions, such as installing public standpipes, setting up markets or collecting domestic refuse. These interventions are fairly common but not highly visible, as they are not necessarily part of any programme of actions or public policy, and may sometimes even counteract them. Residents' living conditions are improved without having to wait for projects subsidised by international aid;
- Interventions to provide basic infrastructures, regularise land tenure and encourage self-build projects as part of larger-scale, national-level projects. These operations do little to change the existing layout, and explicitly aim to minimise the displacement of residents unless this is absolutely necessary to provide public amenities or infrastructures. Any displacements that do take place are negotiated with affected residents.

These modes of intervention are the least traumatic for residents. Nevertheless, they may be rejected if residents think they do not do enough to change the negative image of their neighbourhood or make them feel that they are a real part of the urban and social fabric of the city.

Standardisation/restructuring operations

This category includes operations that strictly enforce urban planning regulations and standards for amenities in the formal city. Applying these standards requires major interventions to reduce housing density and tackle all aspects of urban development: amenities, infrastructures, access to services and housing. Parcel plans are rationally reconfigured, and land tenure is regularised. These operations completely dismantle/restructure the neighbourhood so that it conforms to a certain idea of a

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] *Objectives, number of displacements, content of the investment programme, institutional and operational mechanisms, scale of the operation.*

[30] *See Françoise Navez-Bouchanine, 2002, Les interventions en bidonville au Maroc. Une évaluation sociale, ANHI, Rabat, pp. 19-40.*

'modern' city. As a result, numerous residents are moved to different sites with varying levels of services. The term 'resettlement' is used when displaced families are given a plot of land to build on, and 'rehousing' when they are moved to partially built or finished homes.

Residents may support these operations despite their high social, financial and urban costs, viewing them as an opportunity to improve their housing conditions and living standards, and make a fresh start.

Operations to clear/'tidy up' neighbourhoods

This type of operation is primarily driven by technical and political considerations, and does not aim to improve living conditions in the original neighbourhood. Families may be moved to unserviced sites, where they wait to be resettled at some future date while the original site is cleared to make way for new urban developments. In other cases, the aim may be to hide neighbourhoods and restrict their growth by planting trees or building walls around them, effectively turning them into ghettos.

Cf. Summary table on following page.

Each type of operation can be categorised according to its context and how it is viewed by the actors concerned:

- 'upgrading' operations are modest interventions that work with existing conditions;
- 'restructuring' operations aim to 'standardise' the neighbourhood;
- 'clearance' operations often involve major interventions, if not the complete eradication of the settlement in order to 'tidy up' the city.

If we apply this typology to the four case studies discussed in Part II, the operations in Rwanda and Senegal clearly fall into the first category (upgrading/improving existing conditions), even though many residents will have to be displaced to make room for the highway in the Senegalese intervention. The operation in Mauritania is a good example of the second category (restructuring/standardisation); while the operation in Morocco includes some initial on-site restructuring followed by clearance (from 2007 onwards).

Operations may switch from one category to another as they progress. This is usually due to power relations between the different actors concerned, or to technical or financial constraints.

Each type of operation needs to find the right balance between over-provision and under-provision, urban density and urban spread, making a 'clean sweep' and keeping neighbourhoods as they are, and the realities on the ground in the actual settlement and the planned neighbourhood.

Lack of a single term

As with neighbourhoods, there is no generic term for all the urban operations that target these informal settlements. Therefore, we will use the typology described above when referring to the four cases studied in this paper: 'upgrading' for Senegal and Rwanda, 'restructuring' for Mauritania, and 'clearance' for Morocco.

When referring to operations in general, we will call them 'informal settlement restructuring operations', even if this does not exactly reflect the objective or type of operation concerned.

Possible actions for each type / Type of intervention		In the original neighbourhood				Residents moved to other areas	In resettlement areas		
		Basic amenities/ infrastructures	Land parcelling and consolidation	Regularise land tenure	Access to housing		Amenities / infrastructures	Regularise land tenure	Access to housing
Upgrading actions to improve existing conditions	Isolated interventions	Minimal, targeted	-	-	Sometimes, with the help of specialist operators	-	-	-	-
	Interventions as part of a national project	Scope negotiated with residents	Marginal	Yes	Self-build incentives	Very few, if any	Yes, if residents displaced	Yes, if residents displaced	Yes, if residents displaced
Standardisation/restructuration operations		Based on existing national regulations and standards	Usually based on orthogonal plans	Yes	Housing standardised, through rehousing or access to serviced, self-build parcel	Many, if not all	Based on existing national regulations and standards	Yes	Assistance in financing self-builds or rehousing
Clearance/"tidying up" operations		Yes, but for other social groups	Usually based on orthogonal plans	Yes, but for other social groups	Yes, but for other social groups	All	Basic, if any	No	No

Tailored social assistance mechanisms

- **Social interventions depend on how tightly the project is defined**

The level of social and economic assistance delivered by urban operations mainly depends on how much room to manoeuvre there is at certain points in the process, and how tightly it has been defined.[31] If the operation is 'sewn up', with everything decided in advance and no chance of modifying the objectives, setup or implementation, there will be no room for social assistance beyond possibly conducting socio-economic surveys. Conversely, there is much more room for experimentation in 'open' operations. Appropriate and achievable types of social assistance need to be identified and delivered in every situation across this spectrum.

- **Competences and activities change with the project cycle**

Support mechanisms are based on a set of activities that need to be undertaken at different phases of the operation. Each activity requires and mobilises specific competences, methods and tools.

While identifying the strategy, or during the pre-operational phase:

- understanding how settlements evolve and the history of urban policies;
- knowledge about social and economic situations, how families appropriate land, and the social organisation of settlements, obtained through socio-urban and socio-land surveys;
- identifying the possible impacts of operations and measures to mitigate and/or optimise their impacts (with special attention to estimating losses, and fair reparation/compensation);
- defining the intervention strategy and operational choices (eligibility criteria, location of resettlement sites; taking account of urban mobility, options for development, town planning, land, housing products; defining rights holders);
- identifying rights holders on the basis of neighbourhood surveys and censuses;
- content and transmission of information
- organisational choices (mechanisms for steering, monitoring, arbitration and grievance procedures);
- defining the monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

During the implementation phase:

- assistance for residents and participation by affected households (especially with construction works and/or, if possible, steering and monitoring the operation);
- allocation and distribution of parcels;
- compensation for families;
- aid and assistance measures before and during the transition phase, especially with administrative and financial matters and temporary housing.

During the post-operational phase:

- assistance in securing land tenure and accessing services, housing and basic infrastructures;
- support for socio-economic development activities;
- contribution to the evaluation and development of operations.

Each activity will raise particular operational questions that need to be resolved. For instance, how to keep residents informed and enable them to participate, how to take account of vulnerable groups and individuals, how to compensate residents according to their land situation and holdings.

Ideally, the operator responsible for social assistance activities should be responsible for all these activities. However, field observations show that certain activities are not undertaken due to lack of institutional support, resources or local competences.

[31] *Françoise Navez-Bouchanine, coord. H. Berra and M. Chaboche, collab. Projets de résorption de l'habitat insalubre. Guide de l'action sociale. Ministère de l'Habitat, de l'Urbanisme et de l'Aménagement de l'Espace. Agence française de développement. Agence de développement social. 2008*

Presentation of the case studies

Slum clearance in Karyan Thomas and Douar Skouila in Casablanca, Morocco

The operation to clear the slums of Karyan Thomas and Douar Skoulia in Casablanca was prompted by the suicide bombings of 2003[32] and various strategic decisions made in their aftermath. These events marked an important turning point in the Moroccan authorities' efforts to deal with substandard housing, and led to the launch of the 'Cities without Slums' Programme (CWS) in 2004. The objective of this operation, which was instigated by the King, was to eliminate all urban slums by 2010. It affected about 300,000 households (1.5 million residents) in nearly 1,000 slums, nearly a third of which were in the metropolitan area of Casablanca. The Ministry of Housing[33] and the public operator Al Omrane were appointed to implement this operation.

Douar Skouila

© Olivier Toutain, 2011.

[32] *Young men from the Douar Thomas slum in the eastern outskirts of the city carried out suicide bombings in Casablanca on 16 May 2003.*

[33] *Ministry of Housing, Urban Development and Spatial Planning (MHUAE).*

The operation involves rehousing nearly 8,400 families from two of Casablanca's largest and longest-standing slums:[34] Douar Skouila (6,077 households) and Karyan Thomas (2,405 households). It combines several types of intervention:

- Rehousing some families on the original site, in a decanting operation that entails moving residents out of one group of shacks, reorganising and servicing the affected parcels, moving the displaced households back in, and then repeating the process in another part of the neighbourhood;
- 'Resettling'[35] others in the 'integrated urban centre' of Essalam Al Loghlamon on the outskirts of the city.[36]

Site map

Source: CNES Spot image 2011 **and** Social Development Agency**.**

Families that are eligible for rehousing are divided into pairs, and each pair allocated a single plot of land to construct a four-storey building (G+3) to accommodate the two households. This is funded with help from a 'third partner' (a developer or property owner, etc.) who agrees to finance and construct the building for the two families in return for two of the four floors (usually the ground floor and first floor).

The social assistance component of this operation reflects the more open-minded attitude taken by the Ministry of Housing in the early 2000s, and its desire for a procedure that would "*facilitate operations and ensure that target populations subscribe to the programme.*"[37] This procedure, which includes information and communication campaigns, administrative and financial assistance, conflict mediation and management, and support to help households settle into their new environment, is either directly implemented by Al Omrane, or subcontracted to different social operators (Social Development Agency, private consultancy firms).

[34] *The first slums in Casablanca emerged in the 1930s, when large numbers of labourers employed to construct the Port of Casablanca lived in rudimentary housing close to the quarries that produced the stone for the port – hence the name 'karyan'(a version of 'quarry') by which slums gradually came to be known in Moroccan dialect.*

[35] *This term is used for interventions where slum dwellers are allocated housing plots that they develop or build on themselves.*

[36] *A 71-hectare site about 7 kilometres from Douar Thomas, and close to Douar Skouila. The plan is to accommodate 77,000 residents in 1,942 plots.*

[37] *Minister for Housing, May 2005.*

New housing on the resettlement site

© Olivier Toutain, 2011.

The operation is now in its sixth year of implementation. It seems to have been fairly successful despite the technical complexities of the undertaking, the scale of the displacements, and the political and social issues involved. Most of the shacks in the original slums have been demolished,[38] all the land on the new site has been parcelled up, and the new homes are nearly finished. The housing has gone up very quickly, unlike some of the other operations in the CWS programme,[39] and the public operator seems to be recovering a good proportion of the cost of the plots from beneficiary contributions. The resettlement site is well serviced thanks to an agreement to develop the sector,[40] and the new neighbourhood, which is not in the city centre, is taking shape and gradually being absorbed into the urban fabric.

This paired rehousing system also represents significant progress for the operation, as residents initially rejected it and took a while to come round to the idea.[41] The financial leverage generated by the option of getting a third partner to finance construction in exchange for a share of the building has enabled the vast majority of families, including those on very low incomes, to become homeowners without going into debt[42] or having to resell their 'bonds'.[43]

However, several aspects of the operation have been less successful, especially in slums where a large number of households stayed on the original site. Shacks are now being demolished at a much slower rate, and the process has been delayed because the decant sites are not being freed up as

[38] *Over half in Skouila, (nearly 3,000 households), and 60 per cent in Karyan Thomas (around 1,500 households).*

[39] *Follow-up studies of slum clearance operations show that self-builds can sometimes take over ten years to complete.*

[40] *A budget of 200 million dirhams, or nearly 18 million Euros, was released in 2007.*

[41] *Several decades ago, the government adopted a policy of rehousing slum dwellers based on the principle of one plot per household. This policy is now increasingly being called into question as pressure on land increases, especially in cities where the pressure is greatest. Many residents rejected attempts to rehouse two households on a single plot on the grounds that it would not be equivalent to their original situation.*

[42] *Less than 2 per cent of households took out bank loans; half of the pairs used a 'third partner' to build their home.*

[43] *Registered bond issued by Al Omrane to beneficiary households involved in clearance operations.*

quickly as planned. Progress is also compromised by resistance from the remaining households (which may be insolvent, resistant to the project, tenants, families with complex structures, or those not covered by the census), lack of land due to the increasing number of families, and people whose circumstances have changed during the course of the operation. There is now considerable uncertainty as to whether it will be completed. Institutional support dwindled once the initial impetus and dynamic had worn off, social tensions are emerging, and the situation has become increasingly politicised. In addition to this, stakeholders in the operation failed to reach a consensus on how to proceed, have pulled back and are refusing to take responsibility for delays in the operation.

Post-operational problems on the new site

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The social assistance mechanisms put in place by the public operator were inadequate in an emergency context, and reflect the fact that this is an operation with predominantly quantitative objectives. The social operators were essentially brought in to move the operation forward so that the shacks could be demolished. Lack of coordination between the technical and social activities left the social assistance units with very little room to manoeuvre – unable to carry out the socio-economic development missions planned in the contracts, or get involved in post-resettlement assistance for households once they have been rehoused.

Finally, while the type of rehousing used in this operation (paired households from the slum site, with possible recourse to a third partner) has certain advantages, it has also generated a large number of conflicts and disputes due to the lack of a suitable framework and appropriate social management.

Work on the Essalam Al Loghlam operation

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The difficulties of incorporating economic activities into the new site

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The operation to restructure El Mina *kebbé* in Nouakchott, Mauritania

The operation to restructure the *kebbé* of El Mina was a central plank of the electoral promises made by the President of the Republic of Mauritania prior to his election in 2002, and efforts to modernise the city of Nouakchott through the Urban Development Programme (UDP). This project was launched in 2001 with support from the World Bank, and was one of the largest urban projects in West Africa, if not the biggest in terms of the number of residents affected.[44]

This operation targeted the 'historic'[45] *kebbé* of El Mina, a slum south west of the city mainly inhabited by Harratine or black Moors. These groups were historically dominated by the ruling white elite, and 97 per cent of them currently live below the poverty line. This operation combined three types of action: (1) providing access to essential urban services, (2) installation and construction of basic amenities, and (3) regularising residents' land status.

El Mina *kebbé*

© Christian Vium, Gret.

The operation was steered by an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister of Mauritania, and managed by Nouakchott Urban Development Agency (ADU), which was specially created in 2001 at the recommendation of the World Bank.[46]

A resettlement unit was established within the ADU to provide residents with various types of assistance during restructuring operations: administrative (paperwork relating to eligibility for resettlement and getting electricity connected), technical (allocation/displacement) and financial (managing compensation). Like the rest of the operation, this unit was supported by numerous NGOs and local and international consultancy firms.[47] El Mina town council was involved in discussions about the operation, but the State retained overall control of the process.

The operation began in 2000. The first phase consisted of preparing studies and assessments to get a better understanding of the socio-economic and urban realities in El Mina, conducting a detailed census of its residents, establishing the eligibility criteria and defining measures to support those

[44] *The total budget amounted to $100 million over 10 years, or nearly $100 per citizen; 70 per cent of the funding came from a loan from the World Bank, and 30 per cent from the Mauritanian government.*

[45] *This settlement first appeared in the 1970s and expanded as Mauritania was hit by successive droughts. After the State undertook a series of 'heavy-handed' operations in the 1980s, Nouakchott was left with just one settlement of this kind by the early 2000s.*

[46] *The ADU was placed under the aegis of the Ministry of Amenities and Transport, through its Housing department.*

[47] *The ADU asked Gret for assistance at various stages of the operation: in defining the strategy to consolidate two pilot blocks in 2004; with implementation in 2005 and 2006; and in preparing the pre-operational study on restructuring gazras in Nouakchott in 2008. Gret has been the operator for numerous urban projects in low-income neighbourhoods in Nouakchott since the end of the 1990s, especially the Twize housing programme (1998-2008). Elements of the evaluation cited here are based on detailed knowledge of the field and actors acquired during these various missions.*

affected by the operation. These elements were formalised in a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP).[48] The next phase (2002-2003) entailed installing services in the neighbourhood, opening up the main roads and clearing spaces set aside for future public amenities. By way of compensation, displaced households were given a 120m² parcel of land in a nearby neighbourhood (free of charge) equipped with water, electricity, schools and health centres, and offered privileged access to a social housing programme.

Aerial view of El Mina *kebbé* after the servicing phase

© Lucien Godin, Groupe Huit.

The second phase consisted of 'consolidating' the grids created by the main roads, formalising the secondary road network and regularising families' land tenure status. The World Bank had advocated a consolidation-upgrading type approach that would minimise the number of displacements, and there was supposed to be a pilot operation to test this on two blocks before extending it to the 14 other blocks covered by the *kebbé*. In the end, the Mauritanian authorities opted for a consolidation-reconfiguration approach that resulted in more people being moved to another development. This was partly due to a desire to 'modernise' the city, partly to the precedent created by the servicing operation, and partly to the expected political consequences of the significant value this approach would add to the land.

[48] *According to the provisions of the RAP, each displaced household would receive a lump sum of 70,000 MRO (equivalent to 200 Euros, or just under four times the local minimum wage) to cover the cost of resettlement. In addition to this, an allocation and compensation commission (CAC) would be set up to validate the allocation of parcels, manage conflicts, define a specific, staged procedure for gaining access to ownership (issuing a badge and then, within two years of allocation, an occupancy permit once the parcel had been developed), technical and administrative assistance with resettlement for vulnerable people (help with administrative procedures, moving home, dismantling, transporting and reassembling shacks), and offering interested families the opportunity to get better housing through a social housing programme (Twize).*

The resettlement zone in Nazaha

© Aurore Mansion.

Nearly eight years elapsed between the first technical studies and residents being resettled on the new parcels. Over half of the 14,300 households affected by the operation were displaced: about 2,000 households were resettled nearby, and 5,000 were moved to isolated and poorly serviced outlying areas.[49]

Parcel plans for El Mina *kebbé*



[49] *Located about 2 kilometres from the original site of the kebbé.*

The main stakeholders in the operation (the State, local government, donor, operators and residents) regard it as a success because it reached its target and proceeded peacefully. Relations between residents and staff in the resettlement unit were good,[50] the allotted parcels were developed quickly thanks to the Twize social housing programme, and the original neighbourhood and resettlement zones have now been incorporated into the urban fabric. This exercise helped inhabitants establish or develop their own landholdings.

Meketta resettlement site

© Aurore Mansion.

However, Gret had certain reservations about the operation's impact in terms of improving living conditions and managing urban development. For example, the fact that the eligibility criteria ranked land appropriation more highly than occupation meant that tenants had no right to any benefits; some potentially eligible families were excluded due to errors in the census; and the bodies responsible for appeals and arbitration did not function well.

In addition to this, the flat-rate compensation took no account of the families' composition or estimated assets.[51] Residents were given minimal information to stop them from developing strategies in anticipation of the operation, and were not formally involved in it. Finally, initial plans for post-resettlement measures were not implemented, apart from the Twize programme, which had separate funding.

Just over one in two households were resettled in new neighbourhoods, some of which were poorly serviced when the first families moved in. This generated unprecedented costs of various kinds – socio-economic (fragmented families, severed social links, separation of social and work zones), financial (compensation, servicing several resettlement areas) and urban (the spread and management of new neighbourhoods) – which will have major repercussions on future urban operations in Mauritania.

[50] *The head of the Resettlement Unit cited several factors that helped create a climate of trust, and ultimately smooth the progress of the operation: the speed with which services were installed and the promised compensation distributed (four months for the operational phase of the displacement), and the allocation of the first and best plots to vulnerable people. This was seen as a sign of the allocation team's integrity, and the unit's ability to manage sensitive resettlement and allocation activities without political interference.*

[51] *This was less of a problem in the kebbé where the housing was homogenous, largely composed of wooden shacks. However, the same flat rate was paid in subsequent operations in the gazras, which also included solidly built housing.*

Upgrading and consolidating peri-central informal settlements in Kigali, Rwanda

The Rwandan Ministry of Infrastructure launched the Infrastructure and Urban Management project (PIGU) in 2003, in response to the exponential demographic growth and proliferation of informal settlements in the city of Kigali in the late 1990s.[52] Operational activities on the first urban project funded by the World Bank (IDA) and the Norwegian government began in June 2006, after a two-year phase of preliminary studies, and were completed in December 2010. In addition to an investment and institutional capacity-building component, PIGU also included a programme to improve living standards in three neighbourhoods near the city centre (mainly Gitega, also Cyahafi and Rwezamenyo). These sites were selected partly on account of their strategic location on the Nyarugenge plateau, near the city centre, and partly because they were classic examples of insecure housing in terms of their history, density, rough terrain, sanitation problems, and varying degrees of inaccessibility. The operation planned to implement a targeted investment programme in order to minimise the number of displacements in these settlements, which each had a population of around 25,000 people.

General view of peri-central settlements



© Benjamin Michelon.

The operation was supervised by the Ministry of Infrastructures (Mininfra), through a Project Coordination Unit (UCP) that was appointed to manage and coordinate the various aspects of the operation – producing studies, executing works, defining and applying measures for compensation, allocation and resettlement. One of the other main actors working alongside the UCP was the public works agency, ASSETIP, which specialises in managing the technical aspects of operations.

[52] *The population of Kigali more than doubled between 1991 and 2002, rising from 235,000 to over 603,049 inhabitants (according to the 2002 General Census).*

ASSETIP was created by the World Bank in 2005 during the project implementation phase, and was responsible for preparing and managing tenders, supervising technical studies and monitoring the execution of works.

The City of Kigali was closely involved in validating the choice of intervention zones and defining the implementation strategy. To ensure that the operation was transparent, the Ministry of Infrastructure set up a Resettlement Commission composed of central and local government representatives, and chaired by a representative from the Land Ministry.

At the start of the project, the local authorities had approved plans to completely demolish these settlements, which would have been very traumatic for their residents. The consultancy firm that prepared the baseline assessment pointed out the risks of an over-ambitious development; namely, that residents would be unable to make the necessary financial contributions to the project, and would be pushed out by market forces that favoured the better-off. Therefore, it suggested a much more modest intervention to improve the settlements. This was eventually validated as local elected officials wanted to release the funding for other components, although they actually intended to modify the project as it was implemented.

Projected development plan



One of the positive aspects of this project was the fact that the diagnostic assessment not only recorded these informal settlements on the map, thereby acknowledging their existence, but also showed how difficult daily life is for their residents and thus recognised their 'precarious' nature.

The preliminary studies and Resettlement Action Plan took three years to prepare, and were key tools in documenting, arguing and driving through a strategy that the authorities originally rejected. The works went ahead according to this plan, and the project resulted in the demolition of very few homes.

Bridge to the youth centre

© Benjamin Michelon.

However, it must be said that it also had serious limitations. Tenants were not taken into account, and few, mainly women, residents participated in it as casual labourers who were recruited to pave the roads.

The biggest disappointment is that this turned out to be a one-off experience, despite the positive findings of the evaluation conducted in 2010. Furthermore, it had absolutely no effect on urban policies. The Kigali Conceptual Master Plan, which was officially adopted by the government in May 2008, listed "*the progressive demolition of haphazardly constructed informal settlements*" as one of its priorities.[53] The cleared land was then supposed to be allocated to private investors to help establish businesses and generate more revenue. Kigali saw a huge wave of evictions without due compensation between 2007 and 2010, and in the end, it was private investors, not residents, that benefited the most from expropriations in the public interest.

[53] *Gasheegu Muramila and John Baingana, "City Council to reduce slums", in The New Times, 13 November 2006, cited by Benjamin Michelon, Kigali, 'Une ville durable… pour tous?', intervention at the Troisièmes controverses d'action publique - 8 & 9 October 2009. Sustainability, so what ? Retour critique sur les promesses du développement urbain durable, Lausanne.*

The programme to upgrade, restructure and regularise land tenure in Pikine Irrégulier Sud, in Senegal

In 2005, the Senegalese authorities launched a programme to construct a 34km-long toll highway between Dakar and Diamnadio.[54] The aim of this programme, which is backed by the World Bank, is to install a national-level infrastructure that will help Dakar fulfil its role as an economic hub. Section 3 of the highway bisects a 5.5km stretch of the densely populated neighbourhood of Pikine Irrégulier Sud (population 250,000). Properties in the area will need to be demolished and thousands of families moved out to make way for the new road.

Pikine Irrégulier Sud is an old settlement that first emerged in 1963, when the capital was under severe pressure from rural exodus and internal migrants struggling to cope with escalating economic problems. The authorities' response to the situation was to instigate mass evictions in various parts of Dakar. This 'bulldozer policy' and growing land speculation forced the poorest residents onto rural land around outlying villages, for which there was little demand at the time. This was the start of Pikine Irrégulier Sud. Most residents (86 per cent) have no ownership titles, but thanks to a State policy of subsidised utilities in the area, many do have access to a potable water supply (80 per cent), electricity (86 per cent) and a fixed telephone line (40 per cent). This is very unusual for this type of settlement, making Pikine Irrégulier Sud something of a special case. However, the area is still blighted by a lack of rainwater drains, and flooding is a major problem.

Flooding in Pikine Irrégulier Sud

© Papa Ameth Keita.

[54] *Preparations for this project began in the 1970s. It was launched in 2005, and pre-operational studies began in 2006.*

Typical housing in Pikine Irrégulier Sud

© Papa Ameth Keita.

Government measures to compensate for the highway-building programme include an operation to upgrade and restructure Pikine Irrégulier Sud. The aim is to reorganise the layout of the area, improve basic urban infrastructures and secure residents' land tenure, in line with government policy on restructuring and regularising land in informal settlements, and broader long-term efforts to contain them.[55]

APIX, the agency responsible for promoting investment and public works, is in charge of both the highway component and project management of this urban operation. The city council's role is to observe and help plan the process, not to finance the operation. As the body responsible for managing municipal land, it has the right to inspect any works executed on its territory, and will take over management and maintenance of the new amenities. It is represented in all decision-making bodies, and facilitates relations between the different intervening agencies (economic interest groups, consultancies, APIX, etc.).

A decree has been passed stating that economic interest groups (EIGs) should be established to ensure that local people can participate in the operation.

The project affects about 1,000 concessions in the area slated for restructuring. About 47 per cent of the households concerned (around 7,000 people) will able to stay on the site, and 53 per cent (about 8,000 people) will be moved. Economic interest groups will help families that remain on the original site to regularise their land tenure, while displaced families will receive compensation in kind (a new house built on the resettlement site) or in cash (this option is only available to title-holding property owners and on request).[56]

[55] *See in particular Decree 91-748 of 1991, setting out the procedure for land restructuring operations in undeveloped neighbourhoods in zones earmarked for urban renovation, and Decree 96-386 (which replaces that of 1991) instituting a Land Restructuring and Regularisation Fund (FORREF) to finance these operations.*

[56] *Very few property owners asked to be compensated in cash (15 of the 508 households obliged to leave the neighbourhood).*

The investment programme includes plans to install roads, sanitation and social and cultural amenities on the original site,[57] and social and cultural amenities[58] and 2,000 homes in the resettlement site in Tivaouane Peulh, 10 kilometres away.

None of the families had been moved when this paper was written, but a mechanism to monitor and support their resettlement and help the works progress has been planned and a local service provider appointed to put it in place.

The process has generally gone well so far, without any particular problems. All the studies have been completed, and residents understand and accept the proposed project. They are ready to move, the site has been marked out and everyone knows what will happen to them.

Plans to develop the resettlement area have been drawn up and the tendering process is under way. The works will be assigned to five different companies to avoid possible delays in delivering the new housing for beneficiaries of the restructuring project. However, the project is already behind schedule, which could cause problems if changes in the families' situations invalidate any assessments prepared earlier in the process.

[57] *Most of the amenities will be built on two sites: one in the centre of the zone, which is liable to flooding and will be upgraded in preparation for the new amenities; and the other on the outskirts, on private land expropriated in the public interest. The economic hub of Waranka will contain the market and transport infrastructures, and the Seven-up hub will have the educational and sports facilities.*

[58] *Planned amenities on the resettlement site include two primary schools, a secondary school, a market, a clinic, two multi-functional sports grounds, a multi-purpose social centre and two places of worship.*

The main characteristics of urban operations

The four operations presented in this paper were implemented in very different situations. They combine various objectives to provide amenities and basic infrastructures (road networks, urban services, public amenities) and secure residents' land tenure (regularising occupancy). In three of the four cases, a large proportion of residents has been or will be resettled on a different site.

Although each operation took place in a particular context, they share a number of common characteristics.

A comprehensive table of this can be found in the Annex.

Primarily political objectives

- **Operations shaped by security, economic and political concerns ...**

The official discourses and papers relating to operations funded by international cooperation agencies state that their objectives are to reduce urban poverty and inequality and improve living conditions in informal settlements. It is important to note that another, less explicit set of objectives invariably lies beneath these official pronouncements and that the urban dynamics and interplay between stakeholders in these operations are largely determined by three of these underlying objectives.

The first is directly related to the way that political decision-makers, social elites and technicians perceive informal settlements and their social dynamics.[59] They are seen as dangerous, threatening and, outside the law. Further, they are perceived to be breeding grounds for revolution,[60] terrorism,[61] political opposition or aberrant behaviour such as prostitution, drug trafficking and other forms of social deviancy. These are places that need to be neutralised, at best by upgrading or controlling them, but more usually by eliminating them and displacing their residents. Security is the primary concern here.

The second objective relates to globalisation and international competition between cities and territories. The stakes are primarily economic; the issue to attract national and international investors. Cities need to be 'modern' and inviting if they want to play on the global stage. There is a stark contrast between the ordered modernity of planned city centres and the anarchic disorder of informal settlements whose social, urban and land components need to be 'standardised' (as in Nouakchott). The aim of these operations and programmes is to transform 'worthless' spaces into profitable hubs. When land is scarce, informal settlements in prime locations are invariably demolished to liberate valuable land for public or private developments, even if these settlements are longstanding and partly legalised. Here, the primary objective is economic.

[59] *See above, What are urban informal settlement restructuring operations? Aspects of the words used to describe informal settlements.*

[60] *Remember that hunger riots and revolutions generally start in poor neighbourhoods in capital cities and major economic centres, which represent a real challenge to the ruling powers.*

[61] *The suicide bombings in Casablanca in 2003 were the catalyst for the urban operation and launch of the Cities without Slums programme.*

Informal settlements collide with urban development in Rwanda

© Benjamin Michelon.

A third objective, which is linked to the first two, relates to the recovery and distribution of land rent. This is a key source of income for the richest and most influential groups in many countries, especially in Africa, and is often the main savings and investment vehicle for people who live in informal settlements. Depending on how they recover, control and distribute land rent, political decision-makers can attract new allies, serve their supporters' interests and buy social peace. This objective is primarily political and financial.

With such high stakes to play for, governments are keen to control operations in strategic territories like capital cities or key economic centres (as in Morocco and Mauritania), and have the State step in as project manager in order to keep a grip on operations. When the issues are more technical (as in Rwanda[62] and Senegal) the main operator has more room to manoeuvre.

- **… but not urban policies**

Security, economic and political objectives directly determine whether or not an operation is likely to maintain, consolidate or eradicate the target settlement or neighbourhoods. They reflect the way that these informal settlements and their residents are seen, and their place in the city.

Yet most of these operations and programmes are disconnected from thinking on urban policies and institution-building processes (legal framework, actions to reform and strengthen the capacities of relevant institutions and administrations). Rather than seeking to bridge the gap, cooperation agencies often exploit this divide, at best only looking to link in with sectoral policies on land (mainly registration) or social housing.

Where urban planning tools do exist (master plans, local development plans, sectoral plans for urban resettlement, sanitation, etc.), they are usually limited to the formal city, and focused on legal urban developments, business districts, residential areas and large public development operations. Any urban development in informal settlements is done through successive operations.

[62] *In Rwanda the political issues seem to have been played out outside the operation.*

This creates several problems. On one hand, operations do little to address concerns about land speculation, deal with existing informal neighbourhoods or prevent the formation of new settlements. On the other, such actions rarely amount to more than isolated pilot projects (as in Rwanda[63]) or standardised large-scale programmes (as in Morocco, although there was some adaptation to local situations in this case).

With isolated operations, steep increases in land and property values in the target areas invariably create a 'pull factor', trigger land speculation and lead to market evictions. Large-scale programmes implemented in the absence of policies to ensure that enough good quality land of different types is available and accessible to poor residents ultimately help drive them into the outskirts, far from employment hubs. This not only pushes them into further poverty and insecurity, but also increases the density and degradation of existing informal settlements.

- **Contradictory policies and projects**

Willingness to take account of the different environmental, social and economic dimensions of operations can generate contradictory objectives. These then require certain political compromises, which reflect both the international balance of ideological power and the ambiguous attitudes to policies among donors and national and local actors. The same actors who are prepared to let economic interests take precedence over environmental and social concerns in the name of liberalism, private ownership or globalisation also promote policies that are favourable to poor neighbourhoods and their residents (which are usually much less generously resourced).

Such contradictions may be internal to the project, as in the case from Mauritania, where the desire to limit displacements was overridden by concerns about urban continuity. Restructuring the neighbourhood according to standards and plans in force in other parts of the city was seen as a more important objective than minimising resettlements off-site. Another factor was the recovery of land rent, which certainly contributed to the outcomes of this operation.

These urban operations also function in different spaces and timeframes, which are not always compatible:

- The spaces taken up by the neighbourhood, the city and the urban agglomeration (city centre, urban and rural outskirts);
- The project, donor and policy time frames, and the time needed for urban and social integration in the new settlements or renovated sites.

Social dynamics within neighbourhoods are shaped by the conflicting and contradictory interests of individuals who may be seeking to develop or even profit from their holdings (usually the better-off), struggling to survive, or trying to defend the rights of the weakest and thus most vulnerable groups (women, younger siblings, tenants, dependents). If these interests converge, the number of beneficiaries may increase, as they did in Mauritania (more rights holders and parcels allocated). Conversely, the development focus may shift from the poorest to the wealthiest groups. This raises the more general question of what the real social target of these operations is, and how it is identified and clearly defined on the ground.

Operations can secure settlements on their original site and initiate improvements that will make beneficiaries less likely to sell their assets if they have social assistance mechanisms and procedures that take account of the diverse interest groups concerned and help build compromises. In fact, there have been cases where residents have organised themselves and imposed their own conditions on these operations.[64]

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[63] *It is worth noting that this operation was technically replicable, but that the authorities were unwilling to repeat it in Kigali.*

[64] *NGOs working in India and 28 other countries support residents who have formed savings groups and initiated, steered and interacted with the public authorities on slum rehabilitation projects. They are part of the global federation, Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI). See Quick Guides for Policy-makers. Housing the poor in African cities. Quick Guide n° 5: Housing finance. Ways to help the poor pay for housing. UN-Habitat. Cities Alliance, Cities without slums Nairobi, 2010, p. 53.*

The World Bank: A key actor in urban operations

The World Bank has been a driving force in promoting and funding urban operations since the 1970s.[65] In 2001 it published measures setting out the funding requirements for these operations, Operational Directive and Operational Policy 4.12 on 'involuntary resettlement' (known as BP and OP 4.12), which marked a fundamental change in the way that such operations are designed and implemented.

World Bank Operational Policies and Procedures for involuntary resettlement (OP 4.12)

The main aims of these policies and procedures are summarised below. They are to ensure that:

- Displacement to the minimum, exploring all possible options for doing so within the project design;

- Operations are undertaken as development programmes;

- Local people are given the opportunity to participate in the planning and implementation of resettlement programmes;

- Local authorities and civil society actors are informed, and maximise their involvement and participation in the planning, implementation and monitoring of resettlement;

- Resettlement plans should safeguard the need for displaced persons to be kept informed and be consulted and compensated for the loss of any goods caused by the operation;

- An operational framework for resettlement is be developed, specifying eligibility criteria, measures to support displaced persons during resettlement, specific measures for vulnerable people, and mechanisms to resolve potential conflicts;[66]

- A census is conducted to identify people likely to be affected by the project;

- *Ex ante* environmental and social impact assessments are conducted to determine the potential negative/positive impacts of the intervention and identify measures to mitigate/optimise these effects.

Since its adoption, OP4.12 has become the conceptual and operational framework for informal settlement restructuring operations in urban areas funded by the World Bank and other donors (such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Agence française de développement).

The operation in Morocco was a national initiative largely inspired by international recommendations on slum clearance, especially those of the World Bank.[67] The other three operations (Rwanda, Mauritania, and Senegal) were implemented at the instigation of the World Bank.

Our cross-cutting analysis of these four cases shows that OP4.12 is limited in its ability to deal with local practices. In the three cases where it set the mandatory conditions for operations, the political officials concerned did the bare minimum to meet their partners' requirements, and adapted the framework to their particular circumstances and vision of the operation. The World Bank seems to have been more concerned with the reporting requirements (mainly fulfilled by international experts) than the fact that the mechanisms for social assistance and local government and residents' participation

[65] *The emblematic Parcelles assainies project in Pikine was one of the World Bank's first urban projects, in 1972.*

[66] *A manual on preparing resettlement action plans was published in 2005 by the International Finance Corporation, which is part of the World Bank group.*

[67] *Cf. Julien le Tellier 'Programme Villes sans bidonvilles et ingénierie sociale urbaine au Maroc', in Julien le Tellier, Aziz Iraki (coordinateurs), Habitat social au Maghreb et au Sénégal. Gouvernance urbaine et participation en questions, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2009, INAU, Rabat, 2010.*

were largely ignored, or that these operations resulted in avoidable displacements. Paradoxically, the World Bank failed to enforce one of the most innovative aspects of its policy. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that this was because the compensation for displaced residents was funded by the governments concerned.

Operational mechanisms need greater social and local focus

- **Project management driven by political and technical imperatives rather than local concerns**

The institutional mechanisms in these case studies show that the World Bank and national project managers tend to prioritise the political and technical aspects of urban operations rather than their social dimensions. Project management was assigned to public works agencies such as AGETIP[68] and the technical operator Holding Al Omrane in Morocco.

The main options for these four operations were determined by national governments and agencies, and mainly executed by national-level bodies. When operations are subject to tight political control, the technical operators are expected to accelerate progress on the intervention (as with the restructuring of El Mina *kebbé* in Morocco), while the deconcentrated authorities' task is to frame and manage sensitive activities such as conducting censuses, drawing up lists of rights holders, and overseeing allocations, demolitions, displacements and conflict management.

Certain activities are undertaken by international and local experts. How much influence they have depends upon the political priority given to the operation, the type of mission (technical, social, political) and the opportunities for technical and social experimentation.

Where OP4.12 has made significant advances is in increasing the use of external, local or international service providers to conduct impact assessments, prepare Resettlement Action Plans, determine the level and form of compensation, and devise strategies and operational mechanisms for informing residents and/or facilitating their participation.

Their missions sometimes extend to programme implementation. This may involve delivering particular technical services (as in Mauritania) or working through the social operator (as in Senegal). In some cases they may be able to influence the investment programme component, as they did in Senegal and Rwanda, by adjusting certain planning regulations (mainly reducing the amount of land taken up by roads) and adapting the project in order to minimise displacements. However, this is not always possible.

Local governments have the least power among intervening agencies. Their involvement is usually limited to formal inclusion in the bodies responsible for steering the process, and possibly consultation on the choice of neighbourhoods, resettlement sites and development options (as in Rwanda and Senegal). Often (as in Mauritania and Morocco) their capacity to exert any influence depends more on their ability to manipulate local networks and political relationships than their territorial management responsibilities. The extent to which they are involved depends on the level of decentralisation in the country, the strategic importance of the operation for the central government, and whether they support or oppose the ruling party. The municipal technical services play a very minor role in such operations.

[68] *The World Bank created a large number of public works type agencies in the 1980s and 1990s, such as AGETIP and, more recently, AMEXTIPE and the Agence de développement urbain (ADU) in Mauritania, APIX in Senegal and ASSETIP in Rwanda, to address the lack of such actors and competences in countries where it finances infrastructure operations (managing public markets, tendering processes, supervising technical studies, project and business management). These agencies have been sustained by funding from donors and government-funded public contracts. In 1993, 19 executing agencies formed the association AFRICATIP (l'Association africaine des agences d'exécution des travaux d'intérêt public).*

The use of city contracts as framework partnership documents in Morocco and Rwanda is an interesting development,[69] but there needs to be a genuine political will and sufficient resources to ensure that they are consistent.

- **Lack of participation by residents**

Residents are in a strategic position, as operations cannot proceed without their practical and financial cooperation. They have the capacity to oppose or block the process (whether they are organised or not), and are sometimes required to make financial contributions to the programme. When participatory procedures are put in place, their collaboration in defining and implementing actions is also sought, either directly or through existing organisations and groups.

Participation is one of the weakest aspects of three of these four operations, even though it was a pre-requisite for international support. The exception in this respect is Senegal, where economic interest groups (EIGs) have been set up and involved in defining development priorities and negotiating resettlement and compensation arrangements.

In the two cases where residents were consulted on development choices (Senegal and Rwanda), the investment programmes were more modest, with greater emphasis on improving existing neighbourhoods (especially improving internal services and incorporating settlements into the urban fabric) and reducing the impact of displacements. More examples will be needed to generalise this analysis.

Participation in Morocco is limited to consultation, and is politically controlled. In Rwanda, beneficiaries were invited to express their opinions at meetings held at various stages of the project now however, this had little impact because they were not very well organised. As for Mauritania, participation was channelled through neighbourhood dignitaries and was highly politicised.

Public information session in Rwanda

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[69] *City contracts were signed in many operations in the Cities without Slums Programme in Morocco, although not in the case studied here. The operation in Rwanda led to this type of contract, but we do not have sufficient information to evaluate its impact.*

None of the mechanisms that these three projects put in place to listen to or inform residents were inclusive or democratic. When residents did participate, it was through other channels, outside the spaces created by the projects. Although they were not formally consulted by the authorities, input from residents in Mauritania and Morocco led to the selection of eligibility criteria that maximised the land and property benefits of the operation, regardless of the impact this decision would have on displacements. The World Bank does not seem to have intervened in either of the cases.

A meeting of the Allocation and Compensation Committee in Mauritania

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- **Social assistance subordinated to technical objectives**

The social aspects of these operations are usually managed by the technical operator with overall responsibility for the works.[70] Mauritania is an interesting exception in this respect, as the Urban Development Agency (ADU) was made responsible for social concerns and the Housing Department in charge managing the technical aspects of the operation. This created a space to strengthen national competences, build a team and increase awareness of the need for social assistance, although the ADU was still concerned with the technical aspects of land matters.[71] In the end, however, the social assistance was scaled down because greater priority was given to completing the operation quickly and the technical options proved more expensive than originally anticipated.

The social assistance in Mauritania and Morocco was primarily used to help drive the operations forward. Activities mainly consisted of information and administrative and financial assistance for displaced families, and were dictated by the technical schedule. Most problems tend to arise at the end of the operation, when operational support has slackened off and only the more complex cases are left to be managed.

[70] *The body or person who determines and funds the social assistance missions is responsible for overall management of the social aspects of these operations. The missions themselves are carried out by specialist teams.*

[71] *The ADU covers the capital, and AMEXTIP the rest of the country.*

An example of 'tail-end' problems in Mauritania

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The social assistance in Senegal is well-funded, thanks to a favourable institutional and legal framework. This component has been assigned to local service providers.

In Rwanda, social assistance is limited to finding out what residents expect from the operation, reflecting their aspirations in the development options, and using local labour to execute certain works.

There is little or no post-operational support[72] to help residents start or resume economic activities, build their homes or adapt to their 'new' life on or off the original site.[73] This is largely due to the lack of knowledge and experience in establishing local mechanisms to promote and support economic and social development, and lack of post-operational institutional support. Yet these neighbourhoods can change rapidly as a result of residents' efforts to consolidate and invest in the area, creating an urban fabric out of the blank canvas often left by these operations. These dynamics can be very vigorous, but often reinforce inequalities as they are generally self-funded and unregulated.

- **Monitoring mechanisms and tools dominated by technical and economic considerations**

Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are often quite weak. There is also a strong tendency for technical criteria to take precedence over social and environmental criteria, and for performance indicators to focus on physical or economic progress. For instance, the rate at which shacks are being demolished, housing built in new neighbourhoods or ownership titles issued (Morocco); the number of displacements per day or per month (Mauritania); the rate at which costs are being recovered, or the operation's financial balance sheet. Social indicators such as levels of income, changes in family makeup, configuration of the neighbourhood (new buildings) and type of conflicts are neither defined nor documented. This is despite the fact that they can be useful in predicting the kind of support that

[72] *Cf. 'L'étude d'évaluation et d'impact du Programme d'appui à la résorption de l'habitat insalubre et des bidonvilles au Maroc', an ongoing study by the Gret-AREA group.*

[73] *Post-operational socio-economic assistance activities are planned in Senegal, but the operation has not reached this stage yet.*

families will need and how the operation will progress, and improving the way that these procedures are managed.

Operations and programmes are evaluated on a regular basis, and post-operational impact assessments are now also undertaken to measure their social effects. These missions, which are usually requested and funded by donors, cast a necessary critical eye over the mechanisms and outcomes of urban operations. Yet little is done to encourage professionals and practitioners to develop or discuss their findings, even though such mechanisms and tools are needed to consolidate and disseminate the many positive innovations in this field. They also make excellent training tools.

Conclusion
Options for improving the quality of operations

Well-defined target groups and clear eligibility criteria

Defining and identifying 'who has rights' is a crucial aspect of operations. Yet it is frequently impaired by:

- broad eligibility criteria that often exclude tenants (Mauritania, Morocco) and fail to provide safeguards to prevent operations encouraging speculative behaviour;
- the censuses used to allocate plots and housing,[74] which are supposed to provide a reliable, detailed and accurate picture of occupancy, but are actually rarely objective. Furthermore, they freeze constantly evolving socio-economic realities at a 'cut-off date',[75] taking no account of the fact that people's circumstances are likely to change during and after the operation.

Given the diverse socio-economic situations in informal settlements, and the speculative behaviour often associated with urban operations, it is important to have clearly specified targets and sufficient resources to correctly identify beneficiaries in the field.

This question of defining and identifying who has the right to be included in operations is discussed in **Sheet n° 1**.

Multi-actor and multi-dimensional mechanisms for long-term support

Despite the World Bank directives, most social support mechanisms shut down when project execution ends. These studies show that political and institutional support tends to dwindle as the operation progresses, which makes it difficult to see land regularisation processes through to completion. There are periodic activities to facilitate access to housing improvement programmes and productive micro-credit (such as the Twize programme in Mauritania) or put families in touch with utility providers (electricity, water), but very few mechanisms to help residents deal with the potentially traumatic issues and changes generated by these operations. As a result, there is a danger that slums may reappear several years later due to lack of post-operational support and increasingly dense housing conditions.

[74] *UN-Habitat, GTLN. Count me in: Surveying for tenure security and urban land management, 2010. (http://www.gltn.net/index.php?option=com_docman&gid=231&task=doc_details&Itemid=24).*

[75] *World Bank methodology and terminology.*

Operational assistance needs to be supplemented by long-term support mechanisms to help residents and neighbourhoods integrate into the social and economic fabric of the city. These mechanisms are not directly within the operators' remit, but are broader urban management issues.

These support mechanisms are complex, as they involve interventions in various domains that are not addressed upstream, and are implemented by diverse actors who may not be prepared to manage informal settlements and their residents. Some of the issues raised by the institutional setup and long-term management of operations will be developed in **Sheet n° 2.**

The importance of social assistance

The cases from Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal suggest that significant progress has been made in terms of the importance accorded to social assistance activities in these operations.

Project managers are more or less agreed on the need to plan for these mechanisms during the implementation phase, but there is still a long way to go in establishing them upstream and downstream of operations. This could be done through institutional support (building the capacity for interaction and dialogue between social and technical project managers), and by defining the social operators' mandates and strengthening their capacities.

Proposals for consolidating the place and role of social assistance activities in operations are developed in **Sheet n° 3**.

Greater participation by residents

The extent to which residents participate in operations largely depends on the cultural context. Participation does not come about of its own accord, even if it is planned and residents are given a space to make their voices heard. It is also often weak and subject to political control. Residents are diverse, and may have different expectations and visions of their neighbourhood's future. Furthermore, the weakest and most vulnerable residents are often least able to participate.

Levels of involvement range from a total lack of participation to close collaboration that gives residents a meaningful role in operations. Various approaches and mechanisms need to be established, according to the specificities of the neighbourhood and the operation, the political context, the characteristics of local civil society and the competences available at the local level.

The participatory aspect of operations will be explored in greater depth in **Sheet n° 4**.

Support for involuntary resettlements

Involuntary resettlement of some or all residents may be necessary, for technical or political reasons. When it is genuinely unavoidable, every effort must be made to provide various kinds of support to reduce the negative effects of displacement. Very specific technical, economic and social measures need to be taken before, during and after resettlement to ensure that it proceeds in the best possible way for both the operators and families concerned.

Support for involuntary resettlements is a key issue. It is discussed in **Sheet n° 5**.

Diversify approaches to securing land tenure

Many operations aim to regularise residents' land tenure, but have failed to achieve this objective because they focus on individual ownership titles as a means of securing tenure. There are other options, such as hire-purchase, collective ownership, prescriptive rights, etc., which have not been properly explored in the contexts covered by this study.[76] In the last few years experts and international organisations have moved forward in the debate about whether it is better to legalise or secure tenure.[77] The next step is to convince national decision-makers. Even more importantly, the focus needs to shift from discussing principles to identifying realistic modes of implementation in different national and local contexts.

Sheet n° 6 looks at the challenges of securing land tenure in the context of restructuring operations.

More innovative financial setups and mechanisms

The operations under consideration here used classic funding mechanisms, apart from Morocco, where more diverse sources of funding were sought. Operations to upgrade and restructure neighbourhoods are expensive, especially when they involve compensation for resettlement and include major investment programmes. National and local authorities have little capacity to invest in such projects, which can only be implemented if donors provide subsidies and discounted loans. It is important to adapt financial products and modes of funding to suit different segments of the population, and to think more carefully about financial balance and cost recovery in order to secure resources for so-called 'insolvent' groups that need to be highly subsidised.

The financial balance of operations and question of whether residents should be expected to make financial contributions to development efforts are explored in greater depth in **Sheets 7 and 8**.

Better monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are designed to aid decision-making; facilitate reporting on project execution, and help document learning and development processes. In the operations covered by this paper, they were mainly used to report back to national decision-makers and international donors on the technical and economic progress of operations. Voluntary procedures are needed to incorporate social, economic, urban and environmental impact assessments into monitoring and evaluation. Decision-making and steering processes also need to be improved by using more rigorous methods and tools, conducting a public debate about operations, and through more determined support from donors. Monitoring and evaluation should not be restricted to managers and experts; the operators and decision-makers concerned also need to be involved in the negotiation, mediation and learning that this process entails.

The objectives and possible modes of monitoring and evaluation are discussed in **Sheet n° 9**

[76] *Cf. Edésio Fernandes, Regularization of Informal Settlements in Latin America, Policy Focus Report, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2011.*

[77] *See Alain Durand Lasserve, Geoffrey Payne, Jean-François Tribillon, Philippe Lavigne Delville and other authors who have published numerous articles defending this point of view.*

Nine strategic themes to improve urban operations in informal settlements

How to use these sheets

This second section examines the strategic themes identified during the literature review and crosscutting analysis of the four case studies. Each theme represents a line of work that can help make urban operations more effective tools for improving living conditions in informal settlements.

Each of the nine themes is explored in a sheet that considers various strategic or structural questions. The content of the proposed responses will obviously vary according to the local situation, the institutional and political context, and the objectives and type of operation concerned.

These nine 'catalytic' questions are set out below:

- Sheet n° 1 – Who is the target of restructuring operations?
- Sheet n° 2 – Where do operations begin and end? How are they steered?
- Sheet n° 3 – How does social assistance fit into urban operations?
- Sheet n° 4 – Why and how are residents involved?
- Sheet n° 5 - Under what conditions should residents be displaced?
- Sheet n° 6 - How are land issues managed?
- Sheet n° 7 - How are operations funded?
- Sheet n° 8 - Should residents be 'made to pay' or be 'paid', and how?
- Sheet n° 9 - Why and how should operations be monitored and evaluated?

These sheets are not intended to provide universally applicable 'formulas' or 'turn-key tools', but to provide useful frameworks and references that will help the designers, decision-makers and operators involved in urban development improve their practices.

The sheets are divided into three sections, as follows:

- An overview of the question: what are the issues, ongoing debates and different views on this particular question?
- A summary of the four experiences studied: how was this particular issue dealt with in the Moroccan, Mauritanian, Rwandan and Senegalese operations? The four cases illustrate each point differently, depending on the subject and its relevance to each operation, the information available, and the stage that the operation had reached when this paper was written.
- Lessons and recommendations to guide the actors responsible for operations as they establish their procedures and plan activities associated with this theme.

Although the sheets are presented in a particular order, they can be read separately as stand-alone references.

This is a huge topic, so these sheets are by no means exhaustive. While some themes clearly need to be explored in greater depth, our experience has enabled us to make more operational recommendations on others.

The main focus here is on the methodological options likely to improve the social outcomes of urban operations. This focus shaped the way that we approached the task, and is the result of the way that we read the operations, our field practices and the objectives of our social mission as a development NGO.

Sheet n° 1 – Who is the target of restructuring operations?

Overview of the question

The question of who has the right to benefit from the various compensation or resettlement measures on offer is clearly strategic. Since the scope and cost of an operation will vary according to the selected eligibility criteria, it is also important to consider the factors on which these criteria are based. Before going into the case studies in any detail, we will examine the difficulties that operators encountered in identifying those with the right to participate in operations once the eligibility criteria were defined.

- **Determining the reference units for local practices**

The socio-economic groups and buildings found within informal settlements are never completely homogenous. Relatively 'well-off' residents may live next to very poor households, and shacks made of wood or recycled materials intermingle with solidly constructed, sometimes very good quality housing.

Arafat *gazra* in Nouakchott, Mauritania

© Hélène Julien

Modes of appropriating and occupying land may be equally varied within the same neighbourhood. Each settlement is a combination of social and spatial units – such as the household, family, extended family, and shacks, rooms, houses, concessions.

Social and spatial units

Every neighbourhood can be broken down into several spatial units:

– The paths, roads and amenities that structure and organise public spaces;

– The shacks, rooms or houses that constitute the main private living spaces. Other rooms or constructions with specific functions are incorporated into or added onto these spaces (kitchens, sheds, toilets, showers, etc.);

– Concessions or parcels containing one or more building and outbuildings (kitchens, sheds, etc.). These spaces are not necessarily physically demarcated;

– Units of production (artisanal workshops, shops, formal businesses);

Several types of social unit can be identified within these spatial units:

– Households or families structured around an individual or couple, who may or may not be responsible for children;

– Large or extended families, or so-called 'complex' families composed of one or more households and other affiliated people (younger siblings, unmarried cousins, widows, relatives, etc.). Large families are usually controlled by the head of the family.

Home life in Africa is generally structured around the extended family (several affiliated households or persons living under the authority of the head of the family). This extended family may own several dwellings or rooms or live in a single house, depending on their available resources and capacity to build. Therefore, the configuration varies from one family to the next, and one concession to the next. The only way to understand the socio-spatial realities in these neighbourhoods is to conduct field surveys.

The plans below are taken from the case in Mauritania.



The eligibility criteria for an operation are based on these socio-spatial units (shack, house; family, household), and the 'benefits' of the operation (compensation, plot, housing, etc.) are allocated to individual units. Failure to clearly define these units can lead to confusion and delays in implementation.

- **Complex land and property situations**

Informal settlements are characterised by the fact that most of their residents occupy land and buildings on an 'irregular' basis. Some may have negotiated unofficial settlement rights with the local authorities (prefect, mayor, customary authorities) or private owners (formal or otherwise), but they will very rarely be given any documents testifying to that right. A minority of families may hold ownership titles. Some of these families will live in the neighbourhood, others elsewhere.

Three key factors in modes of appropriating land and buildings

Different modes of appropriation lead to different types of occupation: housing may be permanently occupied by the owner, rented by tenants, inhabited, or empty but with the owner known to neighbours, etc.

The situation is determined by three factors:

– Land ownership: whether the occupant holds/does not hold an official document recognised under current laws;

– Home ownership: whether the occupant built/did not build their home;

– Home occupancy: individuals may or may not occupy housing that they have built or which they rent, and may be neither the owner nor the tenant of the housing they occupy (free lodging)

These situations may be further complicated by the fact that more than one title has been issued for the same parcel.

Defining the eligibility criteria for urban operations is a strategic stage of the process. Who will be eligible to participate in an operation? Families who live in the neighbourhood on a permanent basis but rent rather than own their home? People who don't live in the settlement but own property there? In operations funded by the World Bank, this is done when the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) is drawn up, in which case, decisions about 'who is eligible' are made on the basis of detailed socio-economic, land and building surveys (census).

- **The census: a decisive stage in the process**

A census is a detailed exercise to identify and register residents and buildings, and establish lists of rights holders. This decisive stage in the process also raises the question of which procedures should be put in place to tackle the various strategies that actors use to capture the benefits (land and housing) generated by the operation:

- Actors from outside the neighbourhood who see these operations as an opportunity for speculation, capitalisation and wealth generation. They buy or construct cheap shacks or makeshift buildings in order to be allocated land or housing that they then sell or rent;
- Residents seeking to obtain more parcels or housing than they would automatically be allocated. The four main strategies in the operations studied were:
  - Speculation, usually by better-off groups;
  - Survival strategies, mainly seen in groups that are poor but well-informed or connected to people likely to influence the allocation process (census enumerators, topographers, local authorities, etc.)
  - Building up holdings that can be sold or rented to release cash for living expenses or passed on to descendants;
  - Individualisation, mainly among people who are excluded from access to ownership by rules of inheritance, social conventions (women) or family situations (cohabiting households, unmarried youth, etc.).

Numbered houses in Mauritania, Senegal and Rwanda

© Aurore Mansion, Papa Ameth Keita and Benjamin Michelon.

Census operators are well aware of these strategies and deal with them in various ways, largely by controlling the preliminary information given to residents. Some use surprise tactics, sending in large census teams without giving residents any advance warning; others opt for a process of upstream information. There are never any obvious solutions, and their effectiveness varies according to the context of the intervention.

Summary of the experiences

- **Mauritania: more eligible households than originally anticipated**

The government promised that residents affected by the operation to restructure the ***kebbé*** of El Mina would be given land, although the only known factor when the operation started was the housing conditions in the settlement. There were no reliable, detailed data on residents' living standards or how they occupied and used the space.

The public operator started a census to establish the baseline situation for the overall project to restructure the ***kebbé*** without having decided on the eligibility criteria for the operation or the unit for parcel allocation. The information gathered for each of the units surveyed was recorded in two ways:

- A family sheet recording information about the head of the household,[78] the type of housing, the household's tenure status and its constituent members;[79]
- A photograph of the head of the household with a sign showing the number used to identify the household.

Each family was given a census number, which was painted on their home. At the end of the census, 14,319 family sheets were registered for a total population of 50,978. This figure was well above the original estimates, which put the total number of residents in the ***kebbé*** at 37,000.[80]

When the census was finished, a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) setting out the eligibility criteria for the operation was established in accordance with the World Bank directives. This document specifies that "*all owners of habitable and inhabited buildings surveyed during the census in 2000 will be eligible for resettlement. The notion of a habitable building excludes sheds, verandas, tents, shops and other structures that are clearly not designed for habitation. We do not recommend making tenants and people living rent-free eligible for resettlement benefits. This would risk setting a precedent that would be very difficult for the Mauritanian authorities to manage in the future*".[81]

[78] *Family name, first name, occupation, region of origin, level of education.*

[79] *Relationship with head of household, level of education, age.*

[80] *These estimates were calculated as part of the preparatory studies undertaken by Urbaplan.*

[81] *Giovannetti F., Plan d'action de réinstallation. Restructuration du quartier El Mina à Nouakchott, Amextipe, Nouakchott, December 2000.*

Discrepancies between the initial hypotheses and the census findings

These discrepancies can be put down to several factors.

The original methodology and estimates prepared by the census operator used the concession as the reference unit. Residents had not been consulted about this, and refused to complete the census until the operator agreed to take shacks as the basic unit rather than concessions.

According to the final report, the total result (14,319 households) included an estimated five per cent of 'fictitious' households – families that own several shacks which are not all used for housing, and had registered several members who were not heads of household. For example a man, his wife and their young son and daughter might each be recorded as the head of household in four shacks belonging to the same family. This 'family multiplier' tactic had been anticipated.

The second means of registration (photo) was intended to counteract this tactic by enabling enumerators to cross-check information. However, this was not always possible as the family sheets and photographs were not necessarily done at the same time. A total of 14,315 photographs were taken and 14,319 family sheets completed, sometimes with several photos for one sheet and none for others. The discrepancy between the number of family sheets and the number of photos was due to a logistical problem: the census operator did not have enough photographers, so they sometimes photographed the heads of household the day after the census enumerators had filled in the family sheets.

The operator noted these limitations in his final report, but was unable to correct the census due to political pressure to move on to the implementation phase, as the objective was to finish servicing the neighbourhood before the presidential elections in 2003. In a sense it was too late anyway, as all the actors concerned had used this first list as their baseline reference, setting the course for the entire operation to restructure the *kebbé* of El Mina.

As a result, tenants were excluded from the operation, despite the recommendations made several months later in a social impact assessment study: "*we propose that the criterion for eligibility to acquire a plot is to be any kind of resident of the* kebbé *(owner or tenant). This would avoid encouraging speculation by wealthy people who live in other neighbourhoods. Some of them keep poor families [in their property] as guardians while waiting for the land to be parcelled up, and then move them out once this has been done*."[82]

In the end, the eligibility criteria defined in the RAP were not used to correct the baseline reference generated by the census. This meant that tenant households were classified as speculators from outside the neighbourhood, and were never accurately quantified.

The operation was eventually implemented using an erroneous baseline reference, which inevitably created problems further down the line. It enabled people from outside the neighbourhood to obtain cheap plots at the expense of some of the neighbourhood's 'real' residents; and impeded overall implementation, as the resettlement unit had to focus on resolving errors in the census rather than working on support measures to facilitate the resettlements.

- **Senegal: taking tenants into account**

The first stage of the operation to restructure Pikine-Sud consisted of an economic, environmental and social evaluation of the highway project. This was conducted in 2006 to assess the buildings and residents on the land affected by the highway (socio-economic characteristics and land tenure). The evaluation concluded that a significant number of tenants would be involved, as 45 per cent of the buildings' occupants were tenants and 38.1 per cent were 'owners'.

[82] *Martella A., Étude d'impact social El Mina, Ryiad, Dar Naim, Teyarett Nord, Amextipe, January 2001.*

The next step was to prepare a resettlement policy framework[83] in accordance with the World Bank provisions. This specified the criteria defining 'persons affected by the project' (PAP) who can benefit from assistance, and measures to compensate for losses suffered as a result of the operation.

Tenants were classified as PAPs, partly because they constitute a large proportion of residents, and partly because the operation aims to be a sustainable development programme. The Resettlement Action Plan prepared between 2007 and 2008 proposes three types of compensation for tenants:[84]

- A compensatory payment equivalent to six months' rent;
- A lump sum to help find new accommodation, calculated at one month's rent (at the level currently paid by the family) plus the cost of brokerage fees;
- A payment to help with resettlement and development calculated at a fixed rate per room and capped at 50,000 francs CFA per family.

The concession was selected as the baseline unit for allocating compensation. The team responsible for the RAP conducted a field survey to identify PAPs and gather all the information needed to calculate the compensation payments on this basis. The survey, which took six months to complete (July-December 2007), registered 1,800 concessions that would be affected by the highway clearance operations. The fieldwork was undertaken by two separate teams:

- A team of researchers, which went from concession to concession filling out the family questionnaires and photographing rights holders;
- A team of technicians, which was responsible for refining the concession plan, and listing and numbering every building and plot.

The RAP team opened an office in the neighbourhood so that owners and residents who were away when the teams conducted the surveys could be included in the process.

Balancing information and disinformation

The RAP operator noted that the enumerators encountered several problems while working on the inventory of holdings and census of residents:

Lack of information created a climate of mistrust and suspicion about the survey: "*Some of the unpleasantness the teams encountered in the field (verbal and armed threats, physical aggression, prayers in the mosque ill-wishing researchers, etc.) was due to ignorance and lack of understanding among certain owners. This climate of mistrust meant that the RAP coordinator had to increase the number of field visits and interviews to convince these people that the project was appropriate and the RAP was transparent and fair.*"[85]

People also made false statements in order to obtain compensation for fictitious tenants, subdivided concessions, etc. The operator released very little information about the types and amounts of compensation planned for tenants in order to avoid an excessive increase in this category of residents.

When this paper went to press, the RAP for the operation had been validated but none of the residents moved. These resettlements will inevitably carry certain risks, given that the operation "*will mobilise several billion francs CFA, and see hundreds of parcels allocated to beneficiaries with little education or knowledge about their rights. There are a huge number of temptations in this kind of situation ...*"[86] That is why the operator is tasked with supporting all 'persons affected by the project' (PAPs) throughout the resettlement process – organising residents into economic interest groups, restarting their economic activities in the resettlement area, providing support to help children adapt to their new schools, and so on.

[83] *The Urbaplan-Ingésahel group was responsible for this work.*

[84] *Cf. Urbaplan-Ingésahel, Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), 'Élaboration d'un plan de restructuration des quartiers de Pikine-Sud traversés par l'autoroute Dakar-Diamniadio', APIX, Senegal, September 2008.*

[85] *Ibid.*

[86] *Ibid.*

Lessons learnt and recommendations

- **The need for joined-up thinking on eligibility criteria, the unit of allocation and the restructuring strategy**

The eligibility criteria, units of allocation and restructuring strategy for urban operations are closely interlinked, and need to be dealt with accordingly. In the case from Mauritania, these three elements were disconnected, determined independently of each other and without reference to any socio-economic studies. Failure to discuss the terms 'household' and 'concession' with all the actors concerned at the start of the process led to ambiguities and opened the way for opportunistic behaviour.

In the Senegalese case, the eligibility criteria and unit of allocation were defined before the census, and an impact assessment enabled the team to measure the neighbourhood's real level of occupancy. The purpose of the census was clear, in that the enumerators knew what information they needed to gather from the field, and tools were put in place to identify 'genuine' rights holders (information and monitoring mechanisms).

These two cases show the steps that need to be taken when defining a restructuring strategy:

- At the beginning of the process, agree on the definitions and establish a common understanding of the different types of land use. This entails 1) preliminary socio-economic studies, 2) working with operations managers to decide on a definition for each term, which should be tested and validated in the field with residents.
- Do not start thinking about the eligibility criteria until these definitions have been agreed. This should be done as part of the restructuring strategy, and taking account of the fact that the selected criteria will determine the allocation units for parcels and housing. These units will in turn have an impact on the social acceptability of the operation, the amount of land and possibly the amount of housing needed, and the associated development costs.
- Decisions on the eligibility criteria need to be made according to:
  - the objectives of the operation: is it a development project, or to provide amenities or infrastructures? Is it a development project that also aims to improve living conditions?
  - the costs of the different possible hypotheses for the criteria;
  - the social impact, i.e., the groups that will be included in or excluded from the operation;
  - the possible impact on other clearance operations, programmes or policies being planned;
  - the census can only begin when these decisions have been made, the necessary safeguards put in place, and account taken of the selected criteria.

- **Managing opportunistic strategies is largely a matter of political will**

The examples from Senegal and Mauritania show that identifying rights holders can be an extremely risky stage of the process. Also, that certain tools can be used to accurately identify legitimate rights holders and counteract efforts by residents to fraudulently maximise the benefits derived from the operation. These tools come in various forms:

- **Technical surveys**: using several types of survey materials (sheets to gather socio-economic data, photos of rights holders, physical markers, GPS surveys when densities allow) makes it possible to cross-check the information gathered in the field, and identify inconsistencies that may be due to misrepresentation of the facts.
- **Information mechanisms**: these two examples show that information can be a double-edged sword, allowing residents to plan strategies for circumventing the rules. It is worth remembering that officially disseminated information will be circulated through parallel channels and captured by those with the most social, economic and political capital, to the detriment of the most vulnerable groups. It is better to organise broad information sessions for all social groups, to clearly explain the programme objectives and eligibility criteria, and make residents aware

that manipulating information can have serious consequences for the individual and collective benefits of the operation (allocation in outlying areas, etc.).

- **A mechanism for sanction and control**: experience has shown that it is not enough to rely on well-informed residents to act in 'good faith'. A mechanism for sanctions and external control is needed, possibly involving surveillance during survey periods. While the operators responsible for the surveys clearly need to have the capacity to exclude possible fraudsters, it is ultimately a matter of whether there is sufficient political will to apply the criteria in a transparent and equitable manner, since representatives of the ruling powers are often involved in granting special privileges to certain people, and may even be guilty of corruption or nepotism.

- **Tenants need to be more involved**

Many informal settlements include large numbers of tenants, who are often among the poorest and most vulnerable residents. Not taking them into account, or not planning measures to ensure that they have access to housing at the end of the operation can encourage people to give false statements, 'increase' the density of existing neighbourhoods, or even create new informal settlements. The case from Mauritania shows that speculative behaviour is not reduced by excluding tenants as beneficiaries.

Tenants can be involved in these operations in various ways:

- Putting in place compensation and specific support to rehouse tenants in new neighbourhoods, as in the case from Senegal.
- Developing a credit mechanism that is adapted to tenants' incomes, to enable them to gradually buy or build their own accommodation.
- Assistance in formalising contracts between owners and tenants in order to control rent increases.

None of these solutions are entirely satisfactory. Other responses could be envisaged, tailored to the specific characteristics of this category of residents and the development dynamics in the neighbourhoods concerned, which inevitably lead to higher land and property prices. Resources need to be available upstream in order to move forward on this issue and gather information about tenants' socio-economic situations, expectations, capacity to pay for housing, etc.

- **Possible alternatives to the practice of using 'cut-off dates'**

One of the major problems in these operations is the contradiction between the need to 'fix' one aspect of social and urban reality at a given moment, and the dynamic nature of this reality (births, deaths, marriages, separations, arrivals, departures, etc.). Because operations usually take several years, cut-off dates that freeze the situation in these neighbourhoods at a particular point in time can lead to exclusion and injustices if no provision is made for changes in family circumstances during project implementation. In concrete terms, this can be done by:

- Planning conditions and rules that can be applied when family circumstances change. This should be done at the outset of the operation and when the eligibility criteria are defined
- Creating a commission to register changes, and a mechanism for updating the database on rights holders
- Sensitising the relevant administrations and ensuring that they have the necessary resources to produce official documents confirming changes in family circumstances.

Sheet n°2 - Where do operations begin and end? How are they steered?

Overview of the question

Restructuring operations are often viewed as a series of technical or social activities to be undertaken in a logical order over the three main stages of the process: preparation, implementation and post-operation.

Most effort is expended on the preliminary technical studies and execution of the works. As a result of the World Bank provisions, preliminary studies with environmental and social impact assessments are now mandatory in certain operations. These are usually fairly standardised, although some operations also include socio-economic studies, which can be quite detailed. The post-operational phase is often limited to land regularisation programmes and managing the 'tail-end of operations' or clearing up difficult cases.

- **Viewing operations as processes**

Talking about 'project cycles' may give the impression that operations progress in a linear fashion. However, this is rarely the case. Urban operations are often implemented over very long periods, and several years may elapse between a strategy being defined and implemented. In the meantime, certain actors may come and go, and institutional and political support may wax and wane. All these changes have implications for the operational strategy, which also has to deal with numerous unanticipated difficulties that invariably arise during implementation. Sometimes a simple adjustment is all that is needed, at other times a major rethink is required.

Urban operations are made up of economic, social and institutional activities that are implemented by different actors – the State, technical operators, social service providers, residents (who may or may not be organised) elected officials, donors and experts. All these actors have their own vision of the operation's objectives and expected outcomes, and there may be several conflicting visions within a single organisation.

It is also important to remember that the protagonists involved in all the mediation, negotiations and decisions behind these operations do not have the same capacity to influence decisions. Compromises that are reached at certain points in the process may be challenged further down the line. Some are thrashed out in the formal, multi-actor spaces usually put in place for policy guidelines and technical follow-up; others are reached elsewhere through power relations and the interplay between actors and local and national political arenas.

- **Operations are not ends in themselves**

Just as the technical, social, urban, environmental, institutional and economic dimensions of operations are managed by different actors, so are the territories affected by these operations. Here the key players are local governments and sectoral administrations (which may be deconcentrated),

operators from the private sector (especially banks, and businesses), residents and grassroots organisations.

With so many different players involved at various levels, consultative bodies need to be put in place to ensure that operations are steered properly.

Another issue that needs to be addressed is how to determine when an operation is finished. When is it time to pass the baton to ordinary actors? How is the transition made from a 'project mechanism' to a 'territorial management' mechanism?

The structure that is used to steer a project is important in several respects. The two most common types operate through a project management unit or within a national mechanism, with responsibility for coordinating the different institutions assigned either to the head of a national project (with technical backup), or directly to the technical assistance provider. It is crucial that this mandate is included in the terms of reference for the project management unit or the technical assistance.

Summary of the experiences

- **Rwanda: strong diagnostic phases but lack of political support**

The feasibility study for this operation was prepared by the consultancy firm Urbaplan. It took two years to complete, and was conducted in three phases:

1. Preparing a city-wide assessment and strategy: this involved analysing the social and spatial issues and producing a typology of informal settlements; defining the intervention's scope and strategy around three entry points (avoiding displacement whenever possible, planning swift investments, modest upgrades to existing neighbourhoods); and proposing several target neighbourhoods;
2. Defining a strategy and preparing a five-year investment plan for selected settlements (needs analysis, quick financial estimate, nominating one priority neighbourhood);
3. Producing a three-year priority programme for the chosen neighbourhood (detailed financial, administrative and technical plans).

The proposed approach had several advantages:

- It extended beyond the target neighbourhood and took account of problems in the city as a whole;
- It generated shared knowledge about the city and neighbourhood;
- It developed a shared vision and strategy for action that mobilised all stakeholders at the start of the process;
- It generated reference documents that made it possible to stick to the stated objectives, despite attempts by the local authorities to change an upgrading exercise into a clearance and resettlement operation.

The main weakness was the lack of real political support for the procedure, although the operation took advantage of the political uncertainty to switch to an innovative approach that focused on urban issues and took account of residents' concerns.

Unfortunately this operation has not been replicated. Furthermore, subsequent operations have been assigned to private operators whose job is to ensure that residents are evicted and to clear the land for conversion into economically viable spaces.

- **Mauritania: finding a universally acceptable compromise**

The operation to restructure the *kebbé* of El Mina was a central element of the presidential electoral campaign and government-backed projects to modernise the city.

An inter-ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister of Mauritania steered the operation as a whole, while technical aspects were managed by the Department for Housing and Town Planning,[87] and social aspects by Nouakchott Urban Development Agency (ADU). The ADU was also responsible for executing some of the works.

The objective to minimise displacements was not achieved, as just over one in two households had to leave the settlement.[88] This was due to the restructuring strategy and development options that were chosen, setting the household as the unit of allocation, allocating each household a 120m² parcel, and consolidating and reconfiguring the original site according to a grid system.[89]

Local actors were generally positive about the process, even though there were more displacements than originally planned due to efforts to respond to all the protagonists' expectations and interests:

- residents' strategies to maximise the benefits of the operation,
- the government's leniency in managing the allocations (in order to maintain social peace, keep its supporters happy and ensure that the operation maintained its momentum),
- the World Bank's lack of control over the strategy, which resulted in a high level of displacements,
- the political, electoral and financial gains anticipated by elected municipal officials, who were not closely involved in the process.

The situation was probably least satisfactory for the technical experts and international NGOs that were involved in the process. In the end, the practices used to distribute parcels were rarely replicated, and the financial, socio-economic and urban costs of the operation seem to have been quite steep. These actors had little influence on the strategic choices made by the government, and may have ended up feeling that they had been brought in to fulfil the donor's conditions.

- **Morocco: the limitations of multi-partner management**

Operations in the 'Cities without Slums' programme involved actors at three main levels:

- the State, through the Ministry of Housing, Town Planning and Urban Development (MHUAE), the director of the 'Cities without Slums' programme and the Ministry of Finance, which was responsible for funding it;
- the agency assigned to manage the project, Holding d'Aménagement Al Omrane, which was responsible for executing the operation on behalf of the MHUAE;
- the local authorities[90] (governor, pasha, bosses) responsible for compiling the list of beneficiary households and procedures for allocating parcels and demolishing shacks.

This operation was monitored by a provincial committee that brought together all the stakeholders in the field (the commune, a delegation from Housing, Al Omrane, and the Social Development Agency) and was chaired by the governor.

In reality, the elected officials were largely sidelined by the project and had little say in the decisions that affected them. These were mainly taken by the technical operator and local representatives of the State. The lack of a framework for multi-partner governance reflects the minor role that local

[87] *Under the auspices of the Ministry of Works and Transport.*

[88] *Of the 7,000 households displaced, 2,000 were resettled in an adjoining area, and 5,000 were moved to a poorly serviced area 2 kilometres from the original site with few links to the city.*

[89] *There would have been fewer displacements if the neighbourhood had been consolidated/readjusted, as the plan would have been adapted to the existing structure.*

[90] *Deconcentrated State bodies represented by governors in the prefectures and provinces, and by Walis in the main county towns.*

governments, associative organisations and residents have played in implementing the 'Cities without Slums' programme. This is partly due to the emphasis on security following the suicide bombings of May 2003, and fears that the project would be influenced by political or religious concerns.

The national ministries for Health and Education were not involved at the start of the project, and therefore were not in a position to plan or budget for the planned social and public amenities in the resettlement site.

To resolve this problem, the government made an exceptional budget of 18 million Euros available to construct these amenities, and brought the sectoral departments back into the process. However, the resources needed to manage and staff them have yet to materialise.

Local governments have not been prepared to take over the post-operational management of the resettlement site, and banks have not been prepared to grant loans through the mechanism that the State put in place for this purpose.[91]

Lessons learnt and recommendations

- **Use preliminary studies to formulate city-wide strategies**

The case from Rwanda shows that preliminary studies can help raise awareness of the realities of these neighbourhoods among institutional actors, who often have little or no understanding of informal settlements despite their prevalence. Generating this kind of knowledge helps legitimise these urban spaces and their inhabitants.

The Rwandan city-level assessment and strategy for action led to a decision to make a minor intervention in the pilot operation, followed by further modestly-funded actions in other neighbourhoods .

- **Establish multi-actor spaces for dialogue during the preliminary study phase**

The Rwandan example also shows that the preliminary study phase is a key point for building compromises on a restructuring strategy that is acceptable to all protagonists (the State, elected officials, technical operators and residents).

Technical and social studies are not only useful in producing technical or specialised knowledge. They are also an opportunity to bring different actors together to discuss the operation, identify its main objectives and formulate shared responses to the following questions: What problems are we hoping to address through these operations? At what level do we want to act (housing, land, amenities, poverty alleviation, etc.)? What are our priorities? Which neighbourhoods and social groups do we want to target?

- **Dialogue requires good outreach capacities**

Experts mobilised for these operations do not always have the necessary outreach capacity to facilitate dialogue between different actors. The issue here is not so much developing technical knowledge as understanding and managing the balance of power, and thus the political dimension and dynamics of the process. This is only possible if the facilitator is mobilised over a long period, and has developed a thorough understanding of the social relations at play.

The bodies responsible for steering and monitoring the process are generally the best spaces for dialogue, although this is not always possible in local contexts. Negotiations may also take place outside these bodies, as in the case from Mauritania. Therefore, the agency responsible for dialogue should establish links with relevant actors outside these bodies.

[91] *The Moroccan State had put in place a guarantee fund for bank loans for households with low and irregular incomes.*

- **Involve local governments in project management to ensure post-operational support and territorial management**

Urban operations end when the works are completed, but they often leave behind huge building sites, especially in resettlement areas. As the example from Morocco shows, amenities are not always planned, completed or functional. Families have to rebuild their home or, if it is provided by the operation, adapt to their new environment. Several factors need to be taken into account in this respect: the numerous administrative procedures to be completed, access to schools and health services, and public transport to get to and from work and avoid social isolation.

As the bodies with primary responsibility for managing their territory, local governments need support so that they can work alongside State ministries and public works agencies, and gradually assume responsibility for managing these operations. Technical assistance programmes and missions should include a capacity-building component to enable them to do this.

Sheet n° 3 – How does social assistance fit into urban operations?

Overview of the question

- **Two categories of activity**

Activities in restructuring operations fall into two main categories:

- Technical activities, which include all the tools, mechanisms and tasks involved in preparing, implementing and monitoring the physical and spatial aspects of the project (infrastructures, amenities, housing and restructuring);
- Social assistance activities, whose main functions are to provide methodological assistance for the technical actors, reinforce the social aspects of the operation, and enable beneficiaries to appropriate the project.

We could add a third category: organisational and institutional activities. These include putting in place steering, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and staff training and institutional support to help develop the organisations, programmes and policies concerned. These activities are sometimes part of a programme or a programme-specific component – as in the Infrastructure and Urban Management project in Rwanda, which aimed to deliver institutional development support and capacity building for urban actors. This mainly focused on planning and financial management capacities.

In many projects, technical and town planning activities take precedence over social and institutional initiatives. In contexts where "*the 'solution' to the 'problem' is primarily seen in terms of its architectural, town planning and technical components, the social, political and economic aspects are not viewed as the main elements of the problem, or the primary focus of the intervention.*"[92]

In recent years, pressure from international partners and social movements has shown that social assistance is needed to optimise development efforts and harmonise the spatial and social aspects of projects. However, various technical and political obstacles need to be overcome before this theory can be translated into action.

[92] *Les interventions en bidonville au Maroc. Une évaluation sociale, Françoise Navez-Bouchanine, op. cit., pp. 41-42.*

- **Characteristics of social assistance**

The five main types of social action missions in restructuring projects

Françoise Navez-Bouchanine identifies five main types of social action mission in her guide to mechanisms for social action in projects to clear substandard housing in Morocco:

– Information (top-down, horizontal or bottom-up): ensuring that information circulates between the different intervening agencies (workshops, meetings, reporting back, etc.);

– Intermediation, mediation, consultation, negotiation: finding compromises, reaching consensus (conflict management, consultation meetings, etc.);

– Managing the social aspects of change: organising and monitoring residents' displacement from their original neighbourhood to the final resettlement site (preparing files, helping with the move, financial assistance, transitional or temporary housing, etc.);

– Socio-economic development actions: supporting and/or initiating socio-economic development activities in neighbourhoods (funding projects, etc.);

– Outreach and capacity building: encouraging residents to appropriate the project and new settlement (help setting up associations, creating training centres, etc.).

These missions come at different phases of the operation. Some are crosscutting (conflict management, information), while others are more intermittent (preparing files, financial assistance).

It is not easy to determine how much time is needed to implement activities such as organising consultations between groups of actors, resolving conflicts, mobilising certain institutions and managing information.

These activities require a range of technical and social skills – institutional analysis, listening, communication, negotiation, conflict management[93] – that are deployed to 'get things done' and support the people, groups and institutions involved in the operation, rather than 'do things for' them.

Because the bodies in charge of technical activities rarely have all the necessary social expertise in-house, activities are often spread between several agents from different organisations (consultancy firms, NGOs, grassroots organisations, administrations, local government services, technical operators).

- **Interdependent and complementary activities**

Situations range from projects with virtually no social activities to highly participatory initiatives. The social actions scenario should take account of the type of project concerned: some are 'sewn up' from the start and only offer limited opportunities for change, while others are more open and provide greater scope for 'improvisation'.

[93] *Vincent de Gaulejac, Michel Bonetti, Jean Fraisse, L'ingénierie sociale, coll. Alternatives sociales, Syros, Paris, 1995, p. 121.*

Summary of the main phases and activities in a typical urban restructuring operation

Before (pre-operational)

1) Preliminary studies, whose nature may vary according to the objectives of the operation: *socio-economic assessment*, analysis of previous operations, urban policy, etc.

2) Assessing the settlement, with a survey of the existing parcel plan, buildings, soil studies (in certain cases) and *census of residents*.

3) Defining an initial intervention strategy and sometimes an *ex ante social and environmental impact assessment*, a programme for the operation and a plan of the neighbourhood to be restructured, taking account of urban planning regulations, standards and utilities.

4) *Preparing an action and resettlement plan when involuntary resettlements are anticipated: this should identify rights holders, calculate compensation, and determine information and support measures, steering and monitoring mechanisms and grievance procedures.*

5) In certain cases, additional land will be needed to rehouse all or some households on a temporary or permanent basis.

During (operational)

1) Developing and preparing possible sites for resettlement or rehousing.

2) *Compensation for residents and/or contributions to the development effort.*

3) Total or partial demolition/relocation of the original housing, freeing up the occupied space.

4) *Displacing/resettling residents* in their allotted parcels/housing (in the original neighbourhood and on the resettlement site).

5) Installing infrastructures (electricity, potable water, sanitation, roads) and amenities; possibly constructing housing.

After (post-operational

1) Assistance in reconstructing/improving housing (technical support and help obtaining finance).

2) *Access to basic services (water, electricity, education, health, public transport, etc.)*.

3) *Securing access to land*.

4) *Support for socio-economic activities*.

(Predominantly social activities are shown in italics).

While the explicit and implicit performance criteria partly determine how social missions fit into the overall operation, the box above shows that technical and social activities are in fact interlinked and interdependent. This can create bottlenecks if they are poorly coordinated. Social operators often have to follow the technical agenda, but they do come to the fore in crisis situations, at least temporarily.

Summary of the experiences

- **Mauritania: conflict management through social assistance**

The Urban Development Agency (ADU) was created in 2001 to implement the informal settlement restructuring operations planned in the context of the Urban Development Programme, which was funded by the World Bank. The ADU managed both the technical and social aspects of the operation.

The ADU's Resettlement Unit was responsible for preparing administrative documents, allocating parcels, compensating displaced households and helping vulnerable families through the resettlement process. International technical assistance was provided to help the unit establish the necessary methodology, procedures and tools during the servicing and pilot consolidation phases. The unit had to deal with numerous conflicts, which were mainly caused by:

- Errors and omissions in the census, which was used to determine whether residents were eligible to benefit from the operation. No-one was eligible unless they had completed a census form. However, certain families and individuals managed to complete several forms so that they could obtain more land, some missed out because they were away when the survey was conducted, and others completed the census but were not registered on the database;
- Contested allocations: the plan was to allocate plots in the resettlement area so that whenever possible families would have the same neighbours in the old and new sites. Putting this idea into practice proved to be more challenging than expected, as many plots in the original *kebbé* had more than one shack on them – in which case, the new plot was allocated to the owner of the shack with the largest footprint. Many families felt that they would be better off staying where they were (especially during the consolidation phase, because the resettlement zone was far away, isolated and had few amenities), and contested the allocations even when surveyors were involved in the decision-making process.

The Resettlement Unit was directly responsible for managing most disputes. A local NGO acted as a mediator during the servicing phase, and called upon the allocation and compensation committee if it was unable to resolve a disagreement.

The unit's task was also complicated by the fact that social and political relations in Mauritania are structured by the tribe, which means that conflicts are not always managed through institutional channels. It is not uncommon for residents in informal settlements to have family links with members of the State apparatus, so the unit sometimes had to deal with decisions that had been passed down 'from above' rather than taken within the framework of the operation.

Nevertheless, the operation generally proceeded fairly quickly and without too many disputes. It was officially considered closed in 2008, although a number of 'recalcitrant'[94] households remained on the original site. The resettlement unit was unable to deal with these problematic cases because it had been moved on to other tasks.

[94] *So called by the head of the resettlement unit.*

- **Morocco: social assistance subordinated to operational objectives**

Social assistance for residents is a relatively new feature of slum clearance operations in Morocco,[95] which was initiated in the early 2000s and tested in several urban development projects.[96] In the project to clear Thomas and Skouila, this mission was given to the Social Development Agency, the public body responsible for poverty reduction, and the private service provider Team Maroc.

Social assistance tasks and missions in Morocco

The teams that deliver social assistance in slums usually work to an agreement or service delivery contract with the public operator. These teams are generally composed of a project director and extension agents, whose task is to:

– keep residents informed about the different components of the project;

– provide administrative support and help prepare the paperwork for beneficiary allocations;

– mediate and manage claims arising from the project, especially relating to the allocation of plots or apartments (when several households live in a single shack, disputes between landowners and tenants, etc.);

– provide financial assistance for households, intermediation with banks and credit agencies.

The social assistance teams were only called upon during the operational phase, when they were brought in to help drive the works forward and meet the performance criteria (number of shacks demolished, construction rates in the resettlement site, cost recovery rates). They were not mobilised upstream, when the operation was planned or in the period before the decant to the resettlement site; nor were they called in downstream, to provide economic and social assistance for residents that had been moved to the new site.

Two different approaches: technical and social

Disagreements over certain organisational and operational aspects of the project were largely due to the fact that the Social Development Agency and the technical operator Al Omrane came to the operation with different intervention programmes.

The technical operator was focused on achieving results, and wanted to get on with the easiest elements of the operation – families that had volunteered for demolition, resettlement, one- or two-household shacks, and families living on public land.

The Social Development Agency wanted to start further upstream, analysing the different social situations (straightforward cases, large families, families with businesses, opponents of the operation), and defining a strategy and rules to help manage all these possible variations throughout the process.

Their differences came to a head over a block of shacks in *douar* Thomas, whose joint owners and tenants do not want to be rehoused (the rest of the site is publicly owned land). This question has not been resolved, and the block remains an intractable problem that is delaying the evacuation of the shacks and implementation of the decanting operation.[97]

[95] *It was introduced by the Ministry of State for Housing (SEH), with support from social science researchers led by Françoise Navez-Bouchanine.*

[96] *In 2008, 23 social support contracts for slum clearance operations were awarded to different public operators (Al Omrane, Idmaj Sakan...). These contracts covered 58, 000 households and nearly 20 per cent of the planned CWS programme activities, mainly in Casablanca (Nouaceur, karyan Thomas, douar Skouila, Errahma) but also in other cities such as Salé, Agadir, Laayoune, and Kénitra.*

[97] *A decanting operation consists of freeing up one part of the site or housing while the works are going on, and then resettling or rehousing residents on this area.*

Although the social assistance was supposed to have helped accelerate progress, it actually seems to have thrown up more problems than it resolved because certain aspects of the operation had not been adequately prepared (access to finance from banks, tenants, etc.).[98] The Social Development Agency was also unable to carry out its planned socio-economic missions on the resettlement site.[99]

- **Senegal: social assistance in all three stages of the operation**

The Senegalese government ran a tendering process and appointed a group of national consultants and NGOs (Ingésahel and Enda Graf) to help resettle families displaced by the construction of the Pikine-Keur Massar section of the Dakar-Diamniadio highway. This assistance will start when families receive compensation and continue until they are finally rehoused in new resettlement sites or other areas. The objectives of this support are to:

- Establish the baseline situation for different categories of affected residents through socio-economic surveys, visits and individual interviews, and by establishing a geographic information system;
- Prepare and implement a plan to support and monitor the resettlement;
- define and implement an appropriate communication strategy;
- Identify actions to improve living conditions and promote socio-economic and cultural activities in the new resettlement zones.

A multi-disciplinary team has been put in place to implement this procedure, which includes a combination of technical and social activities (information system, socio-economic survey, help setting up projects; information and awareness-raising, social assistance). One of the main challenges of this approach will be finding solutions that are consistent with decisions made by the government and the technical execution agency responsible for constructing the highway (APIX), and which also respond to residents' concerns.

Lessons and recommendations

- **Lack of social support upstream and downstream from operations**

These case studies show that it is generally agreed that operations proceed more smoothly when households are given administrative and financial assistance. Social support would seem to be equally important in managing disagreements and conflicts.

In three of the four cases, social support is weakest upstream and downstream from operations (Senegal being the exception).

Upstream, social assistance can be useful in various ways: producing reliable socio-economic data, conducting, updating and adjusting censuses, defining rights holders, determining what levels of compensation and contribution are acceptable to residents, identifying possible social risks,[100] defining the priorities for development and amenities (especially in resettlement zones), planning and coordinating technical and social activities, and determining how information about the operation will be circulated.

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[98] *Olivier Toutain, 'Retour sur l'expérience d'accompagnement social des projets de résorption de l'habitat insalubre au Maroc', in Lamia Zaki (ed.), L'action urbaine au Maghreb,enjeux professionnels et politiques, Paris, Karthala, 2011.*

[99] *In the framework of its agreement with Al Omrane, the Social Development Agency had planned for a budget of about 500,000 Euros to implement socio-economic development activities with families once they had been resettled.*

[100] In her *Guide de l'accompagnement social des populations*, Françoise Navez-Bouchanine identifies five main risks: opposition or blockage by groups that may affect other residents; problems associated with the relocation or complete eradication of certain economic activities; insolvency or insecurity among people who find it difficult to integrate into the new residential, economic and social context created by the project; the deficiencies or even total lack of amenities on resettlement or rehousing sites; concerns about local power games, and ownership or power being undermined.

Downstream, post-operational support with housing, access to services and socio-economic assistance is equally important. It also involves dealing with individuals or groups who are resistant to the programme, and assistance in regularising land tenure and recovering the expected contributions from beneficiary households.

- **Promoting social project management in operations**

To compensate for the fact that social operators often take second place to their technical counterparts, it would be advisable, whenever possible, to have signed contracts assigning management of the social and technical aspects of the operation to specialists who will be responsible for coordinating the two components and ensuring that they function properly.

When project management is weak, as is often the case, it is essential to have contracts specifying where the different operators stand in the operation, what their objectives are, and how they will coordinate with each other (see next point). The place given to social operators in decision-making bodies will be an important factor in these considerations.

- **Clarifying and formalising the social operators' mandate in a contract at the start of the project**

The social action scenario[101] will vary according to the local context, any institutional analysis that may be undertaken, and the openness of the project. The objectives and missions of the social support should be defined accordingly and validated by the overall project manager, the delegated project manager and the social operator or operators concerned.

At the start of every operation, all intervening agencies should sign a contract setting out:

- the objectives of the urban operation and social support mission,
- the distribution of roles and missions, with a detailed, step-by-step breakdown of the tasks, and guaranteed funding,
- how the technical and social planning will be coordinated,
- what part the agencies will play in the bodies steering the process,
- indicators of economic and social outcomes [102] (such as the degree to which residents are kept informed, the number of conflicts and how they are dealt with, the number of organisations contacted, proportion of expected contributions recovered from residents, initiatives or projects undertaken by residents that have been supported, number of households assisted).

- **Capacity building**

Social assistance workers often need to improve and broaden their skills. This could be done by creating specific general and professional training programmes, putting in place capacity-building programmes in donor-funded operations, and organising regular team meetings to discuss their experiences.

[101] *Term used by Françoise Navez Bouchanine.*

[102] *This expenditure is often justified to decision-makers by focusing on the costs/benefits for the families and wider community, and on the savings made thanks to this activity. cf. Vincent de Gaulejac, Michel Bonetti, Jean Fraisse, L'ingénierie sociale, op. cit.*

Sheet n° 4 – Why and how are residents involved?

Overview of the question

- **Should residents be involved?**

Development policies generally tend to encourage democratic processes that involve stakeholder discussion, participation and consultation – as much on account of their cost as their effectiveness.

Informal settlement restructuring operations have attracted a good deal of attention and generated numerous initiatives on every continent, with participation "*as the new guiding principle for public action and main ideological dictum among international bodies*".[103]

Yet participation is not really a new idea, especially in Africa, where residents are usually closely involved in financing and building their cities and neighbourhoods. What has changed is the fact that these practices are now being recognised and channelled in the framework of government-driven operations.

Advocates of participation claim that it leads to more effective operations with clearer and better-tailored objectives, results in greater understanding and acceptance of decisions, mobilises local knowledge and skills, facilitates implementation, reduces costs and improves cost recovery rates.[104]

Its detractors argue that far from ensuring an element of stakeholder control over public actions, participation is more of "*a strategy by governments in developing countries to meet the demands of international actors and gain access to international aid finance*".[105] In their view, the gaps between imported procedures and local systems for dialogue and debate open the door to manipulation and abuse.

Other critics argue that these lengthy and expensive processes are not appropriate in emergency situations or when finances are tight.[106] Finally, some maintain that these procedures compete with local governments, diverting power and resources that are rightfully theirs away from them (elective democracy vs. participatory democracy).

This is a complex debate that looks set to run for quite a while. Here, we will consider two of the arguments in favour of participation.

In practical terms, participation is a matter of improving the relationship between supply (housing, amenities, services) and demand (residents' diverse situations and expectations).

In political and symbolic terms, involving residents amounts to recognising that social groups, which are often stigmatised or ignored, have the capacity to make positive contributions to the development

[103] *Françoise Navez-Bouchanine, Les interventions en bidonville au Maroc. Une évaluation sociale, ANHI, Rabat, 2002, p. 257.*

[104] *Handbook on best practices, security of tenure and access to land, How to implement a housing programme. UN-Habitat, Nairobi, 2007, p. 48.*

[105] *Françoise Navez-Bouchanine, Les interventions en bidonville au Maroc. Une évaluation sociale, op.cit., p. 272.*

[106] *Papa Babacar Diouf, 'L'ingénierie économique et sociale dans les projets de lutte contre l'habitat insalubre à Dakar, Pikine et Guédiawaye (Sénégal)', pp. 225-243, in Le Tellier Julien, Iraki Aziz (eds), Habitat social au Maghreb et au Sénégal. Gouvernance urbaine et participation en questions, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2009, INAU, Rabat, 2010.*

and management of their city. Participation changes the social relations between policy-makers, experts, technicians and residents.

- **Possible types of participation**

The next question is how to get residents involved. Participatory approaches require time, money, rigorous methodologies and specific skills. Their feasibility also depends upon the nature of the regimes in place and the maturity and dynamism of civil society. These conditions vary considerably from one operation and local context to the next.

Levels of participation range across the scale from very 'passive' or vertical to highly 'active' and horizontal.[107] The box below presents a typology of the different forms of participation observed in several programmes, projects and sectoral and cross-cutting development initiatives that claim to implement participatory methods.[108]

Rough typology of 'participation' in urban projects

'Contributive' participation: based on the idea that sustainable amenities require financial contributions from local residents. When public finances are tight, residents need to contribute to investment in public services.

'Consultative' participation: residents or their representatives are asked to provide the information needed to execute actions.

'Deliberative' participation: the actions to be undertaken are discussed with the actors concerned. Consultation is organised at different levels and the resulting ideas are negotiated. The objective of these exchanges is to hear the views of different members of the public and encourage collective appropriation of future actions. The proposed framework allows for open debate.

'Accountable' participation: Joint management and negotiated partnerships are the rule here. Actors are made accountable and decision-making is shared. This type of participation encourages the emergence and development of local authorities, and is the transitional phase towards empowering participation. These modes of participatory management are most often found in development actions.

'Empowering' participation: organised residents manage the action autonomously. Actors have considerable room to manoeuvre in making decisions and taking action, and are responsible for controlling, initiating and putting in place joint actions. Support from technical teams is sometimes needed to ensure that actions are steered effectively. As the most elaborate form of participation, this is hard to put in place, and requires long-term specialist support.

It should be remembered that there are many other types of participation apart from the formal frameworks envisaged by projects and programmes. These include social and power relations (which are often intensified by the prospect of change or the expected benefits of an operation), and overt or covert support or opposition to particular causes by various groups or movements.

- **Participation is not a given**

It is often assumed that people will naturally mobilise once a project has put in place a framework for participation. However, this is not necessarily so, for various reasons: individual fears about the consequences of an operation, suspicions about the initiative and its political backers, or lack of time and money to devote to activities that are invariably voluntary. People may be put off by previous, sometimes traumatic experiences with operations, or a mutual lack of understanding and mistrust of government representatives. Economic insecurity is another powerful disincentive to participation.

[107] *J.-E. Beuret, La conduite de la concertation, Politique sociologie, 2006, 342 p.*

[108] *Source: B. Michelon, J. Dos Ghali, J.-C. Bolay, A. Dahman Saïdi, A. Nejmi, M. Tamim, M. Tozy, M. Yghir, and J.-J. Simond. 'Électrification rurale décentralisé: les leçons de la vallée de l'Ouneine', in Cahier de la Coopération N°7, EPFL, Lausanne, 2010.*

- **Different social groups have different visions for the future of their neighbourhood**

More attention also needs to be paid to the diverse and complex social dynamics in these settlements. People's expectations and ability to contribute to an operation are not only shaped by the economic aspects of the programme; they are also influenced by other factors such as gender, political, religious and community affiliation, position within the family, length of residency in the neighbourhood, and so on.

- **The question of representation**

Most projects rely on residents' 'representatives', whose legitimacy and representativity is often questionable. While the practicalities of an operation make it hard to avoid appointing a limited number of interlocutors for the project, their selection is rarely made on neutral grounds – whether they are chosen by the project team or imposed by the local authorities.

These representatives tend to be neighbourhood dignitaries or leaders. They usually belong to the best-educated and most affluent groups, and are often the longest-standing residents of the settlement. They are also more culturally and linguistically at ease than other members of the community when dealing with local policy-makers, project teams and international experts. At best, they have a certain vision of the general interests of the neighbourhood, but they may equally focus on those of a small group.

There is a strong possibility that their vision will differ from that of less influential groups lower down the social scale, who rarely find a place in participatory mechanisms because there are very few spaces where they can express themselves freely.

- **Lack of parity in dialogue between residents, decision-makers and technicians**

Even if they do belong to the neighbourhood elite, residents' representatives may still be constrained by their understanding of the institutional framework or grasp of the operation's objectives and constraints, their technical knowledge, or capacity to argue their case and speak in public – especially when the working language is not the local one. In short, there are huge inequalities between these individuals and the technical and institutional actors with whom they have to work.

Their ability to participate in discussions on an equal footing may be further hampered by the attitude among decision-makers and technicians. Some of these actors seem to assume that they have knowledge, the law and authority on 'their side', and are dealing with ignorant, possibly illegal occupants who are out to profit from the operation and may constitute a threat to authority. It is not uncommon to see a kind of condescending benevolence based on the idea that "these people should be grateful for what we're doing for them".

If the participatory process is to function, intervening agents need to change their attitude to residents and show that they are more open and transparent, willing and able to listen, consistent in their messages and what they say and do. Such changes can take time and require interventions by specialist trainers.

Summary of the experiences

- **Rwanda: a highly participatory objective, but limited implementation**

In accordance with the World Bank's project funding requirements, one of the three objectives of this operation's component 'Improve living standards in informal settlements' was for "representatives of beneficiary populations to participate in defining priorities."

Efforts to implement this objective were constrained by a poorly structured civil society, and a public accustomed to strong central government institutional frameworks and decisions made without local

consultation. In this case, participation consisted of numerous interviews and meetings with residents and representatives of local authorities, and field observations.

The main outcomes of participation in this operation are summarised below:

- The site of the operation and resources to be mobilised were chosen in conjunction with the City of Kigali and district officials;
- The programme of work was adjusted to reflect the priorities and contributive capacities of the families concerned,[109] by prioritising the improvement of internal services, local amenities and recreational spaces;[110]
- Residents were paid to work on road paving activities, especially women, widows and youth. Previous experience[111] had shown that this type of action helps people regain their sense of self-worth and earn their neighbours' respect, while enabling them to put money aside for housing or school fees.

- **Mauritania: highly politicised participation**

In Mauritania, the political parties introduced a nationwide system of basic units composed of 100 households. Each unit elects a president by a show of hands, usually a dignitary, who is ultimately answerable to the central government.

The president trains members of his or her unit and acts as a conduit for top-down and bottom-up information (about complaints, claims, opposition activities, etc.). As president of the unit, dignitaries influence both the residents that they represent (and who vote for them) and the State apparatus. Within the framework of this urban operation, they acted as indirect administrators for the State.

When the ADU technical assistance team tried to consult representatives who were not co-opted by the authorities, in order to get a clearer idea of what other residents wanted, they encountered strong resistance from both the public authorities, which did not wish to include people they had not chosen, and the dignitaries, who did not understand why their legitimacy was being questioned.

In the end, these dignitaries remained the residents' only official representatives. They sat on the Allocation and Compensation Committee and supported some of the residents' claims, but were not equally available to all social groups as their interlocutors.

- **Morocco: information rather than participation**

The operation in Morocco was initiated by the King in response to the suicide bombings of 2003. It was an emergency exercise, implemented by the State in the interests of national security, without any prior consultation or space for participation.

Residents' involvement in this operation was minimal: they were simply informed about the project once it had started and major decisions had been taken. The social assistance teams' role was limited to maintaining a presence on the slum sites and informing beneficiaries about the operation and the formalities for being rehoused, and various proposals that the ADS project manager managed to push through at project monitoring meetings in *karyan* Thomas through sheer force of personality.

This lack of involvement is not particularly unusual, as participation is not generally a major feature of urban affairs in Morocco. This is due to the very top-down decision-making system, and the fact that elected officials are unable to fulfil their political role as democratically elected representatives.

Residents in irregular settlements with solidly built housing generally set up societies or associations in order to gain collective access to infrastructures and amenities. Slum dwellers, on the other hand, tend

[109] *The development programme needed to be consistent with the objective of minimising the number of displacements. An overly ambitious programme would have involved displacing people, and also risked forcing out the poorest families who would be unable to cope with higher land and property prices and the cost of the new services. Other experiences have also shown that insufficiently ambitious actions can generate disappointment and the feeling that nothing has been done.*

[110] *Some of the planned amenities did not materialise due to lack of funds.*

[111] *Module management unit, European Union Programme.*

to be poorly organised. This meant that the community organisations that the social assistance staff tried to work with on the *karyan* Thomas slum clearance project represented small fringe groups rather than the interests of the majority. Some of them were motivated by political or religious concerns rather than a desire to improve living conditions in the settlement

- **Senegal: 'institutionalised' participation through EIGs**

In Senegal, popular participation is legislated for in a decree stating that "*prospective beneficiaries of parcels will be organised in economic interest groups or cooperatives to ensure that they participate in the execution of the restructuring operations and land regularisation programmes*".[112]

EIGs, a conduit for dialogue between residents and project staff

All restructuring and regularisation operations in Dakar work through economic interest groups (EIGs), which are light, legally recognised structures that are easy to set up. EIGs constitute an organised and easily identifiable interlocutor that project managers and other administrative entities can deal with throughout these operations; and provide a framework for dialogue and participation for residents of affected areas. To make them more legitimate, each group elects a 'committee of elders' (so-called due to its composition) and a bureau at a public meeting. The bureau, which is renewed after a given period, is registered at the Department of Tax and Domains, and then at the court.

EIGs discuss the validity of urban renovation plans in planning workshops, and may be able to influence certain measures envisaged by the State, although the final decision rests with the State.

In the operation in Pikine Irrégulier Sud, the consultation process with EIGs lasted for two years, from 2005 to 2007. At the end of this process the level of development had been decided, the location of the public social amenities agreed, and the resettlement zone endorsed. These consultations also smoothed the progress of the operation by defusing opposition to the initiative.

Lessons learnt and recommendations

- **Low-level, politically directed participation**

These case studies revealed several things:

- With the exception of Senegal, there is little place for participatory procedures in these operations.
- Participatory mechanisms are shaped more by local contexts and the priority given to moving operations forward than by World Bank procedures. It seems that donor requirements can be reinterpreted and standards lowered without provoking much reaction or incurring any particular sanctions.
- The public authorities closely control the mechanisms for disseminating information and the selection of residents' representatives. In Senegal, the level of participation was determined by an institutionalised national framework.
- The processes that were put in place did enable residents to help define the development programmes, which were adapted to take account of their expectations and available resources. In Mauritania, residents were recruited to execute certain works.
- Residents mainly influenced operations – which is the primary objective of participatory procedures – outside these formal frameworks, through negotiation, pressure or obstruction.
- The weakest groups are least able to influence the course of operations, through formal or informal frameworks.

[112] *Decree 91-748.*

- **Adapting approaches to local contexts**

Whatever the level of possible participation, mechanisms need to be adapted to local contexts and competences. These competences may need to be strengthened (see Sheet 3 on social assistance). It is also important to work in local languages and have an understanding of the social organisation of the neighbourhoods concerned.

The proposals for the various types of participation presented below are based on Gret's experience with project implementation over the last 35 years, and were developed in response to different institutional situations (see box on the typology of participation). In order to make even modest changes to behaviour and attitudes, and encourage more participation, work should always be done in conjunction with the different actors involved – primarily residents, but also decision-makers and technicians.

No participation

Where there is very little scope for participation, survey mechanisms can be helpful in determining the realities of residents' living conditions, and their expectations and possible contributions. This can be done through interviews, meetings, focus groups, etc. led by technical service providers or social assistance teams, who then report back to decision-makers.

'Contributive' or 'consultative' participation

Lack of organised information will cause profound inequalities between those who can access information through social networks and those (usually the most marginal and subordinate groups) who cannot. Not providing information amounts to giving one group opportunities at the expense of others.

However much care is given to preparing and implementing operations, some mistakes, resistance or conflict are inevitable.

Therefore, in contexts that are reasonably favourable to participation, two measures need to be prioritised:

- putting in place mechanisms for public information and awareness-raising (top-down, bottom-up and horizontal);
- putting in place decision-making bodies and grievance procedures for residents

Information mechanisms should be activated at each major stage of the process, and should be permanent rather than periodic. Different channels and forms of communication in local languages should be used to reach as many people as possible: door–to-door visits, meetings, leaflets, public billboards, theatre, popular music, etc.

Meetings should be organised so that residents and political and technical officials can discuss and debate the issues. These are opportunities to make all actors aware of their respective responsibilities and help establish trust between residents and intervening agencies. For this to happen, it is important that these agencies send coherent messages.

Putting in place decision-making bodies and grievance procedures is one way of channelling residents' disputes and complaints, dealing with problems regarding eligibility, plot allocations and compensation payments, and resolving disputes between owners and tenants or other residents.

These bodies should function regularly and be monitored in order to avoid nepotistic behaviour and abuses of power.

'Deliberative' participation

The foregoing recommendations also apply to more favourable contexts, where more resources are available. Additional factors also need to be taken into account, such as:

- The diversity of the people appointed to represent residents;
- Support for these representatives at steering and monitoring meetings.

Broadening the range of residents' representatives requires knowledge of their social dynamics. This can be done quite quickly, through interviews and preliminary visits to people from different social and interest groups, and possibly through more in-depth socio-anthropological analysis. Every approach requires a sound methodology. Care should be taken to ensure that men and women are equally represented, and there should be an opportunity to change representatives if they prove unsatisfactory.

Representatives are not paid for their services.

Support at meetings can be delivered upstream, by preparing the agenda with residents' representatives, and downstream, by reporting back to larger groups of residents on discussions that have taken place and decisions that have been made.

The person providing the support should talk to different groups of residents on a regular basis to ensure that information is being circulated, determine whether decisions are being respected, and identify possible problems in enforcing them.

'Accountable' participation

Here, the objective is to look beyond the interests of individuals and particular interest groups, and reach compromises that are technically and socially acceptable to all the various social groups, decision-makers and technicians concerned. This involves defining the development options and key aspects of the restructuring strategy: the eligibility criteria, housing products, modes of allocation, resettlement zones, compensation/financial contributions, and so on. Assistance will need to include translation, facilitation and mediation services.

'Empowering' participation

This is still a fairly theoretical, even Utopian option, given the seemingly inevitable presence of the State in this type of operation. Nevertheless, it is worth considering, if only as a distant ideal.

The starting point would be to work on existing priorities within settlements, rather than inviting residents to 'participate in' externally determined frameworks. Although methodological assistance will be required to help residents express their concerns, recount their problems and identify possible solutions,[113] this approach would help intervening agencies engage more closely with communities than previous types of procedure. "*What we're trying to do is more upstream work with local communities, to help establish organisations that are capable of managing their spaces and resources*".[114]

The success of these procedures will depend upon the intervening agents' intellectual honesty and ability to deliver quality assistance; otherwise there is a risk that participatory procedures may be manipulated, even if involuntarily.

[113] *Jean-Pierre Darré, Gerdal, La recherche coactive de solutions entre agents de développement et agriculteurs, Gret, coll. Études et Travaux, 2006.*

[114] *Ibid.*

Sheet n° 5 - Under what conditions should residents be resettled?

Overview of the question

Opinion is divided over the question of resettlement: some see it as a price worth paying for 'a better life' and the opportunity to escape the stigma of living in a poor neighbourhood. Others argue that it is expensive and upsets the socio-economic balance of informal settlements.[115]

As it is sometimes impossible to avoid resettling some or all of the communities concerned, the best means of doing so and reducing the negative impact on affected families needs to be found. This goes beyond discussing the 'pros and cons' of resettlement to considering the conditions in which it should take place. These will be determined by the development scenario that is selected. The challenges in each case will vary according to the nature of the operation and type of resettlement involved.

- **Wholesale resettlement**

Slum clearance operations usually entail moving all residents out of the target area in order to free up the land for private or public development projects. Displaced households are moved to a new resettlement site where they are allocated plots or housing.

This type of operation often has very mixed socio-economic outcomes for residents. Having to leave the original settlement, lose their home, everything they have invested over the years and start again from scratch can be a traumatic experience.

What they find in the new neighbourhood can vary considerably from one operation to the next. Some arrive on sites with little more than a basic grid system and minimal services that will supposedly be improved and developed over time. The lucky ones find a well-laid out site with a full range of public amenities, services and infrastructures; others will be faced with something between these two extremes. The main issue is the 'habitability'[116] of the new settlement, especially if it is poorly serviced, far from the original neighbourhood and lacking in public transport and economic opportunities.

There are numerous operational advantages in wholesale resettlement, as it avoids having to deal with the question of who stays and who goes, and simplifies the development works. However, it does require affordable land resources, which are not always available in suitable locations. The only available sites may be located on the outskirts of the city far from the original neighbourhood,[117] socio-economic links and employment opportunities. This can have negative consequences for residents in terms of transport and lack of urban facilities, etc., especially for the poorest groups, who are most dependent on public services (transport, health, education, etc.).

[115] *This is the view among international organisations in general, and the World Bank in particular.*

[116] *Term used by Françoise Navez-Bouchanine to denote quality of life in terms of housing, location, amenities, etc.*

[117] *Further research is needed on perceptions of the distance from or proximity to the original neighbourhood. The economy and balance of family life may be radically changed even if the new site is only a few kilometres from the original settlement. Social links and access to employment, markets, administrative services, etc. may be very different even if the two sites do not look far apart on a map. See Parhib evaluation and impact assessment, Gret-Area, op.cit.*

- **Partial resettlement**

Most interventions involve some level of displacement so that various changes can be made to the land use and layout of the neighbourhood, and basic infrastructures and amenities installed. Depending on existing land reserves, residents may be resettled or rehoused in areas at varying distances from the original neighbourhood, with differing levels of amenities and infrastructures. These households will receive some assistance in the form of compensation, help with rebuilding, etc. In relatively modest operations, residents who leave the original neighbourhood may be seen as having 'done better' than those who stay behind.

The opposite applies when major investments are made in the original neighbourhood (including modifications to the parcel plan), and the resettlement/rehousing sites are far away and have fewer urban and social amenities. In such cases, displaced residents face similar difficulties to those involved in wholesale slum clearances.

In these operations, decisions need to be made about who goes and who stays. This can delay implementation as negotiations may be long and arduous, conducted collectively or argued on a case-by-case basis. Actions to improve and service an existing neighbourhood (laying of water, sanitation, electricity facilities) can be highly complex, especially in areas that are densely populated or on difficult terrain.

- **Temporary or transitional displacement**

Temporary displacement occurs in two types of situation:

- 'decanting' operations where one part of the site or housing has to be freed up for the works to be done, and residents are then resettled or rehoused on the same site;
- operations that require the original housing to be demolished before the resettlement sites are serviced or new housing is built (by the beneficiaries or a contractor).

In addition to providing social and financial assistance for families that need temporary housing because they cannot stay with family or friends, this type of operation may need land for 'transitional' accommodation near the original or resettlement site. This can sometimes be very problematic for the operator.

The duration of the displacements varies according to the operation, and whether the development works on the original and new sites run to schedule. Often, they do not. The level of support for displaced persons (compensation, help finding alternative accommodation, assistance with the move) also varies according to each operation. Some residents eventually leave these projects because the negative consequences of displacement outweigh their potential benefits. This is particularly true for the most vulnerable families and in operations where beneficiaries are asked to make a financial contribution to rehousing or resettlement (see Sheet 8 on financial contributions from residents).

Whether they are permanent or temporary, total or partial, displacements need to be considered and planned according to each operation's particular development options and restructuring strategy. Displacement should not just be viewed in terms of technical or economic activities, but also – especially – in terms of the social assistance activities that will be required before, during and after resettlement.

Summary of the experiences

- **Rwanda: displacements kept to the minimum**

This operation was largely directed by the preliminary studies and Resettlement Action Plan, which were formalised and validated with input from all the actors concerned. These documents provided a reference point that helped the project stick to its strategy of minimising displacements, which was the residents' preferred option as it meant that they could stay on the site. Upstream consultation meetings were held to inform stakeholders (City of Kigali, Assetip, UCP and the technical consultancy firm) about

the principle of minimising displacements, and collective site visits were organised to enable them to visualise the planned changes on the ground.

These efforts evidently paid off, as only one house had to be completely demolished and 19 partially removed to improve road safety (visibility for drivers). Like everyone affected by the project, the owner of the house that was demolished was able to choose between partial and total demolition, with the possibility of being rehoused if she went for the latter option.[118]

- **Mauritania: half of residents displaced**

The operation to restructure the *kebbé* of El Mina led to half of its residents being displaced. This was done in two stages. In the first phase, 2,316 households living on land earmarked for main roads and public amenities were moved to a neighbouring area (Nazaha) with schools, public standpipes and electricity. Each displaced household received a lump sum of 70,000 MRO to cover the costs of the move and of dismantling and reassembling their shack. Although the first displacements took a while because this was a new approach, affected residents reported that they were happy with the outcome of the move.

The second phase of the operation was a more complicated process that involved moving 5,000 households off the original site. In the interests of fairness, the conditions for resettlement (level of compensation, plot size, administrative assistance) were the same in both phases. However, because the site at Nazaha was full by the end of the first phase, the remaining households had to be moved to another site in Meketta three kilometres away, which was hastily developed as the first families moved in (earthworks, plot demarcation, two standpipes for running water). This new neighbourhood was much less attractive than the first one, and many residents refused to move.

The operation affected 15,200 households, and ended with nearly 1,200 unresolved cases. Some of these so-called 'recalcitrant' families had refused to move, while others missed out due to errors in the census. Without calling the overall operation into question, it has to be said that these cases could have been better managed, as political support had tailed off because the operation was supposed to be finished, and the ADU had been called in to work on new operations in other parts of town (the *gazras*).

Meketta resettlement zone before the first families moved in

© Aurore Mansion.

[118] *The owner benefited from the operation as she did not live in the house and was compensated for its demolition. Her tenants did less well out of the arrangement, as they had been living rent-free in the house before the operation.*

- **Morocco: problems managing temporary displacements**

Displaced families in Casablanca waited an average of ten months before being moved to the resettlement site. This is relatively quick compared with other CWS operations, where some residents have faced much longer delays.[119] In fact, it seems very efficient, given that the operation in Casablanca had to deal with a much more complex combination of one-family plots and shared accommodation in jointly owned housing. Because most households (80 per cent) had to pay high rental costs as a proportion of their income (an average of 130 Euros per month), they were given transitional housing assistance of 3,000 Dh (270 Euros), plus 12,000 Dh (1,080 Euros) to help with building costs.

The impact assessment shows an interesting change in the way that residents get to work once they have moved to the outskirts of the city:[120] only 25 per cent of heads of household now walk to work, compared with nearly 60 per cent before the move; and a much larger proportion use taxis (58 per cent now compared with 14 per cent before resettlement).

The resettlement site on the outskirts of Casablanca

© Olivier Toutain.

Families that were resettled in Essalam were allocated housing on a 'first come, first served' basis. Their housing was selected off the plan in the order that payments were registered, which meant that they were not able to choose their neighbours or maintain the close links they had established in the original neighbourhood. As the operator was unable to stage the process by developing several blocks of land at a time, it was decided to accelerate the process by working on all the slums at once. In fact, this ended up causing blockages and slowing things down because the project managers were not able to free up all the land needed to rehouse the families *in situ*.

[119] *In some cases technical delays led to a wait of one or even two years.*

[120] *The resettlement site is located about 7km from douar Thomas, and at least 1 kilometre from douar Skouila.*

- **Senegal: residents pleased with minimal displacements**

Just over 1,000 households will be affected by the need to free up land for the highway in Senegal, and over half of them will have to be moved. The resettlement site on the outskirts of Pikine (north of Keur Massar and west of Tivaouane Peul) has already absorbed residents from several operations, and is better serviced than the original site, with schools, shops, street lighting, running water and sanitation. A group of Senegalese organisations will help displaced households throughout the process (obtaining compensation, providing information, etc.).

The conditions for resettlement are relatively good, and the households concerned are genuinely eager to move. For the time being, the families that are due to stay behind have been pretty positive about the situation, although this may change if the authorities and their partners do not invest in the social and economic development of the original neighbourhood when the resettlement and works are completed.

Lessons learnt and recommendations

Displacements need to be planned and prepared at every stage of the process.

- **Before: preparing the resettlement site**

Even minimal displacements need to be properly planned to ensure that they proceed in the best possible conditions. This involves taking certain technical and social measures before anyone is moved off the original site:

- developing and servicing the resettlement site, having discussed the investment programme with the residents concerned;
- validating the programme of infrastructures and amenities in the original site, keeping remaining residents informed and reassured about the planned works;
- reducing the transitional phase by waiting until the resettlement site is ready to accommodate displaced families before demolishing any housing on the original site;
- anticipating new needs for public transport to ensure that families can move around as necessary;
- identifying the most vulnerable families, and allaying their concerns by circulating clear information about the specific measures and programme of assistance planned during and after resettlement;
- defining the rules for resettlement (who stays and who goes) and how parcels or new housing will be allocated. On this last point, experience has shown the importance of maintaining social links between neighbours, although this does not preclude drawing lots if there is no alternative or if there is a blockage in the process.

- **During: information, compensation and support**

Residents need support while the resettlements are taking place. The following measures should be taken when families can be resettled or rehoused immediately:

- Helping residents with their administrative paperwork (obtaining the necessary documents from the relevant administrative authorities);
- Planning a mechanism to help move people and property (setting up/taking down belongings, moving home, settling in), even if compensation will be paid;
- Anticipating the amount of compensation due for all losses caused by the displacement;
- Putting in place a specific mechanism for vulnerable households (individual support, etc.);
- Communicating, discussing and informing residents throughout the implementation process (local unit, etc.);
- Staying in contact with families in temporary accommodation, to identify possible difficulties and adjust support accordingly (duration, amount, parallel measures).

- **After: supporting and consolidating the integration and development of new neighbourhoods**

Residents affected by urban operations need long-term support, whether they remain on the original site or are resettled elsewhere. Measures will need to be taken in the following areas:

- access to ownership/securing tenure: help with administrative procedures, financial assistance;
- access to housing: obtaining staged credit, support with administrative procedures, technical assistance with self-builds;
- access to essential services (water, education, health, etc.);
- support for economic development.

Sheet n° 6 - How are land issues managed?

Overview of the question

Land is a crucial aspect of urban development. It determines access to housing, infrastructures and services, and is needed to establish a local tax base.[121] Land tenure is defined by a set of rules regulating rights of access, productive use and control over land.

Most residents in the settlements covered by these studies have 'irregular' land status, meaning that they do not have rights that are recognised by the current legal and institutional frameworks. This situation is by no means peculiar to informal settlements, as it is estimated that only 5 per cent of land in sub-Saharan Africa was registered in 2010.[122] Rather, it reflects the fact that existing legal frameworks are ill-suited to the local realities in large parts of these countries. This can make it very difficult for urban operations to deal with land issues, as residents use informal land supply chains when there are no appropriate national policies in place.

- **Inappropriate land policies**

The legal frameworks in African countries were built on a colonial model designed to protect settlers' rights. This model, which was based on the Torrens system developed by the British as they colonised Australia in the mid-19th century, reflects a top-down' rather than a 'bottom up' concept of ownership.

The two main models of private ownership

Looking back over the history of private ownership in Europe and Africa, Joseph Comby identifies two main ways in which ownership is established:[123]

– From the 'bottom up', by letting a *de facto* situation become the legal situation. Ownership is based on long-term peaceful possession of land, and is a strictly private affair. The State has no part in it, apart from taxing the property. This model is found in France, and more broadly in 'Latin' countries.

– From the 'top down', where the State is the sole agency able to create and recognise ownership. In this concept, pre-existing or *de facto* rights are denied. This model is found in colonial African land tenure systems.

[121] *UN-Habitat, Overview of urban land problems in Africa. Third African Ministerial Conference on Housing and Urban Development, Bamako, November 2011.*

[122] *Hubert Ouedrogo, Mythes et impasses de l'immatriculation foncière et nécessité d'approches alternatives, 'Land Tenure and Development Technical Committee', December 2010.*

[123] *Comby J., 2007, Sécuriser la propriété foncière sans cadastre, ADEF, http://www.adef.org/RESSOURCES/ propriete_sans_cadastre.pdf*

In independent African countries, and especially francophone countries, these two concepts exist side by side. This can lead to contradictions between:

- **Absolute ownership** where land is the property of a single titleholder. Customary rights are at best tolerated, but are only legally recognised through private ownership titles;
- **State-controlled** land ownership, where the State is often the absolute owner (principle of public domain). It may assign temporary rights to private individuals, by issuing occupancy permits that can be converted into land titles when the land has been developed and marked out.

With this system, the administration is in a strong position because the vast majority of its citizens are unable to follow the long and expensive procedures required to secure tenure. Only the powerful benefit here, particularly when governments make generous land allocations to elite groups rather than addressing the needs of the wider community. This leads to land speculation, and unproductive urban sprawl.

The widespread use of parallel land supply chains is largely due to failed land policies and the inability of the formal sector to meet the housing needs of most city dwellers.

- **Land access in informal settlements**

Land tenure in informal settlements can be extremely complex (see Sheet N°1). Land is often obtained through 'neo-customary' supply chains, where:

- access to land is **managed according to reinterpreted customs**: rights of access are negotiated with authorities that claim to follow customary procedures, although their methods bear little relation to what goes on in rural areas;
- **rights are commoditised**: settlement in these neighbourhoods is becoming monetised, with land and rights bought and sold on the informal market;
- **formal institutions are involved**: the State and local authorities tolerate the existence of these neighbourhoods, and may negotiate the rules for settlement and development.[124]

The initial occupation of parcels in these neighbourhoods is never completely informal, as the official authorities may have been involved in the procedure even if did not fit into the recognised legal framework. Nor is it ever completely free, as rights of access to parcels are still managed collectively. However, residents do not necessarily expect to have to have 'legal' papers in order to build on or sell their parcel. Therefore, informal settlements should not be seen as groups of parcels that have been freely appropriated by households that are waiting for the State to recognise their rights.

Informal settlements emerge in spaces whose status varies (State or privately owned land), and which may be subject to very restrictive town planning regulations. The land may have been allocated to people from outside the neighbourhood, and be occupied by families with administrative papers that are of no legal value but which have a resale value on the informal market.

This is the context in which urban operations are implemented. While their approach to land matters varies according to each intervention, they all have to deal with the need for radical reforms that proceed at different paces, and with local dynamics whose rules may be very vague and barely legal.

- **Should tenure be regularised or secured?**

Regularising informal residents' occupancy was not an objective in all four operations, as:

- some agencies believe that regularising tenure acts in the individual interest; therefore, they do not plan specific measures to help residents obtain official documents when the restructuring is completed;

[124] *Alain Durand Lasserve, 2004, Évolution comparée des filières coutumières de la gestion urbaine dans les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne, PRUD, http://www.gemdev.org/prud/syntheses/Alain_Durand-Lasserve.pdf*

- others put in place mechanisms to help residents follow the necessary procedures within the framework defined by the law;
- others put in place specific procedures, where residents are given documents with no legal value until they can prove that they have developed their parcel.

In each case, regularising land tenure is a complex process that involves appropriating land in the public interest, sorting through existing rights, and negotiating with title holders in the areas affected by the restructuring operation.

Distributing titles to residents does not amount to securing their tenure, whether the process is assisted or not. There is often some confusion between the legality and the security of someone's tenure: title holders' land rights may be insecure if they are challenged by their neighbours, while rights that are not covered by title deeds may be 'secure' because they are locally recognised. Thus, titles are not sufficient to ensure security of tenure, and may even be a source of insecurity if residents are unable to follow the procedures for obtaining them.

In this situation, how can urban operations best help secure residents' land tenure? Should titles be systematically distributed? If so, what type of titles? And what are the possible alternatives to issuing land titles?

Summary of the experiences

- **Mauritania: a specific procedure to regularise tenure**

Very few residents of El Mina had occupancy permits or ownership titles before the operation to restructure the *kebbé.* Regularisation was an explicit objective of this operation, based on current legal procedures for obtaining occupancy permits, but with special measures to prevent permits being bought and sold as they had been in previous operations.

In order to do this, each beneficiary was given a badge with no legal value bearing the numbers of their parcel, block and household census. They then had two years to complete the work on their plot and register it as developed, when an occupancy permit would be issued.

This measure was not entirely successful, as some residents still sold their parcels due to market pressure – and for less than they would have done if they'd had legally recognised documents. However, those that kept their parcels did develop them quickly. This experience shows that the key factor in getting families to develop and invest in their land is not distributing documents, of any kind, but the whole process that the programme puts in place to recognise rights. It could even be said that giving out badges creates a new informal market for these badges.

The market for occupancy permits

"The social objectives of this regularisation policy are undermined by widespread speculation. Households that have been resettled after clearance or restructuring operations receive plots at very favourable prices (averaging about a fifth of the market price). There is a thriving market for occupancy permits, which may be sold as soon as they are issued even though this is formally forbidden. The purchasers do not necessarily want to build on the plot concerned; permits are also bought as a form of investment that can be cashed in when the need arises. This kind of speculation is so widespread that many resettlement plots are not occupied by the people to whom they were allocated, as they have sold their occupancy permits and moved to another informal neighbourhood, where they continue to occupy the land illegally".[125]

[125] *Giovannetti F., Plan d'action de réinstallation. Restructuration du quartier El Mina à Nouakchott, Amextipe, Nouakchott, December 2000.*

Rights holders are given badges on presentation of proof of identity

© Aurore Mansion.

- **Senegal: assisted land regularisation**

The right to individual ownership in Senegal was reaffirmed in specific provisions of the Constitution Act of 2001. Eleven years down the line, the PIS programme is being implemented against a backdrop of increasingly liberalised land management, with regularisation an integral part of official procedures to regulate informal or unregulated settlements across the country. These procedures include establishing leasehold contracts between the State and rights holders, thereby allowing each family to start the usual procedure for obtaining occupancy permits. These can be transformed into individual ownership titles, which then have to be approved by the Ministry for the Economy and Finance or the Ministry of Budget, depending on the amount of land involved.

One of the main shortcomings of this procedure is that is does not stop beneficiaries from selling their parcels, even though they know that they are not supposed to within five years of allocation. As in Mauritania, some beneficiaries then end up resettling in informal neighbourhoods elsewhere.

- **Morocco: little demand for land regularisation**

Slum dwellers in Morocco do not have real rights of occupation. This country has a system of *de facto* recognition that allows the local authorities and elected officials to influence land procedures, and prevents residents from officially securing their tenure.

Two-speed recognition of rights

Slum dwellers occupy public or private land on a temporary basis. They are tolerated but not officially recognised, and therefore do not have access to official ownership titles. The only official documents that may sometimes be available to them are residency certificates, or administrative certificates issued by the local authority as proof of residency. Shacks in these settlements are sold through private deeds, without going through 'modern' registration procedures. This differentiates them from residents of solidly constructed irregular neighbourhoods, who usually hold traditional 'Adoulaire' property rights that are generally recognised by the law in parallel with the 'modern' land regime.

In the slum clearances in Casablanca, two factors worked in favour of the option to rehouse certain residents in the original sites in Thomas and Skouila. Firstly, the land in question was public, which meant that the operation could avoid the problems associated with privately owned land;[126] secondly, there were no specific urban planning constraints. Land regularisation has never been part of restructuring operations in Morocco, even the earliest ones,[127] owing to the onerous administrative and legal procedures involved. As a result, the public authorities treat land regularisation separately from urban planning regulations or access to infrastructures and amenities when dealing with these neighbourhoods.

Recent studies[128] have shown that households are not particularly concerned about obtaining land titles. Surveys of rehoused families have shown that while they do want to secure their occupancy, this seems to have less to do with being formally registered in the land records, and more to do with feeling more secure than they were in their previous situation.[129] Owners that have been rehoused are often happy with an administrative or commercial document (allocation certificate, sale contract, etc.) as proof of their new status or guarantee that they will not be dispossessed of their rights. However, the lack of formal individual land titles can be a handicap for households that wish to obtain a mortgage.

Most of the slum households that were moved to the site in Essalam Al Loghlam are still waiting for individual land titles. This is due to various problems that have arisen, and disputes between co-owners and third partners on the collective housing plots. However, this has not stopped people from selling, buying or exchanging their assets, as owners and other actors in the local property system simply sidestep the rules (especially for recording rights in the land registry) and use parallel procedures for land transactions and registering rights.

- **Rwanda: forcing the pace towards individual ownership titles?**

The operation in Rwanda did not address land tenure directly, as regularisation was dealt with in the framework of the land reform initiated in 2009. Under this reform, all national lands were to be systematically titled in the medium term. The service responsible for this task reported that 95 per cent of parcel boundaries were registered in two of the districts in Kigali by mid-November 2009, and 85 per cent should have been registered in the third district by mid-December. This forced pace towards titling is now highly controversial, as there is a risk that standardising the market will force the poorest residents out of these neighbourhoods.

Lessons learnt and recommendations

- **Distributing land titles does not help secure rights or regulate land markets**

All four of the operations studied conform to current national legislation. Efforts to regularise land tenure are structured around issuing written documents. However:

- These are not adapted to modes of land appropriation in informal settlements (joint management, sales) as they only recognise sole ownership, and take no account of the rights of other family members;
- They are often insecure (revocable) and theoretically non-transferable (badges, occupancy permits, allocation letters);
- Residents cannot obtain these documents without assistance (Senegal);
- The system does not prevent sales on the informal market (all four cases);

[126] *Efforts to mobilize private land in Morocco often run into legal problems or are blocked by landowners.*

[127] *Including World Bank urban development plans of the 1980s (Meknès, Rabat, Tétouan). Even now, operations to restructure slums and informal settlements have done little to help regularise land occupancy.*

[128] *Étude d'évaluation et d'impact du Programme d'appui à la résorption de l'habitat insalubre et des bidonvilles (PARHIB), holding d'aménagement Al Omrane, Gret-Area group.*

[129] *Households whose budgets are already stretched by the cost of building and servicing their new home also find it difficult to pay the registration fees and expenses associated with obtaining land titles.*

- Procedures for obtaining formal ownership are lengthy and expensive: the outcomes of land regularisation fell short of the forecast objectives in all four cases, and there were long delays.

None of the *ad hoc* mechanisms put in place to limit sales were particularly effective. The experience in Mauritania shows that these mechanisms do not limit sales or stop better-off groups capturing the added land value generated by urban operations.

Residents do not necessarily expect to obtain ownership titles. The level of demand for titles depends on the family's situation, what they are trying to achieve and the constraints they face (distress sales). Lack of a title will not stop them from developing their parcel if they have the resources to do so.

The issue here is not so much the deficiencies of the mechanisms put in place by these operations, as the fact that land transactions take place outside the administrative framework because current legislation does not help secure or regulate land and housing markets.

- **Finding other ways to formalise land tenure**

While classic concepts of land and property ownership invariably link the two kinds of rights, this is not always the case in reality. Depending on the local context and what is socially acceptable for families, it may be possible to try to separate land and property ownership, or work towards acquiring ownership over time. This could be done by promoting:

- Long-term leases;
- Hire-purchase mechanisms.

- **Possible alternatives within the framework of land reforms**

Most operations tend to take a very legalistic approach to land issues, and are unlikely to alter their practices until there is a radical change in the national legal framework. Reforms should work on the basis of creating ownership from the 'bottom up'. Some countries are already running pilot operations that use innovative procedures to secure tenure, and testing alternatives to private ownership titles. These include:

- **Taxation**: this can be used to locate residents without having to decide on their legal status. In addition to simplifying the administration's task and increasing its tax revenues, paying land tax also helps secure residents' land rights. These land management tools have substantially increased municipal revenues in trials with urban land registries during the decentralisation process in Benin.[130]
- **Joint ownership**: despite the increasing individualisation of ownership in urban areas, collective rights still exist and operate according to neo-customary principles. Procedures to identify the diversity of local rights have already been tested in Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Benin, which has fully incorporated this new tool into its legislation by creating a new legal category of land certificates that carry the same weight as private ownership titles. Although these procedures mainly relate to rural areas, they are well worth testing in urban areas.
- **Acquisitive prescription**: this principle allows an occupant to be recognised as the owner from a given point in time, provided they can provide proof of peaceful occupation. This concept has existed in France since the beginning of the 19th century, and is the basis for the principle of land ownership. It works best for occupants who exercise their rights.

These reforms are already under way in certain countries, which suggests that perceptions are changing. There has been considerable resistance to them, however, especially in urban areas where there are marked economic advantages to maintaining a 'top-down' concept of ownership. Inclusive, democratic debate is often needed to alter societal choices.

[130] *Land Tenure and Development Committee, 2009. Land Governance and Security of Tenure in Developing Countries. White Paper produced by French Cooperation actors, MAEE, AFD.*

- **How to help in the meantime**

While waiting for reform processes to run their course, mechanisms are needed to help residents understand the range of different procedures for obtaining titles (Senegal). These mechanisms could include access to information, help with administrative procedures or even assistance in establishing the necessary savings. Rather than targeting all families, they should be demand-led, and primarily designed to establish procedures to secure tenure.

Sheet n° 7 – How should operations be funded?

Overview of the question

- **Operations are expensive**

Operations to restructure informal settlements are expensive, as there are numerous costs to be covered:

- acquiring land or making it available (the land base);[131]
- servicing the site or sites (installing road networks and services such as water, sanitation and electricity);
- constructing public and local amenities (schools and health centres; markets, mosques, churches etc.);
- access to housing: building houses, helping resident obtain credit or providing technical assistance for self-builds, possible assistance connecting residents to urban services;
- compensation in cases of involuntary resettlement;
- the economic, technical and social expertise needed to design, implement, monitor and evaluate operations.

The first three sets of costs are mainly publicly funded, by central and local governments or long-term subsidised loans from donors. Public and private service providers may also invest in their particular field of expertise.

Local taxation is supposed to generate enough revenue from land or housing taxes to cover at least some of the costs of urban development. Households may also be asked to pay for the serviced plot they are allocated, possibly at subsidised rates.

Housing is funded through a combination of public aid and contributions from beneficiary households. Public aid may be channelled into construction (building aid) or given to individual families. The level and scope of this kind of funding is determined by government policies on social housing, if they exist. People's ability to pay for their housing depends on the performance of the banking sector and existence of suitable credit products on the one hand; and on the other, their capacity to raise money from savings, rental income, selling assets and obtaining loans or getting help from family and friends.

In operations funded by the World Bank, the central government concerned is responsible for compensation.[132]

The costs of engineering and technical assistance are usually shared between international donors and the technical operators.

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[131] *This can be done through expropriation in the public interest, with compensation for private owners, or by making public land available (which may require transfers between public bodies in exchange for funding). This question depends on the nature of the operation, whether it involves improving the existing neighbourhood, restructuring the site and resettling some residents elsewhere, or freeing up the space and making other land available to accommodate all the residents. See Sheet 6 on land.*

[132] *See Sheet n° 8: Should residents be 'made to pay' or be 'paid', and how?*

- **Complex financial set ups**

Operations are funded by a combination of public and private funding from international, national, local and individual sources.[133] Several types of finance are mobilised (subsidies, savings, self-funded contributions, credit), with the balance between each type determined by the target groups concerned. Substantial subsidies are needed to reach the poorest households, and long-term funding is essential to ensure that the outcomes of the operation are sustainable.

It is not always possible to obtain a summary of all the operation's income and expenditure, especially in large-scale, multi-actor programmes. This means that the overall economy of the operation or programme needs to be well managed, with a high degree of inter-institutional coordination – something that rarely exists. Apart from public subsidies, other national sources of funding include private actors (banks, investors, businesses) and local bodies (associations, residents' federations, cooperatives, etc.).

The nature of the operation will determine how it is funded. Therefore, a national programme will need different mechanisms from an isolated operation heavily subsidised by international aid. Funding needs will obviously vary, as will opportunities to recover, share or offset costs. Account should also be taken of the State's long-term capacity to recover revenues, mainly through national and local taxation.

This is an extremely broad issue, which needs further research in the African context.[134] Therefore, this sheet is intended to present some of the insights and experiences from the four case studies, rather than a detailed exposition of how urban operations are funded

- **Subsidies and international aid**

Subsidies can be described as financial assistance that redirects resources to a particular group of people. In urban operations, subsidies come from central and local governments, international organisations and foundations or private bodies. They may be distributed in the form of materials, technical assistance, subsidised credit, tax reductions or exemptions, contributions to savings or guarantee funds, or in cash.

Lack of clarity and transparency in funding mechanisms can adversely affect the outcomes of an operation and even generate perverse effects.

In contexts where public funds are limited and levels of public debt very high, it can be difficult to balance the need for sufficient subsidies to avoid excluding the poorest groups against the capacity of public institutions to replicate large-scale operations.

- **Contributions from residents**

Savings

Low-income families in Africa have very limited capacity to mobilise savings or operate within the banking system. Recent years have seen the emergence of new structures known as savings and credit associations (SCAs), which act as intermediaries and collectively mobilise individual reserves. They help members manage their savings and finance various initiatives (acquiring and developing land, building homes, etc.).

In certain countries, these savings and credit associations have formed city-level and national groups or federations "*to learn from one another, mutualise some of their funds and strengthen their capacity to respond to housing problems and negotiate with the authorities*".[135]

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[133] *From central and local governments, land and property developers, financial institutions and families.*

[134] *For further information on local investment in African cities, see Thierry Paulais, Financing Africa's Cities – The imperative of local investments. Africa Development Forum series, World Bank, AFD, Cities Alliance, January 2012.*

[135] *Diana Mitlin and David Satterthwaite, 2010, 'Focus. Asie, Afrique: Soutenir les fédérations d'habitants', in Pierre Jacquet Regards sur la Terre 2010, Presses de Sciences Pos, pp. 227-230.*

Neighbourhood federations

A directory of neighbourhood federations in 17 African and Asian countries was compiled in 2010. These federations are mainly composed of women, who use their accumulated savings to buy land for housing, build homes, gain access to public services and develop income-generating activities.

African federations have helped fund major house-building programmes, especially in Kenya, Malawi and Namibia. In addition to making funding tools available for integrated territorial development, they also act as interlocutors with the public authorities, negotiating new finance and asserting their vision for the development of these neighbourhoods.

They have set up an umbrella organisation, Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI), which negotiates additional funding requirements (Urban Poor Fund) with international bodies.

These organisations certainly offer interesting opportunities to finance operations. However, setting them up can be a long and complex process, and they can only function if savers trust the officials responsible for managing the funds. Furthermore, if participation in the savings group is a condition for accessing an operation, they can lead to people who are unable to save being excluded from the intervention.

Experience has also shown that residents are more willing to mobilise their own resources for operations once a project is ready and they have understood how it can be accessed. They are more reluctant to commit to a preliminary savings process if they do not feel that there are sufficient guarantees that they will get a return on their investment.[136]

Individual credit

People who live in informal settlements can rarely obtain mortgages through the banking system. This kind of credit is only available to a small minority of citizens in Africa. In fact, a recent study[137] conducted in 12 African countries indicates that less than 10 per cent of the population is eligible for mortgages under the conditions set by banks (monthly income, outgoings, capacity to save). However, the Moroccan government has introduced an innovative guarantee fund[138] to secure bank loans to enable families with low and/or irregular incomes to acquire plots for resettlement or self-build housing. This kind of loan has been particularly encouraged in the framework of the Cities without Slums programme.[139]

There are many reasons why low-income families find it hard to obtain credit. These include lack of stable/declared employment, guarantors or bank accounts; banking organisations' reluctance to enter the housing market (particularly the social housing market); and the interest rates banks charge to cover the risks of lending, which make loans unaffordable for low-income households.[140]

Other alternatives to mortgages are being investigated to make up for the lack of supply from classic private sources of funding.

[136] *The Solidarité Habitat programme run by Gret from 1988 to 1996 came to the same conclusions.*

[137] *UN-Habitat. Cities Alliance, Cities without slums. Quick Guides for Policy-makers. Housing the poor in African cities. Quick Guide n° 5: Housing finance. Ways to help the poor pay for housing. Nairobi, 2010,*

[138] *FOGARIM. Guarantee fund for households on low and irregular incomes.*

[139] *Evaluation of the FOGARIM housing credit mechanism for households with low and irregular incomes, Holding d'aménagement Al Omrane, 2008, Morocco.*

[140] *Gret-ACT Consultants, Mécanismes d'accès au logement pour les personnes à faibles revenus en Amérique latine. Le rôle de l'accès au crédit et de l'accès au foncier dans l'accès à l'habitat progressif pour les pauvres, 2002, Study report, Inter-American Development Bank.*

Micro-finance for housing: a progressive approach

One way that low-income households can obtain credit for housing is through micro-finance. This usually involves small sums that are used to gradually improve housing, with repayments spread over relatively short periods of two to five years. No mortgage collateral is required, and in certain contexts loans are offered at lower interest rates than those in the classic banking sector. There is usually no limit to the number of loans that one person can take out, provided the previous loan has been repaid.

Several types of actor now offer this type of credit: NGOs, cooperatives, associations, community funds and regulated banking agencies (micro-finance banks, State banks that offer micro-loans, commercial banks).[141]

This approach breaks with the idea of buying housing that is 'ready to move into'. Instead, it involves a staged process whereby families gradually improve their living and housing conditions, and avoid overly long-term commitments that are likely to put them under financial pressure. "*The majority of African city dwellers, and especially the poor, build their homes over time, stage by stage, in what researchers call a progressive process*".[142]

The main drawbacks of this approach are the lack of supply in relation to demand, and the high management and support costs. Another problem is the lack of medium-term refinancing options on the financial markets. The organisations that offer this type of credit usually depend on various forms of public or private aid for their survival.

These alternative forms of credit work better for improving existing housing than for building new homes, and are only possible and effective if they are combined with savings or contributions from people's own funds, loans from friends or family, or even public or private aid and subsidies, etc. Therefore, it is important to think about mixed finance systems that use different sources of funding and combine personal contributions, subsidies and loans.

Summary of the experiences

- **Mauritania: substantial State contribution to the costs of social assistance**

The urban development programme (UDP) that provided the framework for the project to restructure the *kebbé* of El Mina is funded by the World Bank. The city of Nouakchott was allocated USD54 million of the USD60 million budget for the programme, making it one of the country's biggest financial initiatives since independence.

In the operation to restructure El Mina, the State expropriated existing land allocations to ensure that sufficient land was available to regularise some residents' situation on the original site and resettle others in new areas. The World Bank financed the infrastructures, amenities, networks and technical assistance, while the Mauritanian government covered the cost of compensation for displaced families living on land needed for roads and public amenities.

The selected restructuring options and decision to resettle one in two households significantly increased State expenditure on compensation and developing and servicing the new residential areas.[143]

The State and the urban development programme also helped develop the parcels allocated for rehousing through the Twize programme.

[141] *See next box on the Beit el Mal micro-credit organisation, in the section discussing the Mauritanian experience.*

[142] *See Guide n° 5: Housing finance. Ways to help the poor pay for housing. op.cit. p. 38.*

[143] *The bill for compensation alone came to MRO 614 million, or about 1.5 million Euros. This came out of the State budget through the debt relief mechanism.*

Financing a social housing programme

The aim of the Twize programme was to reduce poverty by improving living and housing conditions in several neighbourhoods in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou. It was implemented by Gret between 2000 and 2008, under the auspices of the Commission for Human Rights, Poverty Reduction and Inclusion. The programme was named after a traditional Maure body (*twize*) that is usually composed of women who work together to create a *khaima*.[144] The underlying premise is that working as a group enables people to achieve things that they would not be able to do on their own. The programme adapted the concept and set up a micro-credit agency called Beit el Mal to provide fixed-term loans through a community group. If a member of the *twize* or group is unable to repay their housing loan, the other members pay on their behalf.

The programme offered several basic but solidly constructed products for first-time homeowners in poorly serviced neighbourhoods: a 20 m^2 housing module with an enclosure and latrine. Most of the costs were subsidised (60 per cent), with the remainder (40 per cent) to be paid by beneficiary families: 12.5 per cent as an advance payment and 27.5 per cent as credit repayable over 36 months. The idea was that residents could gradually enlarge and improve their homes when they had the means to do so.

The State encouraged families displaced by the restructuring operation in the *kebbé* to use their compensation as an advance payment for housing in the Twize programme. Many people signed up to the process in the servicing phase, but numbers fell during the consolidation phase as people were worried about keeping up with the repayments if they took out a loans (who would pay them back if they died), and because these modules cost slightly more than self-built housing.

- **Morocco: subsidies, loans and offsetting schemes to balance the operation's finances**

The Cities without Slums programme (CWS) in Morocco draws on several sources of funding to cover the cost of urban operations.

The Moroccan government subsidises the public operator Al Omrane through the Housing Solidarity Fund (HSF), which is financed by a tax on cement.[145] Al Omrane receives a subsidy of 1,300 Euros for each restructured household,[146] 1,800 to 2,200 Euros for each resettled household, and 3,500 Euros for every family that is rehoused.[147] The State aid is used to cover the cost of the land or amenities and infrastructures in the case of restructuring, and housing in the case of resettlement (on the original or new site).

The CWS programme also received external funding from various multilateral and bilateral donors, most notably the World Bank, the European Union and the French and German Development Agencies. This was mainly through loans agreed with the State or Al Omrane to fund operations, and subsidised technical assistance.

Displaced households also contributed to the costs by paying for their plots (at highly subsidised rates), financing the construction of their homes or buying shared housing.

There were also plans to use offsetting schemes to fund the land base for these operations.

[144] *Nomad's tent.*

[145] *The HSF amounted to nearly 150 million Euros in 2009.*

[146] *State aid represents 50 per cent of the cost of works to install amenities via restructuring operations.*

[147] *A 'restructured' household is resettled in the same neighbourhood, possibly in a different plot. A resettled household is moved to another neighbourhood where the family builds its own home, and rehoused families are moved to collective housing built by the technical operator.*

The offsetting system and products

With the offsetting system, the land base for the operation includes plots that are earmarked for medium- or higher-income households. These are sold at market prices, and any profits are then reinvested or added to public subsidies for plots for 'social' housing.

For this system to work, the operator needs to be able to mobilise inexpensive land in order to generate added value on the plots for higher-income families. This is not always possible.

Even when it is feasible, the revenues generated are not always sufficient to subsidise all the parcels and homes for social housing. Nevertheless, this system does help boost the income for urban operations, and encourages a degree of social mix in the new neighbourhoods.

- **Senegal: a specific fund created for the operation**

The PIS operation in Senegal also combines several types of funding. The World Bank pre-finances the infrastructure, amenities and networks on the site and in the rehousing area, while the State pays for all the compensation and makes the necessary land available through public interest expropriations. All State costs are funded from budget lines financed by tax receipts (vehicle and fuel taxes, etc.) and the Land Restructuring and Regularisation Fund (FORREF).

The Land Restructuring and Regularisation Fund (FORREF)

FORREF was created in 1991 to finance operations to restructure and regularise informal settlements. It started activities in 1997,[148] and is financed by various sources:

– Project beneficiaries who pay for leasehold rights and may also contribute to development costs;

– Local governments in the territories affected by operations;

– Donors;

– State subsidies;

– The interest generated by payments into the Fund.

The Fund has been hampered by various problems, such as the principle of the single treasury, municipal authorities failing to make their contributions, and low rates of repayment by households.

In addition to this, it lacks the resources to finance significant actions to develop neighbourhoods once they have been restructured.

Lessons learnt and recommendations

- **Costs vary according to the type of operation concerned**

Minor improvements or upgrades are the easiest option for developing existing housing, and also require less financial input from families. In these operations, local governments have the potentially expensive task of regularising land tenure and improving infrastructures and services in target neighbourhoods. Progressive, negotiated approaches can help spread these costs over time, and avoid extreme qualitative changes that lead to rapid (and potentially corrupt) land and property development.

[148] *The gap between the creation of the fund and the start of activities was due to administrative delays, and uncertainty and conflicts within the administration over the use of this innovative tool in the highly sensitive domain of land.* See Papa Babacar Diouf, 'L'ingénierie économique et sociale dans les projets de lutte contre l'habitat insalubre à Dakar, Pikine et Guédiawaye (Sénégal)', pp. 225-243, in Julien Le Tellier, Aziz Iraki (eds), Habitat social au Maghreb et au Sénégal. Gouvernance urbaine et participation en questions, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2009, INAU, Rabat, 2010.

It is easier to offset operational costs in slum clearance operations that involve resettlement and rehousing, as money can be recovered by freeing up the original site for development and using offsetting mechanisms in the resettlement zone. It is often simpler and cheaper to develop empty sites than ones that are occupied. However, the costs of resettlement and associated support do weigh heavily on these operations, whether they are partly borne by the families concerned, as in the case from Morocco, or publicly funded, as in the Mauritanian and Senegalese cases.

Major restructuring operations that involve developing both the original neighbourhood and a resettlement site combine the advantages and disadvantages of the other two types of operation.

- **The need for subsidies**

Urban operations to improve living and housing conditions in predominantly low-income neighbourhoods need to include fairly substantial subsidies to cover the costs of land, infrastructures, amenities and services, access to housing, socio-economic development, etc. The overall economy and financial setup of these operations can be quite complex.

The case from Morocco and, to a lesser extent, the example from Senegal,[149] show that the resources that are channelled into informal settlements are determined by the national authorities' attitude to the intervention,[150] and whether the operation is seen as an isolated initiative or part of efforts to enforce or reinforce existing public policies.

As informal settlements tend to attract very little public, national or international investment, these sources are unlikely to provide the requisite level of subsidies. Increasing State funding for informal settlements requires long-term reforms and strong political will, both of which may be lacking.

In the meantime, and to avoid being dependent on donors for one-off initiatives, urban operations need to improve their financial balance. This will entail reducing intervention costs and prioritising regularisation-upgrading in order to progressively consolidate informal settlements and ensure that they are legally recognised. This also assumes that revenues for all operations will increase, including interventions that will inevitably involve resettlement and major restructuring.

Experiences in Latin America have shown that operations do have positive financial outcomes if they are measured in terms of improved access to services and added land and property values for owners. It remains to be seen how the wealth they create can be used to finance urban development; in other words, how land and property offsetting systems can be generalised.[151]

- **Diversifying international aid**

Very few central governments in African countries are able to bear all the costs associated with operations and slum clearance programmes. What resources they do have are primarily allocated to execution rather than pre- and post-operational assistance activities.

Although donors do actively support central and local governments and operators, aid is usually given in the form of subsidised long-term loans, and mainly used to finance investments.

Donors need to broaden their targeted funding to include activities that are usually under-resourced: [152] investing in urban policies and dynamics and mobilising and strengthening local governments upstream of operations; providing social assistance throughout the process; and funding post-operational support.[153] This would certainly be an effective way of ensuring that their operational directives were duly followed.

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[149] *The costs of this operation are very high, and could certainly not be covered if it was scaled up. However, this is a very specific, non-replicable programme to construct a toll highway.*

[150] *The same logic would apply at the level of territorial governments.*

[151] *Cf. Edésio Fernandes, Regularization of Informal Settlements in Latin America, Policy Focus Report, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2011.*

[152] *Such as AFD funding for the Social Development Agency in Morocco to put in place an innovative social programme.*

[153] *See Sheet n° 2: Where do operations begin and end? How will they be steered?*

- **Adapting planning regulations to the context**

This aid is often conditional upon the rigorous application of town planning standards or building regulations, which increase the costs for the operation and its beneficiaries. Although they are based on principles of equity and poverty reduction, these standards are not always appropriate to the way that people live in poor neighbourhoods, or residents' ability to pay for new amenities and services.[154] This could be a constraint for families that are unable to meet the new costs generated by improvements to their neighbourhood. More thought needs to be given to this issue, and technical operators should be encouraged to adapt current standards to help reduce development costs and the costs of housing or urban services that families have to bear.

- **The need to link financial innovation with public policies**

Considerable resources are needed to tackle widespread urban problems and restructure large numbers of informal settlements. Governments should lead the way in financial innovation in this field, and develop equitable models that require less public and international funding. Thinking on innovative financial mechanisms should prioritise two strategic variables in access to housing for the poorest groups: access to land and credit.[155]

Land management: one of the keys to equitable operations

Land access is a challenging issue for governments, development practitioners and citizens on every continent. Since urban operations can cause land values to increase substantially, land could be a potential source of finance for urban investments – although this assumes that governments will take transparent measures to recover some of the land rent currently captured by a minority of speculators and politicians. Experimental models in Europe, Latin America and Asia have tried various approaches, such as creating land agencies to establish and manage land reserves and consolidate, redistribute and reorganise land; land sharing, where investors have to contribute to the cost of rehousing residents on or off the original site in exchange for land and building rights; reserving certain land with adapted standards for social housing, etc.

Access to progressive credit and adapted housing products

In order to provide access to credit, local and central governments and operators need to be able to access loans themselves,[156] and set up credit systems for households.

Families will struggle to contribute to the cost of operations unless suitable mechanisms for personal loans are put in place. Without such mechanisms, households that cannot rely on help and support from family and friends will risk being excluded from operations or running into debt.

Residents in informal settlements need adapted housing products that are modest, progressive and flexible. International financiers and national governments should encourage the creation of funding mechanisms such as guarantee funds, support for refinancing, and funding for staff to manage small progressive credit schemes for low-income families.

[154] *For example, the space set aside for roads often bears little relation to actual road use observed on the ground. While it is essential to plan for neighbourhoods to develop and become more dense over time, it is equally important to think about adapting standards in order to keep the costs of the operation under control.*

[155] *See the study undertaken by ACT Consultants-Gret for the Inter-American Development Bank.*

[156] *See Thierry Paulais for further information on this question. Op.cit.*

Sheet n° 8 - Should residents be 'made to pay' or be 'paid', and how?

Overview of the question

- **Why should residents 'be made to pay'?**

The principle that residents should make a financial contribution to development initiatives that affect them gained widespread currency in the 1980s, with the advent of structural adjustment, State disengagement and the mobilisation of civil society.

Financial involvement is supposed to ensure that residents subscribe to operations and 'participate in' and 'appropriate' the various works that they entail.[157] This marks a shift from aid-based schemes to more active and effective approaches that do not encourage opportunistic behaviour. The assumption is that beneficiaries will be much more mindful of how money is used if it comes from their pockets rather than public funds; and that having to invest in operations and possibly take out credit would help reduce speculation and discourage people from selling their holdings when they have repaid their loans.

Where projects are undertaken by groups of residents that have set up savings associations,[158] their financial contribution can give them political and financial leverage in obtaining additional public or private funds and engaging with local policy-makers.

There is also the economic argument that residents' contributions help reduce the cost of operations and balance their finances.

Finally, as the primary beneficiaries on both an individual and collective level, it seems legitimate to ask residents to make some kind of investment in these operations.

- **The limitations of this kind of financial participation**

Without questioning the basic principle that residents should make a financial contribution to development initiatives, it is worth noting the limitations and risks associated with this approach.

Some critics argue that participation is a complex issue that goes beyond straightforward financial involvement. Financial contributions are just one element of the development process, along with trust or suspicion based on previous experiences, the quality of the work and methods employed by the project team, participants' influence on decision-making processes and project governance, and whether it is appropriate to ask them to help fund this kind of investment.[159]

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[157] *These two ideas are fairly vague. See Véronique Dorner, Philippe Lavigne Delville and Emilie Barrau (collab.), Mais pourquoi les bénéficiaires ne paient-ils qu'une partie de leur contribution financière ? Pauvreté, confiance et règles du jeu dans un projet de développement social urbain à Brazzaville, Congo Brazzaville, Gret, Coopérer Aujourd'hui n° 49, August 2006.*

[158] *According to the model promoted by Slum/Shack Dwellers International.*

[159] *Véronique Dorner. Op.cit.*

It is also worth bearing in mind that residents' contributions will only cover a tiny proportion of the overall cost of operations. Recovery rates may fall well short of expected levels, and management and assistance costs can make it very expensive to collect this money.[160]

There is also a high risk that low-income families will be excluded from the operation if the mandatory contributions are too high.

All this means that the principle of residents' financial participation – which is one of the guiding principles of current operations – is not always easy to put into practice from a technical or social point of view.

- **Should residents 'be paid'?**

While the question of financial contributions from residents is a broad one that is equally relevant to urban operations, local development projects and micro-projects,[161] the question of compensation and indemnification[162] specifically applies to major restructuring or slum clearance operations that result in residents being displaced or suffering financial losses.

The objectives of compensation or indemnification for residents are primarily socio-economic. Urban operations generate benefits, but can also result in different types of material or intangible losses, as families may lose their land or goods, be resettled in areas with no local jobs or services, lose touch with neighbours or access to places of symbolic or cultural significance, and have to give up economic or agricultural activities.

The objective is to minimise these kinds of losses and reduce the risk of further impoverishing people affected by the project by compensating them in cash or in kind.

World Bank Operational Directive 4.12 stipulates that any operation involving involuntary resettlement should include '*prompt and effective compensation at full replacement cost for losses of assets directly attributable to the project ... regardless of their status as occupants*'. It also states that displaced residents should receive assistance, possibly in the form of a lump sum towards their resettlement. All compensation should be paid before the persons concerned are moved.

This is very different to the position that the World Bank took in the 1980s, and the previous practice of 'clearing' residents out of informal settlements. These directives recognise the value of what people invest in their neighbourhood and family holdings, and the losses caused by displacement. By extension, they also give informal settlements and their residents certain rights and a degree of legitimacy. However, they do generate substantial costs that have to be borne by central and/or local governments.

Like the principle of financial contributions from residents, the assumption that people affected by operations to restructure or clear slum areas should be compensated is becoming more widespread. In fact, the two often go together: residents receive compensation and are also asked to make a financial contribution to development or reconstruction costs. This can be done in several ways, which brings us to the next question of how contributions and compensation should be delivered and funded.

- **Different types of contribution and compensation**

Financial contributions to these operations are not necessarily made in cash. Residents can also pay in kind – through labour, land,[163] buildings or building materials. Their contributions may help cover the cost of land, housing, public amenities and services, or developing economic activities. Most often,

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[160] *Papa Babacar Diouf, ' L'ingénierie économique et sociale dans les projets de lutte contre l'habitat insalubre à Dakar, Pikine et Guédiawaye (Sénégal)', pp. 225-243, in Julien Le Tellier, Aziz Iraki (eds), Habitat social au Maghreb et au Sénégal. Gouvernance urbaine et participation en questions, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2009, INAU, Rabat, 2010.*

[161] *See the Cotonou Agreements and European Union provisions.*

[162] *These two interchangeable terms denote the amounts paid in cash or kind (indemnification) to families in exchange (compensation) for material or intangible losses caused by operations that oblige them to move.*

[163] *Even if they don't have ownership titles, many residents will have paid a fee to settle in the neighbourhood, or obtained temporary or permanent authorisation from members of the local administration.*

they go towards their plot, housing or utilities (getting connected to urban water, electricity and sanitation services). The most problematic area is funding for housing.

Compensation may also be paid in cash or in kind (allocation of a plot or housing); be paid at a flat rate, calculated according to various categories, or evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The level of compensation is set according to the estimated loss, which may or may not take account of a wide range of factors: whether properties are completely or partially demolished; whether buildings were used solely for residential purposes or economic activities, or a mixture of both; any expenditure incurred; and any land, crops or cultivated agricultural parcels involved.

The costs of displacement and resettlement may be paid at a flat rate or cover a wide range of specific expenses, such as help with rent, various technical, administrative and tax expenses, and help with construction, connection to urban services and removal costs, etc.

Summary of experiences

- **Senegal: a case-by-case approach**

In the operation to upgrade/restructure and regularise Pikine Irrégulier Sud, contributions and compensation are dealt with simultaneously.[164] A detailed financial evaluation is made of each affected concession, taking account of the size of the parcel, any buildings on it, and possible expenditure or potential income from rent, economic or business activities, etc. The evaluation is based on replacement costs at the market price, with no allowance made for depreciation.

Beneficiaries with a permit to occupy their original parcel can choose whether to move free of charge into a fully finished new home in the resettlement area, or receive a financial payment equivalent to the value of their original holding. Very few have opted for the cash payment. Beneficiaries without occupancy permits are not given a choice; their only option is to be rehoused.

If the value of the original holding is lower than the price of the allocated housing, the beneficiary has to make up the difference. Payments are spread over several years, with the full amount to be paid within three years of the housing being allocated.

To help residents make these payments, project staff organise them into economic interest groups (EIGs) and help them open an account in the name of their group. This allows the head of each concession or their representative to build up the savings they need at their own pace, regularise the status of their parcel and thus become its owner

The project team prefer to use compensation in kind, in order to minimise the cash payments to beneficiaries and ensure that women and children are not made homeless as a result of decisions taken by the head of their household (who may have several wives).

Evaluating losses on a case-by-case basis is a time-consuming exercise (it took four months to cover 1,800 concessions), which has been complicated by the fact that some residents were suspicious of the process or absent when the survey was carried out.

The financial contribution from residents consists of paying the difference between the value of their original holding and their new housing, if the former is lower, and making a token payment amounting to about five per cent of the cost of the plot. This money pays the administrative costs of registering the new housing allocated to beneficiaries.

- **Mauritania: 'free' operations**

Residents affected by the operation to restructure the *kebbé* of El Mina in Nouakchott were not asked to make a financial contribution to the intervention. There were two reasons for this: i) the socio-

[164] *This work was undertaken by the Urbaplan-Ingésahel group.*

economic surveys showed that most residents had very low incomes; ii) the risk that beneficiaries would use the administrative receipts issued for financial contributions to sell the parcels they were allocated.

Compensation was a very important aspect of this operation. Each household that was moved to a resettlement site received a lump sum of 70,000 MRO (equivalent to about 170 Euros[165]), paid by cheque just before the move. This money was supposed to cover the cost of dismantling, transporting and reassembling their shacks, although the government encouraged families to use it to access the Twize housing improvement programme.[166] Eligible households that were resettled on the original site did not receive compensation, even though some of them had to move in order to 'access' their allotted parcel.

Displaced persons are paid by cheque

© Aurore Mansion.

This approach was very expensive for the State, which paid out a total of 614 million MRO in compensation (equivalent to about 1.5 million Euros). However, it did mean that most households subscribed to the project, and that it could be implemented relatively rapidly (it took four years to move and resettle the 14,000 households that lived in the neighbourhood in 2001). While we would question the decision to pay a lump sum that took no account of the value of the original holdings or household incomes, this was was balanced by the fact that more land was distributed than originally anticipated as a result of the flexible eligibility criteria and free plot allocations. The ***kebbé*** was also unusual in that the housing, which consisted of wooden and metal shacks, was very homogenous and could be dismantled and reconstructed in a single day.

Although there are no firm figures or detailed evaluations available, this system of combined compensation (payment + free plots) seems to have been a determining factor in the number of sales observed in both the original neighbourhood and the resettlement sites. The operation generated

[165] *This amounts to nearly three times the average monthly income for households in the kebbé.*

[166] *The Twize programme offered cheap housing loans and subsidies, and constructed modules that look very much like the rooms built by the majority of Moor families in Mauritania.*

considerable added value for beneficiaries,[167] from 'top-down' sales by families with other landholdings and landowners who live in other neighbourhoods; and 'bottom up' sales by very low-income families that used this unexpected cash windfall to cover general expenses or pay for weddings, funerals, healthcare, etc., and then moved to less secure housing or went back to renting their accommodation.

- **Morocco: third partners**

Each plot on the resettlement site in Essalam Al Loghlam measured 84m², and was allocated to two families. Construction on these lots followed a standard, mandatory plan for a four-storey building (G+3), giving each family living space on two floors.

Beneficiaries were expected to pay 6,000 Euros per plot, or 3,000 Euros per household. This was a heavily subsidised price amounting to less than a third of its actual cost. The balance came from a contribution from the Housing Solidarity Fund,[168] and money that the operator Al Omrane made selling other housing products on the land base at market prices (offsetting system). The operation was also funded through a long-term, low-interest loan from the French Development Agency.

Each beneficiary household received 15,000 Dh (1,350 Euros). Some of this (3,000 Dh, or 270 Euros) was to cover transitional housing costs and expenses incurred in the period between their original home being demolished and their new housing being completed, and the remainder (12,000 Dh, or 1,080 Euros) to help with construction costs. They had to pay Al Omrane the full amount for the plot in order to obtain their building permits, but were exempted from various charges such as the tax on building permits, fees for submitting building plans, road tax, etc., which were covered by the State or the municipality.

The average cost of building their new homes came to 70,000 Euros. Households had the option of paying for this themselves (which 30 per cent of them did), or taking on a third partner[169] who would be given part of the buildable area in exchange for their financial support. Under these agreements, the third partner usually received two floors, and each beneficiary kept one floor, giving them about 75m² of living space.

This arrangement worked particularly well for poorer households, and enabled nearly 60 per cent of families to become homeowners without going into debt[170] or having to sell their 'bonds'.[171] The financial leverage it generated helped cover the cost of both the plot[172] and constructing the new housing.

This is a very interesting approach to financing such operations, and local officials are keen to extend to other operations in Casablanca. However, while it works in this context, where land is scarce and expensive, it would not work everywhere. Nor can it be said to have been an unqualified success in this operation, as there were numerous disputes between beneficiaries and third partners over the quality and finishing of the buildings, and who got which floors.

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[167] *Having obtained the land free of charge, beneficiaries that sold up made a clear profit. Despite the ban on sales, and fact that the badges issued to those with land rights had no legal value, land prices increased as a result of the operation because the neighbourhoods (the original and resettlement sites) were legally recognised and serviced. Land values went up more in the kebbé because it is well-located close to the city centre, and is better serviced than the resettlement area.*

[168] *The Moroccan Housing Solidarity Fund is funded by a tax on cement production.*

[169] *Usually investors, promoters, Moroccans working abroad, etc.*

[170] *Less than 2 per cent of households took out bank loans.*

[171] *Registered bond issued by Al Omrane to beneficiary households involved in clearance operations.*

[172] *The third partners sometimes paid one or both beneficiaries' contribution to the price of the plot.*

Lessons learnt and recommendations

- **Social and political considerations are as important as economic factors**

These cases show that the question of whether residents should receive compensation or make financial contributions to operations is not simply a matter of economics, but also of what is socially and politically acceptable. Urban operations are not designed and implemented to break even; they are primarily development programmes with a social goal. The decisions made in Senegal and Mauritania were mainly designed to encourage residents to subscribe to the programme and help the operation move forward. They also aimed to ensure that the interventions reached the right people and did not adversely affect their living conditions. This type of approach would not have been possible without substantial support from donors.

The case in Morocco is different in the sense that the operation was conceived as part of a national programme. The third partner funding is an innovative measure that works well in city centres, but would not work in areas where land values are low.

- **Compensation in kind for losses**

Compensating residents can have unintended or perverse effects: encouraging speculation, attracting people from outside the neighbourhood, leading to the loss of housing. Therefore, whenever possible, it is better for compensation to be made in kind rather than cash, partly to control what is funded, but more to ensure that the whole family benefits from the compensation rather than just the head of the household or their representative.

- **Finding solutions for informal activities and tenants**

It is important to consider all the different types of losses caused by urban operations. They not only result in buildings being demolished and expenses incurred, but also in the loss of income-generating activities (rental, economic activities, market gardening, etc.). Tenants need to be taken into account too, so that they do not lose out from operations, especially as they are usually among the most insecure categories of resident. Therefore, operations also need to offer housing options that are accessible to tenants.

If there is no funding for replacement enterprises, residents will start up informal activities on the resettlement site.

- **Diversify contributions to avoid excluding the poorest households**

Contributions from the poorest households need to be adjusted to their level of income, and paid in several ways to ensure that they are not excluded from the operation. This can be done in several ways, such as spreading contributions over several years after residents have been resettled or rehoused, making contributions in kind rather than cash (labour, building materials, goods, land), and providing facilities to develop income-generating activities. Families need to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. This may take time initially, but it can save time later in the process by preventing holdups caused by insolvency.

- **How to avoid families running up debts in order to access housing**

In three of these four cases, specific measures were taken to avoid households going into debt in order to build their homes. In Senegal, this was done by valuing the affected families' existing holdings and investments at the start of the operation – an expensive exercise for the local government, which had to bear the costs of this one-off operation. The minimal mechanism in Mauritania, which enabled families to build at their own pace and according to their means, is only feasible when there is sufficient land and available space in the city. In Morocco, the solution was to use private investors – thus introducing a social mix – and vertical densification. This was possible in Casablanca, where land is

scarce and expensive and the operation represented a profitable opportunity for third partners, but would not necessarily work elsewhere.

- **Using sequential loans to enable low-income families to access housing**

There is also the broader question of access to credit for housing. Many families that have to take out long-term loans to pay for their housing find it extremely difficult to keep up with the repayments, which means that there is a high risk that they will default on these loans.[173] Either one accepts that loans will not be repaid, which amounts to a retrospective rather than a planned subsidy (with all the social problems associated with cost recovery efforts), or families will be evicted, which clearly raises other problems. The key issue is the timescale for repayment, and ensuring that the proposed financial product is appropriate to the way that families progressively build their homes.[174]

- **Finding a balance between 'free handouts' and making beneficiaries pay**

The operation in Senegal combined modest financial contributions with generous compensation. In Mauritania, beneficiaries received a free plot and a cash payment; they were not asked to make any immediate contribution, but were expected to fund the building of their homes. In Morocco, no compensation is planned, but the price of the plot is subsidised and the operation is supported by the private sector. Although the situation differs in each of these three examples, each operation ultimately combines contributions and direct or indirect compensation (the latter through subsidies to the operation).

In these three cases, residents' occupancy was secured, although they did not obtain titles until a later stage in the process.[175] The original neighbourhoods and resettlement sites have been developed and serviced, if not always to satisfactory standards.

Financial contributions or compensation; which way is best? The best compromise is to combine both approaches, with levels of compensation that take account of what families have lost, and contributions that reflect the goods and services households will be able to access as a result of the operation.

It takes a fine, complex combination of financial and social expertise to establish this balance without excluding low-income families. This is rarely achieved.

This aspect of funding also needs to be seen in relation to the overall economy of the operation, with all its immediate and deferred costs.

Very little work has been done on this field, which merits further research. It would also be useful to share experiences with different credit arrangements and innovative mechanisms for funding housing, the estimation of total costs and comparative analysis of operations and larger-scale programmes, modes of evaluating losses, and socially and technically effective mechanisms for compensation.

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[173] *See problems with indebtedness and high default rates in Morocco; also, FORREF's difficulties in recovering family contributions towards the cost of their plots and housing in Senegal.*

[174] *ACT Consultants and Gret, report for the Inter-American Development Bank: Mécanismes d'accès au logement pour les personnes à faibles revenus en Amérique latine. Le rôle de l'accès au crédit et de l'accès au foncier dans l'accès à l'habitat progressif pour les pauvres. Enseignements tirés de sept études de cas (Chili, Pérou, Mexique, Colombie, Argentine, Inde, Afrique du Sud). 2002.*

[175] *See Sheet 6 on land.*

Sheet n° 9 - Why should operations be monitored and evaluated, and how should this be done?

Overview of the question

- **Helping project managers deliver better outcomes**

Monitoring and evaluation is a mechanism for improving the quality of a project or operation at various levels and phases of the project cycle. "*The quality of a project depends upon multiple decisions taken at certain points by a range of people who come to the project from very different angles*".[176]

A broad definition of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms

There is no single definition of monitoring and evaluation. Various definitions exist, each corresponding to a particular policy on quality promoted or adopted by a particular institution. A useful definition should be broad enough to help practitioners understand the value of the different approaches and tools that are currently available. In his methodological paper on monitoring and evaluation,[177] Daniel Neu defines monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as ranges of tools that are:

– intended to generate information and debate;

– designed, activated and mainly financed by the project concerned;

– used to help clarify decisions taken during project implementation;

– helpful in documenting information and communication campaigns and learning and development processes that may take place outside the project cycle.

This definition emphasises the utility of monitoring and evaluation both during and after project implementation.

Therefore, it could be said that these mechanisms are primarily designed to produce information that can be used to 1) facilitate decision-making, 2) report on project execution, 3) document learning and development processes.

The emphasis here is on monitoring and evaluation as a useful tool for the people and teams that are responsible for actions during project implementation. This definition focuses on the mechanisms for producing information and continuous analysis,[178] and how they affect the way that projects are steered and run. It applies to both internal and external mechanisms. The latter may be short missions to

[176] *Daniel Neu, Le suivi-évaluation pour piloter, apprendre et rendre compte, Coopérer aujourd'hui n°72, February 2011, p. 15.*

[177] *Ibid.*

[178] *Continuous analysis does not preclude points in the project cycle when more information is circulated, debated or presented, such as the official launch of an operation, a mid-term evaluation, a major reorientation or change in context, and closure of the operation.*

provide help in specific areas, or ongoing technical assistance throughout the project, delivered in close association with those responsible for project actions.

These activities differ from evaluation in the strict sense of a periodic activity undertaken at particular times. However, "*monitoring and evaluation and retrospective evaluation are based on the same techniques and are mutually enriching. Hence the numerous guides, methods and services used by international development agencies during monitoring and evaluation*".[179]

- **Advantages and disadvantages of predominantly quantitative monitoring and evaluation mechanisms**

The kind of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that will be put in place are largely determined by the objectives of the exercise, the people that are going to use the mechanisms, and the target audience for the findings.

Many projects are mainly concerned with reporting back to donors on the progress of operations and proper use of allocated funds. As the main objective is to prepare the ground for further funding and continued partnerships, these mechanisms tend to focus on procedures (effectiveness, efficiency), quantitative indicators of progress and short-term results.

These procedures provide useful data, but also have certain limitations: they place greater emphasis on quantitative rather than qualitative data; focus on technical and financial information rather than institutional, social, urban or political considerations; and look at short-term results rather than medium- and long-term effects. They are symptomatic of a tendency to standardise approaches according to the requirements of international public funding bodies.

This raises the question of which criteria should be used to determine the success and quality of a project. Is it enough to focus on speed of execution and disbursement, good use of funds and number of outputs (infrastructures, amenities, displaced persons, resettled persons, etc.)? Should more qualitative aspects be included, which take account of the social and urban dynamics that the operation is seeking to change (poverty reduction, access to decent housing, security of tenure and services, building urban management capacities, etc.)? Or should more attention be paid to changing public policies and encouraging institutional learning? If so, what indicators should be retained to measure these criteria? What is the quantity and quality of the housing that is built? Will there be increased incomes, consumption of potable water, a sense of security of tenure?

- **The difficulty of understanding socio-urban dynamics**

Social and political change is much harder to analyse than the technical or financial aspects of a development project. Because this is such a huge subject, hypotheses have to be formulated and fields of observation selected. Identifying and interpreting change, and isolating the effects of an action or a project within the changes observed are complex activities that require in-depth knowledge and expertise.

The indicators that are selected and the information they convey can also be problematic. Various quantitative and qualitative indicators need to be combined to explain the realities and dynamics at work, so one of the first tasks is to conduct socio-economic surveys to identify these indicators.

Similarly, measuring the impact of an operation assumes that data on time 't' (pre-operation) is available for comparison with data on time 't+' (post-operation). This is rarely the case. Furthermore, "*the procedure does not consist of saying that change in a particular indicator is a measure of the effectiveness of an action. When a variation is observed, one should consider its possible meanings, view it as an indication of a change in the situation and develop hypotheses as to what it means, each time asking if this variation can really be ascribed to the action taken.*"[180]

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[179] *Aude de Amorim, Bernadette Cavelier, Michael Ruleta, Yves Yard, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Evaluation Guide, DGCID, Evaluation Office, Paris, June 2005.*

[180] *Vincent De Gaulejac, Michel Bonetti, Jean Fraisse,* L'ingénierie sociale, *collection Alternatives sociales, Syros, Paris, 1995, p. 121. Part III of the work on dynamic evaluation, p. 164.*

The lack of consolidated references and methods is a huge hindrance to monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that take greater account of social factors and urban policies. More research and experimentation needs to be done in this field to reduce this constraint.

- **The role of the evaluator is changing with the emergence of interactive procedures**

"*Monitoring and evaluation is much more than a range of more or less effective tools. It is everyone's business (...) a state of mind, a philosophy for action and a way of designing the intervention to further development, where the tools facilitate the process rather than drive it.*"[181]

This view of monitoring and evaluation excludes mechanisms that are restricted to a small group of people who produce information and keep it to themselves. Observation and analysis should be crosscutting, as the whole process of project design and implementation cannot be controlled by a single person or team. Different viewpoints and divergent interests need to be compared to understand the realities observed on the ground and adjust the action or intervention accordingly.

Methods that encourage involvement by as many actors as possible (operators, elected officials, service providers, residents, etc.) are gradually emerging. This means that the role of the people leading the monitoring and evaluation, who will be responsible for analysing the information gathered, is also changing. They increasingly need to be "*technical experts (capable of undertaking relevant research), diplomatic managers (capable of orchestrating diverse interest groups) and negotiators (capable of channelling and assessing the merits of the different parties' requests for information). This new role should theoretically enable evaluators to be objective in their procedures, even-handed with different stakeholders, and capable of producing useful information. What a challenge!*"[182]

These approaches emphasise the importance of involving beneficiaries, families and all those affected by operations who are rarely consulted. Monitoring and evaluation is often seen as the preserve of project managers and experts, but we must make every effort to "*gather the 'views' of those for whom the action is taken, which will necessarily be subjective. The point is not to make them* objective, *but to* take them into account."[183]

Three main groups of tools

Daniel Neu identifies three main groups of tools in his methodological paper on monitoring and evaluation:[184]

– Tools for collecting or producing and processing information: monitoring tools (information systems, databases, etc.), studies and surveys, systems for checking data produced by others, external evaluations, impact assessments;

– Tools for facilitating debate and re-evaluation: project reviews, monitoring and supervisory missions;

– Tools for collective learning: assisted self-evaluation, building on outcomes.

Monitoring and evaluation tools need to be tailored to the project concerned, the issues it tackles (and thus the power relations at play), its formal and broader objectives, and its governance (who is the information generated for? How will the findings be shared? Who will steer any changes it may precipitate?).

[181] *François Navez-Bouchanine (ed.), 1996, L'évaluation des projets de développement urbain, Les Éditions Magrébines, AERAU, INAU, SNEC, p. 17.*

[182] *Ibid., p.42.*

[183] *Vincent de Gaulejac et al., op. cit., p. 203.*

[184] *Daniel Neu, ibid.*

Summary of the experiences

- **Mauritania: monitoring and evaluation largely disregarded by decision-makers**

The Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for the operation to restructure the *kebbé* of El Mina determined how it should be monitored and evaluated. The objectives of the monitoring and evaluation were to:

- evaluate the extent to which implementation accords with the objectives and methods specified in the RAP, and evaluate the impact of the RAP on incomes and living standards and,
- monitor situations where the displacement and resettlement process has created particular social or economic difficulties.

The indicators for the evaluation were:

- the match between eligible and resettled families, using the database generated by the census as a reference and,
- indicators for income and living standards.

The monitoring and evaluation mainly focused on the social dimension of the operation, and was intended to measure its impact on families in the settlement. However, it was not possible to do this because the available indicators were not sufficiently reliable (especially the census).

The monitoring evolved over the course of the operation. It was initially conducted by a local NGO (Tenmyia) during the servicing phase, and was then taken over by the ADU Resettlement Unit with support from an international NGO (Gret) during the pilot phase to consolidate two blocks in the *kebbé*.[185]

The monitoring and evaluation was partly shaped by political pressure on the ADU to move the programme forward, in that the data generated related to physical progress on the ground (number of households resettled, number of households remaining on the original site, daily resettlement rate, etc.). The technical assistance from Gret was mainly channelled into producing these data.

The operation in El Mina was supposed to provide the basis for the setup of future operations, particularly the restructuring of the *gazra*,[186] which the State had promised to complete within three years. In the event, it launched these operations using exactly the same methods that were deployed in El Mina, without taking the time to evaluate the impact of this intervention and adjust the approach to the particularities of the *gazra*.[187]

- **Morocco: focus on quantitative aspects despite donor recommendations for a social impact study**

The monitoring of the Cities without Slums (CWS) programme was mainly based on quantitative indicators designed to measure the physical outputs (number of shacks demolished, rate of construction in resettlement sites, number of public amenities built) and economic outcomes (number of land titles issued, amount of money recovered) of the operation. The public operator in charge of the interventions conducted a parallel financial monitoring exercise, but programme officials made no effort to incorporate the economic, social and environmental dimensions into CWS programme evaluations, as the programme was launched without an overarching vision or clearly defined objectives (poverty reduction, etc.).[188]

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[185] *The ADU did not ask for technical assistance during the generalisation phase.*

[186] *The kebbé are quite homogeneous in terms of buildings and land, while the* gazra *are relatively mixed in terms of buildings, social makeup and even land, as certain residents hold occupancy permits or land titles. Cf. Hélène Julien, Aurore Mansion, Virginie Rachmuhl, Étude pour la restructuration des quartiers précaires de Nouakchott. Social impact assessment (report), Gret-Urbanis for ADU, June 2008.*

[187] *Especially the fact that the gazra contained solidly constructed buildings not found in El Mina.*

[188] *It is worth remembering that the CWS programme was launched in the emergency following the suicide bombings of 2003.*

Several crosscutting[189] and sectoral[190] evaluations of the programme were undertaken as part of the agreement between the Ministry for Housing and the international bodies and donors involved in the CWS programme. Even though most of these studies emphasised the need for more qualitative monitoring, the focus stayed on the programme's physical outputs, and no reference was made to the social nature of the actions.

However, a social impact assessment of CWS operations,[191] including the one in Essalam Al Loghlam in Casablanca, was produced as a requirement for AFD financial support for the public operator Al Omrane. The objective of this study was to identify the changes (economic, social, urban) arising from the interventions and determine how they had helped improve living conditions for displaced households. The aim was to help better understand the effects and benefits of slum clearance operations beyond the operational objectives defined by the ministry. It is to be hoped that its findings will feed into future actions so that greater account is taken of the integrated aspect of operations to clear substandard housing.

Lessons learnt and recommendations

- **Mechanisms for monitoring execution rather than aids to decision-making**

These examples show that the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that are put in place in urban operations are generally fairly limited. They are usually overseen by delegated project managers (who are technicians), with the main aim of monitoring the technical and financial progress of the operation and reporting to political decision-makers and external funding bodies. These mechanisms seem to do little to contribute to decision-making, as they respond to primarily political requirements and logics.

Little account has been taken of the social effects of these operations, despite the methodological frameworks and assistance offered by donors. This is doubtless due to a combination of methodological limitations and cultural and political restrictions.

There is also a noticeable disconnect between the monitoring and evaluation of these operations and consideration of their impact on the surrounding urban fabric. None of the operations were considered in relation to the local housing market (the need for land and housing for different social groups, the dynamics of the land and property markets), with city-level planning for infrastructures, urban services and public amenities, possible or desirable densities, mobility and public transport requirements, demographic projections for the next five, ten or fifteen years, estimated costs and possible sources of funding, or even the existing competences and capacity building needed to manage all these factors.[192]

This is symptomatic of the spatially limited, short-term logic of these projects, and a narrow view of urban development as little more than a succession of isolated operations. There is no forward-looking vision for the overall city, attempt to link up with existing or potential urban planning tools or institutional reforms, or effort to promote local policies and regulations. This is mainly due to the fact that operations and programmes are directly controlled by state bodies rather than territorial authorities.

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[189] *Fouad Benchakroune, Khalid Nabil, Évaluation du programme 'Villes sans bidonvilles', Ministry of Housing and Planning, Nena Urban Forum, January 2008. Anthony G. Bigi (ed.), Cities without Slums programme, Poverty and social impact analysis, World Bank, June 2006.*

[190] *Olivier Toutain, Bilan évaluation du dispositif d'accompagnement social dans les opérations de résorption de l'habitat insalubre, holding Al Omrane, June 2008.*

[191] *Étude d'évaluation et d'impact du programme d'appui à la résorption de l'habitat insalubre et des bidonvilles (PARHIB), holding d'aménagement Al Omrane, Gret-Area group, 2011.*

[192] *The same observation applies to environmental questions. Although projects financed by the World Bank include ex ante environmental impact assessments, we do not have information on the recommended mitigation measures or how their implementation is monitored.*

- **The need to involve policy-makers**

These case studies show that the data and analysis generated by monitoring and evaluation will have absolutely no influence on strategic guidelines unless these findings are supported by decision-makers. *"It is essential to involve decision-makers. (...) in order to give internal and external evaluators the legitimacy and resources they need to intervene."*[193]

This is not a straightforward issue, and the situation is not helped by poor communication between the technical and political levels. The two are supposed to be interconnected, with the technical services and operators providing decision-making tools for policy-makers (who obviously need to understand how to use them). In reality, their complementary functions are rarely in evidence.

In addition to these methodological constraints, mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation are often limited by political and cultural factors, as they are usually defined by project managers or technical operators who place little importance on monitoring the projects' social indicators.

Even when questions about the social and urban aspects of operations are included in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, decision-makers rarely use the findings and analyses to adapt ongoing actions, plan new ones or guide public policies. The information tends to be taken in isolation, manipulated, or sometimes even used to justify interventions or policies that generate further exclusion and urban isolation.

- **Funding for research and experimentation to improve and broaden monitoring and evaluation**

Funding is needed for research and experimentation on monitoring and evaluation. This should focus on:

- generating relevant methods and indicators for institutional capacity building, social and economic impacts, urban impacts (and environmental impacts) and,
- putting these methods into practice with project managers from the voluntary sector.

- **Organise public debate about the effects and impacts of operations**

This will entail getting all kinds of actors around the table (ministry officials, donors, local governments, operators, NGOs, community organisations, etc.) to define and validate common objectives and ensure that they are respected, both during project implementation and in the long term after the intervention has ended. This work is time-consuming and difficult to measure, as "*it is much harder to make an* objective *evaluation of capacity building than it is to evaluate the attainment of project objectives.*"[194]

Initiating this debate could open the way for future public spaces for consultation, and the formation of local alliances centred around urban operations and the issues they raise at the city level.

- **Donors' role in improving the quality of operations**

Donors can act as catalysts by being more vigilant in ensuring that the principles they promote are put into practice. Although World Bank Operational Directive 4.12 stresses the importance of participatory procedures, local government involvement and minimising involuntary displacements, these case studies show that funding requirements often take precedence over project quality or the application of these directives.

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[193] *Vincent de Gaulejac et al., op. cit., p. 194.*

[194] *Castellanet C. et Blanc C. Assistance technique et renforcement des capacités : problématiques et grandes tendances, AFD, série Évaluation et capitalisation, N° 10, Paris, 2007.*

There are various concrete measures that can be taken to move things forward on the ground. These include:

- Ensuring that financial negotiations between national or local decision-makers and cooperation agencies take account of the operations' social dimensions, and making this a criterion for deciding whether or not to fund an operation;
- Financing technical assistance mechanisms for a given period;
- Programming a sizeable and relatively autonomous monitoring and evaluation component into these projects. Terms and conditions should include the obligation to put in place inclusive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that use interactive procedures and debate the findings. This may require technical assistance;
- Encouraging procedures to build on experiences and share practices in order to reinforce learning processes and institution-building, and provide lessons for future operations;
- Making funding for new operations conditional upon the evaluation findings of previous operations.

Within cooperation agencies, progress can be made on at least two fronts, to:

- Make urban development policies and programmes more coherent. There is a tendency for agencies to support decentralisation, poverty reduction and attaining MDGs on the one hand, while funding operations that take little account of these dimensions on the other. Tackling this issue will require organisational changes within cooperation agencies, to decompartmentalise services and skills and ensure that experiences are shared;
- Develop frames of reference or operational directives by incorporating the lessons learned from a range of experiences.

Conclusion

Operations to upgrade, restructure or clear informal settlements represent a major challenge for cities in developing countries. The situation in Africa is extremely worrying because of the huge number of city dwellers currently living in sub-standard conditions,[195] and short- and medium-term projections for demographic growth. Urban operations have a decisive influence on a nation's capacity for economic development (economic infrastructures, urban mobility, etc.). The building sector is particularly important in this respect as it will certainly be one of the driving forces for growth in Africa in coming decades. In socio-political terms, informal settlements crystallise fears about violence, criminality and threats to public security, which are fed by the political weight that residents of these neighbourhoods can bring to bear and how they might choose to wield it. Another sensitive issue is the added value generated by urban operations, which increase land and property values. This has potentially negative effects for poorer residents (higher housing costs) and substantial benefits for the urban elite who capture the ground rents generated by urban growth.

With all these factors at play, many States and donors view urban operations as priority actions, and have invested substantial sums in these operations. Donors have adjusted their intervention methodologies over the years, with mixed results.

The experiences presented in this paper show that there are considerable variations in the neighbourhoods targeted by urban operations, and between the operations themselves. Some are relatively modest, focusing on installing basic infrastructures and services, and doing little work on access to land or improving housing. Others are major interventions that involve displacing and resettling residents in newly developed sites, which are often located on the outskirts of the city far from the original settlement. Our analysis of these four experiences in Africa is the first time this diversity has been explicitly recognised and examined.

Certain findings will be useful for future actions, especially two key points that emerged from these case studies. The first is the fundamentally political nature of urban operations, although this is rarely made explicit and operations are managed as predominantly technical and financial initiatives. The second is the disconnect between urban operations and public policies. Governments need to better integrate these interventions into an overall strategy for growth and urban development, to avoid encouraging initiatives that will not only be non-replicable, but which will also pose long-term problems for urban development.

Project governance. This analysis shows that close attention needs to be paid to the governance of this type of project, to ensure that urban neighbourhoods develop in a sustainable manner. The State, which often directly manages and steers these operations at the highest level, should ensure that the actors who will ultimately be responsible for managing these neighbourhoods and the outcomes of these operations (ordinary citizens, local governments and sectoral administrations) are involved at every stage of the process.

Steering and monitoring operations. Multi-actor mechanisms are needed to ensure consistent project management and execution, and to make the adjustments that are inevitably needed as an operation progresses. Complementarity and communication between the political and technical levels are also pre-requisites for a successful operation. Steering and management mechanisms should give equal weight to the social and technical components of these operations, rather than

[195] *Particularly with regard to the basic needs identified by the Millennium Development Goals: health, drinking water, sanitation, etc.*

downplaying or ignoring the social aspects, as is often the case. Structured monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that are incorporated into the decision-making process would be very helpful in this respect.

Residents' participation. It is obviously desirable for residents to participate in the design and implementation of operations, to ensure that the selected development options are acceptable, that residents' hopes and aspirations are taken into account, and to encourage them to support the programme. These case studies show that forms and levels of participation vary, and largely depend on the State's willingness to allow its citizens some measure of control over the process. Different types of participation should be encouraged, with content favoured over form (to take account of different opinions and interests and in the interests of fairness). Particular attention should be paid to two aspects of participation: ensuring that everyone is kept well informed (not only elite groups or residents' representatives), and putting in place accessible and legitimate grievance procedures.

Social assistance. Social assistance is needed at different stages of the process. One of its roles is to ensure that participatory processes are effective. Social assistants have a key role to play in the design phase – when the eligibility criteria, allocation of parcels or housing, modes of compensation, and final list of rights holders are decided – to ensure that the rules that are established are fair and transparent. The most sensitive activities during implementation are monitoring resettlement and rehousing activities, and the allocation of aid and credit. In the post-operational phase, social assistants work with local actors to help residents reconstruct their homes, regularise their land tenure, get connected to services, access training and employment, and re-establish social links. This form of assistance requires the ability to listen, analyse information, run activities and mediate – skills that are not always available locally, and which need to be strengthened.

Compensation. Compensation or indemnification for losses and damage sustained by residents should prioritise compensation in kind, replacing existing housing or landholdings with new accommodation or land. The value of the proposed land or housing should be at least equal to the value of what it replaces. The State is responsible for providing compensation, which should represent realistic but fair compensation for tangible and intangible losses. This balance can be hard to achieve.

Particular attention should be paid to the poorest families. It is to be hoped that additional assistance will be provided to cover their costs for moving, temporary housing, hooking up to services and paying the necessary taxes and administrative fees for permits and authorisations.

Funding access to housing. A combination of incentives and regulatory measure could be used to encourage more diverse housing, tackle urban sprawl and optimise urban infrastructures (roads, public transport, and basic services). This will entail putting in place adapted credit tools and self-build opportunities. When land values are high, another interesting option would be using private investors (where they exist) to build mixed housing, with some homes set aside for families that have been rehoused (as in the operation in Casablanca).

Land. The feasibility of these operations largely depends upon land: how the original sites are freed up for development, and what land is available to resettle displaced residents. Land determines household strategies for dealing with expected losses or gains, and influences the economy of these operations. Operations that legitimise residents' occupation of the original neighbourhood or new resettlement site often involve very onerous regularisation procedures. This is largely because individual ownership titles tend to be seen as the only route to regularisation in urban areas, and obtaining these titles is a long and expensive business. Many families are unable to follow these procedures to their conclusion without assistance. Therefore, institutional and organisational reforms are needed to diversify the possible forms of regularisation and simplify procedures for allocating titles, in order to bring the legal framework more into line with actual practice. Most favour the legal route to securing occupancy, through individual ownership. Possible alternative options include separating ownership of land and buildings, rental-purchase mechanisms, experimenting with land consolidation, and using prescriptive acquisition where possible. Much thought has been given to this issue in rural areas, but it has not been considered in any real depth in urban areas.

Funding operations and urbanisation. Finally, there is the question of how operations are funded, and how to ensure that they are replicable. It seems unrealistic to continue to expect most costs to be borne by governments with limited resources, or international donors with finite funding for subsidies and loans. There has been little crosscutting analysis of the global economy of these operations, comparing their immediate and deferred cumulative costs – including social, urban and environmental variables – and the possible types and levels of cost recovery. The added land value that these operations usually generate could certainly provide a substantial source of funding, provided it is not captured by certain economic or political elites. Another potential source of funding that has yet to be fully exploited is land tax. Thinking on this issue would be enriched by broader analysis that includes examples from other regions and continents where such operations are common, and considers them within the framework of integrated urban policies.

Postscript

In recent years African countries have seen huge numbers of their citizens migrate from rural areas to urban centres. This exodus has been triggered by deterioration in rural living conditions caused by droughts or natural disasters, and the concentration of public services and job opportunities in urban areas.

This mass migration, coupled with high demographic growth rates, has resulted in rapid and poorly managed urban development and the growth of informal settlements in and around most major cities in the developing world.

The authorities in certain countries have responded to the multiple challenges this situation presents by taking urgent action to restructure informal settlements, regularise their occupants' land tenure and implement infrastructure programmes to improve their amenities and services.

As a result, informal settlements have come to be a byword for urban development issues in Africa, a form of shorthand for all the complex problems facing cities across this continent.

The methods and approaches used to address the problems created by the spread of these neighbourhoods differ from one country to the next, and even one project to another within the same country. The procedures they follow reflect the similarities and differences in each context. This document fills a gap in the references and standards that actors need to guide them through these operations and procedures, and constitutes a real opportunity to improve the way that the people affected by urban operations are treated.

Mauritania is still working with donors on the long and complicated process of improving life for residents in these neighbourhoods and better integrating them into the rest of the city. This research will certainly provide ample food for thought for the actors who design, run and support these operations, at a time when they are sorely in need of 'inspirational' rather than financial donors.

Mohamed Aly Cheibany
ADU technical advisor
Nouakchott, Mauritania

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Annex 1 –Characteristics of the four operations

	Nouakchott, Mauritania	**Casablanca, Morocco**	**Kigali, Rwanda**	**Pikine, Senegal**
Settlements				
Location of original settlement	Central	Central	Central	Central
Age of settlement	Old	Old	Old	Old
Type of buildings	Shacks	Mixture of shacks and solidly constructed houses	Solidly constructed houses	Solidly constructed houses
General information				
Title of operation	Restructuring and consolidation of El Mina *kebbé*	Slum clearance in Skouila and Thomas, Casablanca	Restructuring and consolidation of informal settlements	Restructuring and regularisation of Pikine Irrégulier Sud (highway construction)
Duration and progress of operation	8 years, 2000-2008 Completed	Operation began in 2005 Delays likely Ongoing	7 years, 2004-2010 Completed	6 years, 2006-2012 Delays likely Ongoing
Status of operation	Pilot operation, precursor to future interventions	Part of a national programme (Cities without Slums)	Pilot operation, not replicated	Operation to support a highway infrastructure project
Potential beneficiaries	*de facto* 'owners', whether or not they occupy or hold titles to the land	*de facto* 'owners', whether or not they occupy the land	*de facto* 'owners'	Owners and tenants, whether or not they are title holders
Number of households concerned	14,300 households, ≈ 51,000 residents	8,400 households, ≈ 42,000 residents	75,000 residents in the intervention zone	1,017 concessions ≈ 15,000 residents
Scale of displacements	50 per cent of households displaced, 50 per cent resettled in situ	Originally a mixed operation. Uncertainty about the future of households remaining on site	Minimal displacements (1 family)	53 per cent of families displaced (about 8,000 people)
Location of resettlement/rehousing zones	2,000 families close to original neighbourhood, 5,000 several kilometres away	2/3 nearby, 1/3 several kilometres away	A rehousing zone was planned, but the sole displaced family was given compensation	Families rehoused in an area about 10 kilometres from the original neighbourhood

	Nouakchott, Mauritania	Casablanca, Morocco	Kigali, Rwanda	Pikine, Senegal
Legal and institutional framework				
National legal framework for restructuring and regularisating informal settlements	None, apart from provisions for expropriation in the public interest, which only apply to holders of titles or occupancy permits	None, apart from a paragraph in Law 12 90 on restructuring irregular land parcels	None at the time of the project, apart from provisions for expropriation in the public interest, which only apply to holders of titles or occupancy permits	A decree setting out the procedure for executing land restructuring operations on unplanned sites in areas slated for urban renovation
Political tutelage of operation	President, Prime Minister, CDHLCPI	Ministry of Housing	Ministry of Infrastructure	Government
Financial contribution from State	Compensation (€1.3 million)	Subsidised land, development and amenities	Compensation	Compensation (€7.5 million) and investment (€12 million)
Project management delegated to a technical operator	Urban development agency (ADU) assisted by an international consultancy group/local service provider	Holding Al Omrane (HAO)	Ministry of Infrastructure/Project coordination unit	National agency responsible for promoting investment and major works (APIX)
Social project management	ADU	HAO	Project coordination unit	APIX
Social project manager	ADU Resettlement unit, assisted by service providers	National service provider (Social Development Agency, consultancy)	Project coordination unit and decentralised administrations (sectors and units)	Service providers (Senegalese consultancy group and Senegalese NGO)
Intervention by external service providers	Social and technical studies (including census and RAP*) and implementation	Administrative and financial assistance during implementation	Preliminary studies to define strategy / technical studies – site monitoring /RAP / *ex-post* evaluation	Preliminary studies (including RAP), implementation
Elected official involvement in steering the process	Poor	Poor	Good	Poor
Resident involvement in steering the process	None	None	Very poor	Good

	Nouakchott, Mauritania	Casablanca, Morocco	Kigali, Rwanda	Pikine, Senegal
Support mechanisms				
Compensation for families	Lump sum	Subsidy and assisted access to housing	Compensation for goods and people, including tenants, on a case-by-case basis	Compensation for goods and people, including tenants, on a case-by-case basis
Resettlement support measures	Flat-rate compensation, public allocations, administrative assistance, help with move for vulnerable displaced persons	Administrative and financial assistance	Compensation	Assistance with rehousing and move
Information strategy	Poor	Average	Poor	Good
Investment programme	Roads, services and basic amenities	Roads, services and basic amenities	Area opened up and serviced, public spaces, some basic amenities	Area opened up and serviced, rainwater management, public amenities, commercial and recreational centres
Land regularisation programme	Yes	Only for displaced households	Not as part of the project, but within the framework of a national land regularisation policy	Yes
Programme of access to employment	No	No	Yes (paving works)	Yes, with the public works implementation agency AGETIP
Post-operational support measures	Twize Programme until 2008	No. Mechanism being planned	No	Support for those engaged in income-generating activities in the original settlement

Annex 2 – Abbreviations and acronyms

ADS	Social development agency
ADU	Nouakchott urban development agency
AFD	French Development Agency
APIX	Agency responsible for promoting investment and major works
ASP	Social support
ASSETIP	Public works agency
CAC	Allocation and compensation commission
CWS	Cities without Slums Programme
EIG	Economic interest group
FORREF	Land Restructuring and Regularisation Fund
HSF	Housing Solidarity Fund
IDA	International Development Association (World Bank)
MHUAE	Ministry of Housing, Urban Development and Spatial Planning
Mininfra	Ministry of Infrastructure
MRO	Ouguiyas (Mauritanian currency)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OP	Operational Policy
PAP	People affected by the project
PARHIB	Slum clearance support programme
PIGU	Urban infrastructure and management project
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
UDP	Urban development programme
RHI	Insecure housing or slum clearance
SDI	Slum/Shack Dwellers International
SEH	State Secretariat for Housing
SMIC	Guaranteed minimum wage
UCP	Project coordination unit

Building Cities for All
Lessons from Four African Experiences

Nearly 500 million Africans currently live in slums. Urban operations are one of the main tools for improving living conditions in informal settlements, where land tenure, housing, development and services largely function outside any official system. While progress has undoubtedly been made over the last decade, these operations have had mixed social, economic, urban and environmental impacts.

Crosscutting analysis of four experiences in Mauritania, Morocco, Rwanda and Senegal is used to highlight some of the problems associated with the design, implementation and monitoring of operations to improve or restructure informal settlements. Particular attention is paid to social assistance, which is an aspect of these initiatives that tends to be ignored.

This paper was written for the designers, decision-makers and agencies involved in these operations, to help them ask relevant questions, understand the issues that they raise and thus deliver better services. In short, its objective is to contribute to more inclusive urban policies and practices and greater progress in building cities for all types of resident in every kind of neighbourhood.

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Tel.: 33 (0)1 70 91 92 00 - Fax: 33 (0)1 70 91 92 01
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ISBN: 978-2-86844-286-4
ISSN: 1775-741 X